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ABSTRACT
This study constitutes an attempt to analyse the
impact of privatisation upon an organisation. The
literature on privatisation suggests that one aspect of
the process is the creation of new organisational form.
In particular, it is believed that the influence of
accounting may increase with the introduction of a new
commercial ethos. The study traces this change in a
privatised Malaysian Telecommunication Company, using
Laughlin's model (1991), and Greenwood and Hinnings'
(1988) work on organisational tracks to provide a
theoretical framework. The research was carried out as a
explanatory case study, using the interpretative
approach.
Information was obtained from documents and from
interviews, during the course of four visits to Malaysia,
including a three-month attachment to the organisation.
To the best of the researcher's knowledge, this is
the first such study to be conducted on a public sector
organisation in a developing country.
The findings of the study may be summarized as
follows:
(1) Accounting emerged as visible in the
organisation, with elements of the accounting system
increasingly prevailing in the design archetype, with a
new emphasis on planning, budgeting, responsibility
accounting, accountability, and performance appraisal.
I
(ii) At the same time, accounting was not able to
penetrate into the first level, i.e. the values and
beliefs, of the interpretative model, leaving the
organisation in a 'schizoid' position (Greenwood and
Hinnings, 1988) i.e. tension between the engineering and
accounting systems. Colonization change has not taken
place, as engineering is reemerging in the organisation
because of inherited values, rapid technological
advancement of the industry and increasing demand for
telecommunication services. The assimilation of financial
and commercial values appears to be limited, largely
confined to fundamental planning.
In addition to shedding light on the accounting and
organisational consequences of privatisation, this
research suggests that organisational change should be
examined more from the process point of view, as it was
found that there are interconnections or interrelations
between the first, second and third phases of disturbance
to the organisation. Moreover, accounting can no longer
be studied in isolation, as it is influenced by the
economic, organisational and political context. Finally,
the study has assisted in the development of Laughlin's
skeletal model.
II
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CHAPTER ONE
Aims and Methodology of the Study
1.1 Introduction
Since the 1980's privatisation has become a popular
policy throughout the world, replacing the public
enterprise boom of 1960's and early 1970's. Influenced by
Reaganism-Thatcherism and the Chicago School, most
governments in the world are either selling off publicly-
owned assets or are about to do so (The Economist, 1985).
There are various definitions of the term
'privatisation' but fundamentally it is a transfer of
public assets to private firms or individuals (Thiemeyer,
1986) leading to a reduction in the activities of the
public sector.
Malaysia is also following this policy, due to the
government's realisation that public expenditure has
became too high and the public sector too large. This
policy was also expected to assist in improving standards
of efficiency and service, thereby contributing to a more
rapid growth of the country as a whole (Little et al,
1989).
For the government, the fiscal impact of
privatisation includes a reduction in government
1
expenditure through the sale of government assets,
reduction in the number of government employees as these
employees join the privatised organisation and a
reduction in other related expenses.
The impact of privatisation has been substantial.
Exposure to the discipline of market forces has led to
increased measures of efficiency for the enterprises
concerned (Hemming and Mansoor, 1988). Other impacts
include reduced political interference, changes in
property rights, liberalisation so as to foster
competition and new roles for regulators of the
industries concerned.
As was commented by Lapsley (1993, p. 1):
"The process of privatisation has impacted not
only on the structure of economies but also by
the creation of new organisational form".
It is on this area of new organisational form that
this research is concerned. In particular because it is
believed that accounting can become more influential in
the organisation, with the introduction of a new ethos
along commercial and financial lines.
However, whilst privatisation has caused some
organisations to make fundamental changes in their
direction and objectives, others have undergone only
cosmetic change, and yet others may be in a state of
inertia or rebuttal (Laughlin, 1991).
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How, then, do we trace the processes of change that
are taking place in the organisation as a result of the
impact of privatisation?
This thesis attempts to answer this question by
examining one particular organisation, a
telecommunication company, in a developing country,
Malaysia. The organisation has been transformed from a
government Department to a public limited company as a
result of privatisation.
The choice of organisation as the focus of study was
influenced by a number of factors. One such factor is the
economic growth of recent decades, whereby the country
has been transformed from an agro-based developing
country into an industrially-based economy, with its
overall Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increasing by more
than eight percent per annum from 1988-1992 (Financial
Times (U.K.), August 31st 1993). One reason for this
favorable economic growth was the industrialisation
policy adopted by the government in the 1970s and 1980s,
in accordance with which many incentives were introduced
to encourage foreign investors, for example tax holidays,
pioneer status etc. This led to an influx of foreign
investors coming into the country, especially in the
electronics-related sectors, where it increases from
M$959 Million in 1985 (Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991, p.135)
to M$29,800 Million in 1990 (FEER, 6th Feb 1992 p.38). To
attract these foreign investors, proper infrastructure
3
and services were needed, one of the most important being
the telecommunication services.
Telecommunication services have been run by state-
owned Departments in a monopolistic environment in most
countries, including Malaysia. But because of rapid
technological advancement and the linkage to computers
and information systems, additional funds were needed to
expand and improve the services, and it became necessary
to consider alternative policies for its
telecommunication services. When the privatisation policy
was adopted officially by the Malaysian government in
1983, it was decided that the state-owned
telecommunication Department would be the first
government Department to be privatised. With the limited
funds available and with the drive towards
industrialisation through participation of foreign
investors, it was felt that the participation of the
private sector in this industry would speed up the
expansion of the telecommunication services and
contribute to development in Malaysia as a whole. It was
also believed by the government that the organisation
would be injected with a new ethos of initiative,
efficiency and entrepreneurship.
It is to explore the impact of this transformation
that the Telecommunication Department in Malaysia was
chosen by the researcher. In addition, the research was
facilitated by the researcher's Malaysian origin, and
4
personal experiences of the organisation in question, as
will be explained later in this chapter.
1.2 The Objective of the Research
The particular objective of the research is to study
the impact of privatisation on the accounting system of a
public sector organisation in Malaysia which has been
transformed into a public listed company. The study
focuses on accounting from an organisational point of
view. In particular, the study aims to contribute to an
understanding of forces that either influence accounting
change or help to shape the different forms that
accounting can take (Hopwood, 1983, pg 288). As was said
by Broadbent & Guthrie, 1992,
"The changes have, therefore, redefined the
'public sector' and have disturbed the cultural
orientations and the perceptions of those
involved in the various organisations as to
'what they are about'. Organisations once
geared towards the production of a service now
often have to answer to 'profit' elements as
well. These developments have given increased
standing to costs and to new systems and
symbols of accountability. New accounting
visibilities have been created. The changes
can, therefore, be argued to have strong links
to accounting and an interest in them by
accounting researchers (too few in number to
date) is not suprising" (p. 4).
Only limited research has been done on examining
accounting from an organisational point of view in the
developed world (Broadbent & Guthrie, 1992) and none (to
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the best of the researcher's knowledge) for a public
sector organisation in a developing country.
The research uses an interpretative approach
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Denzin, 1983) and explanatory
case study approach (Yin 1989, Scapens 1990), using the
Laughlin model (1991) to provide a theoretical framework.
Specifically, it looks at the following:
(i) How did the changes occur, from the public
sector days up until the present ?
(ii) Why did the changes take place ?
(iii) What were the consequences and trends
that emerged as a result of these changes?
(iv) What was the typology of organisational
change: rebuttal, reorientation, coloriisation
or evolution (Laughlin, 1991)?
(v) Do any differences exist compared to the
features of the Laughlin model, and extensions
to the model? If so, why?
1.3 Research Methodology
1.3.1 The research method used in the thesis
The research method used is a case study approach.
Specifically, utilizing an explanatory case study (Yin
1984, Scapens 1990), it aims to explain the reasons why
particular types of accounting system existed and were in
practice under the different types of environmental
influences (which this study, following Laughlin (1991),
refers to as disturbances). The models of Laughlin (1991)
6
and Greenwood and Hinnings (1988) are adopted as the
referential analytical framework, and serve as guides to
the subject: to highlight areas of significance for
discussion; to make possible understanding and
explanation of the reasons for the changes that took
place; and to map the organisational tracks and movements
of the organisation, arising from the disturbances that
occurred (These models, and the rationale for their use,
are discussed in a later chapter). The case study
concentrates on one organisation in a developing country,
Malaysia, as a single unit of analysis (Scapens 1990).
This organisation has undergone the processes of change
through privatisation.
However, several other reasons led to the adoption
of a case study approach in this research. The first is
related to the topic itself, which concentrates on the
accounting system and change that took place as a result
of privatisation. To study the processes of change in an
organisation, the approach is to focus in depth on
understanding the content, context and process of
organisational change (Pettigrew, 1987). In this respect,
as explained below, the data collection framework was
based on Pettigrew's framework (1987).
The second reason is related to the use of
Laughlin's model (1991) as the analytical framework for
this study. As Laughlin (1991), said,
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"These models are intentionally embryonic and
skeletal, requiring detailed case studies to
amplify their nature" (page 209).
The thesis is, therefore, in part intended to assist in
the development of Laughlin model.
Thirdly, the study focuses on the influence of the
accounting system throughout the organisation, in
relation to three phases of disturbance that affected the
particular organisation under study. And it was felt that
the case study approach was particularly appropriate in
such a process-dependent setting.
Finally, as mentioned earlier, too few cased-based
studies have been conducted on public sector
organisations, viewing accounting from the organisational
point of view (Broadbent & Guthrie, 1992).
1.3.2 The Location of Research
The empirical study was carried out at a Company
(formerly a government Department) known as Telekom
Malaysia (hereafter referred to as Jabatan Talikoin
Malaysia (JTM) translated as Department of
Telecommunication, Malaysia, for the period before
privatisation; and Syarikat Talikom Malaysia (STh)
translated as Telecommunication Company of Malaysia since
privatisation). The organisation was privatised on
1.1.1987, being the first government Department to be
transformed after the government announced its
privatisation policy in the early 1980's.
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Initially, STM was not receptive to the idea of such
work being undertaken by the researcher, as it would
involve the use of confidential and potentially sensitive
information about the company's performance. However,
after protracted correspondence, negotiations and a
letter addressed directly to the Executive Chairman, the
researcher was granted official approval for an
industrial attachment in the organisation for the purpose
of carrying out the research work. The attachment was for
a period of four to six months over a period of three
years.
The choice of the object of the case study, was
influenced by the following considerations:
A single organisation was studied because the
researcher was interested to explore intensively the
effects of privatisation on the accounting system of an
organisation, from an organisational point of view,
especially as few or no such studies have been conducted
in developing countries to date (Broadbent & Guthrie,
1992). This led to the decision to use the explanatory
case study approach (Scapens 1991, Yin 1989) and the
interpretative method. Review of literature on studies
from the organisational point of view showed that many
accounting researchers have adopted this methodology
successfully, including Dent (1991), Ansari and Bell
(1991), Hopwood (1987), Berry et al (1985), Covaleski and
Dirsmith (1983, 1986), and Boland and Pondy (1983).
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This particular organisation was selected because it
is a significant organisation with a total staff of
21,358 (in 1979), 27,707 (in 1982), and 29,577 (in 1992)
(Annual Report of JTM 1979 and 1982, and STh 1992) and
has been in existence since 1957. With this strength in
staff size, it is is possible to identify clearly various
changes that took place with the three levels of
disturbance in the management set-up and overall
responsibility areas.
Yet another reason for choosing this organisation
was the fact that the telecommunication industry is
undergoing a period of rapid change, in Malaysia as well
as around the world in general, as will be seen in the
Chapter Four. Along with this change caine the government
privatisation policy, which required the organisation to
undergo transformational change. This reinforces the
interest in studying how external disturbances affect the
organisation and in turn affect the accounting system,
and the budgeting system in particular, on which the
study concentrates.
Another reason for choosing the organisation
concerned was the fact that since it was the first
government Department in the country to be privatised,
knowledge gained from research on this topic may be
useful for further privatisation implementation in the
country of the researcher.
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1.3.3 The Researcher And His Relationship To
The Object of Research
The researcher has been exposed to the organisation
concerned, i.e JTM/STM, from the early 1980s.
From 1982 to 1985, the researcher was supervising
students from the Department of Accounting, Mara
Institute of Technology, Malaysia, on industrial
attachment at the accounting department of JTM,
undergoing fainiliarisation with the accounting system of
a government Department (at that time, JTN was still
under the government). This was in fulfilment of a
requirement that students preparing for the Advanced
Diploma in Accountancy must complete a six months
industrial attachment in a particular organisation.
Since some of the accounting and finance personnel
of JTM/STM were colleagues and students of the
researcher, when he carried out the investigation during
the three phases described later in this chapter in
Section 1.3.5, it was possible to obtain information and
evidence outside office hours, such as over lunch time or
during weekends, thus presenting a more balanced picture.
The researcher has maintained contact with some of these
people through correspondence and telephone,making it
possible to obtain additional information as and when
needed. This was an important element in making it
feasible to adopt the interpretative approach to analyse
the case study.
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Another important point to mention is the fact that
the researcher has had direct experience in a government
budgeting system, such as that practised by JTM. The
researcher held the post of course coordinator at Mara
Institute of Technology, Malaysia from January 1982- July
1984, and from August 1984 - August 1988 headed the
Department of Accountancy.
As course coordinator, the researcher was involved
in the preparation of the yearly budget for the course
for which he was responsible. Later, as a Head of
Department, which was a full cost centre with a student
population of about 1500 and 70 staff menthers
(administrative and academic), the researcher was
directly responsible for the departmental budget, which
involved the preparation of yearly and supplementary
budgets, the budget examination exercise for defence of
the departmental budget, budget allocation, monitoring
and controlling the departmental budget. Since the
organisation was a government Institute of Higher
Learning, the budgeting system practised was similar to
that of JTM.
This experience, together with that of supervising
students doing industrial attachment at the organisation
concerned and the contact with former students and peers
working in the accounting and finance department of
JTM/STM, enabled the researcher to more easily adjust to
the company culture and become familiar with its
workings. Furthermore, the selection of an organisation
12
in Malaysia, having a majority staff consisting of
Malays, (the same race as the researcher) made it easier
to become absorbed into the culture of the organisation
concerned. This facilitated information-gathering from
the line managers, in the sensitive areas where the
research took place.
1.3.4 The data collection framework
The method used in collecting data for the case
study was based largely on Pettigrew (1988). The outline
of the analytical approach to change is as shown in Table
1.1.
"Guiding such a view is a meta analytical
framework which contends that theoretically
sound and practically useful research on change
should involve the continous interplay between
ideas about the context of change, the process
of change, and the content of change together
with skill in regulating the relations between
the three" (Pettigrew et al, 1988, p.2).
Based on Pettigrew's framework (1988), the company
becomes the unit of analysis, with three levels of data
collected for analysis to explain the changes that took
place from the period 1971 to 1992, when three
disturbances were identified.
The first level of data is industry-level. The type
of data collected at this level relates to the
technological, economic and political changes that
influenced the organisation. The concept of public
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sector/public enterprise, private sector and
privatisation are discussed as they affect the
organisation. This is considered as an external context
(Pettigrew 1988) for change, disturbances in which affect
the organisation. The disturbances also contribute in
clarifying the reasons why change took place with respect
to the accounting system, in particular the budgeting
system of the organisation, when it was transformed from
a government-Department to a fully public listed company.
Second are Department/Company-level data. The type
of data collected at this level relates to the historical
development of the Department from the time of its
inception until it became a privatised company. The
organisational structure of the Department/Company, its
emphasis and its mission/purpose under both environments
are also described and analysed. These data were taken
from the Department/Company archival records, financial
statements and other literature on the Department/Company
and also through personal interviews with relevant staff
of the organisation, especially those who had worked
under both environments, i.e. under JTM as well as STM.
The aim was to determine and identify organisational
changes, which would further explain and clarify the
changes that took place in the accounting system of the
Department as a result of its transformation.
The third and final level of data relates to the
accounting system of the entity (first as a Government
Department and later as a private company) and
14
specifically to analysis of the budgeting system.
Collection of this involved tracing the accounting and
budgeting system from its early days to the present form,
and the changes that took place with this transformation.
Data on this were collected from a variety of sources.
Four visits were made to the organisation concerned
during the four years of study. Interviews with key
personnel were carried out to gain insight into members'
perceptions, opinions and views of the accounting system,
particularly the budgeting system, of the organisation as
a government Department and later, as a commercial
entity. Observations were made of the accounting system
in practice under the new environment. It was also
possible to interview staff who had also worked in the
old organisation. Finally, existing and past records were
referred to, so as to capture data which were not
available in other ways.
1.3.5 Phases in carrying out the investigation.
The research was carried out over a period of four
years, during which the researcher returned to Malaysia
four times to obtain primary and secondary data, as well
as to be attached to the organisation for a period of
three months, and further visits were made at various
intervals during the four year period of study.
1.3.5.1 The initial phase
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The researcher went to Malaysia in February 1990
with the aim of finding a suitable organisation to carry
out the research work. He visited a number of
organisations, one of them being JTM/STM. In JTM/STM, the
researcher met former colleagues and students whom he
interviewed and with whom he held informal and
discussions on the organisation and their work. Through
these contacts, he met the General Manager - Corporate
Accounts, Executive Director (Operations) and three
Accountants and interviewed them also. The researcher
identified JTM/STM as an appropriate and interesting
subject of research because of the changes in the
company, especially with respect to accounting, the role
of which had expanded after privatisation. During this
visit, internal materials related to the topic such as
the accounting system of the organisation, the past and
present organisational structures, internal reports,
annual reports, consultants' and auditors' reports on the
feasibility of privatising the organisation and newspaper
cuttings on the topic, as well as on the topic of
privatisation in general, were collected and brought to
the U.K. for further use by the researcher.
1.3.5.2 The second phase
Since the research work involved confidential
information, the researcher wrote formally to the
Executive Chairman of STM to obtain his permission to
have access to the organisation and to be attached to it
for the purpose of research work. At the request of the
Senior General Manager (Administration), the researcher
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returned to Malaysia to discuss with STM personnel the
possibility of carrying out the research using the case
study method. In STM, he met the GM Corporate Accounts,
GM Corporate Finance and AGM Corporate Finance. This
second visit to Malaysia in spring 1991 led to the
researcher spending one and a half months in STM, during
which he studied the accounting system of the company as
a whole through interviews and discussion with the
accounting personnel. A total of 10 personnel from the
accounting and finance group was interviewed by the
researcher. It became apparent that it would be more
feasible to concentrate on one major area of change in
the financial and accounting system, as the accounting
and finance group was a substantial division within the
organisation and too large to study in toto.
Upon coming back to U.K. and after discussion with
the researcher's supervisor, it was agreed that the
researcher should concentrate his study on the budgeting
system, due to the apparent impact of change after
privatisation, referred to earlier. Laughlin's (1991)
model of accounting and orgarilsational change, which
concentrated on looking at accounting within the
organisational context, was found suitable for use,
together with that of Hinnings and Greenwood (1988), as
the analytical framework. The researcher met Professor
Richard Laughlin to discuss the use of his model.
Correspondence was also maintained with an Accountant in
the organisation, to make available further information
as required.
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1.3.5.3 The third phase
The researcher went back again to Malaysia in
October 1991 to do an intensive attachment at the company
for three months. Most of this time was spent
interviewing, observing and looking at the files and
records and concentrating on the budgeting system before
and after privatisation. The industrial attachment was
necessary to enable the researcher to become part of the
organisation (interview with Laughlin in October 1991) so
that data could be collected through casual conversations
and by simply "J3irig around" (Dent 1991).
During the JTM period, the Department was directly
under the federal government. Thus, the process, control
and monitoring of the budgeting system involved not only
JTM adniinistrators but also other central agencies like
the Federal Treasury Department, Economic Planning
Department and Implementation Coordinating Unit of the
Prime Minister's Department, Ministry of Post, Energy and
Telecommunication. Therefore, the researcher approached
these agencies to find out more about the related topics
during JTMs days. Interviews were held with the personnel
who were directly in charge of JTM as far as the budget
was concerned. Th number of persons interviewed from
other organisations in Malaysia is shown in Table 1.2.
With respect to the organisation itself, the
researcher was able to interview 27 participants (14
18
engineers, 10 from the accounting and finance group at
both the HQ and Central Region and three from other
divisions in the organisation) who were directly
involved, in one way or another, in the budgeting system,
during JTM days, under STM, or both. As shown in Tables
1.3, 1.4 and 1.5, the interviews were conducted at
various levels within the organisation, i.e. from the top
management level to the non-executive level. This was
important to an understanding of why disturbances
effected changes in the budgeting of the organisation,
since various levels of personnel were involved. As was
said by Scapen (1990),
"if accounting researchers want to exploit the
full potential of case study methods to
understand management accounting, they must be
prepared to study accounting practices at
various levels within the organisation and the
relationship between the various groups of
managers" (page 278).
The interviews made use of a semi-structured
approach, the structured component of which served as a
guideline for consistency and cross-referencing (The
interview guidelines is shown in Appendix 1 ). The
researcher was allowed complete freedom to choose whom to
interview. Interviews averaged from one to two hours in
length and were spread over the three months period. Most
were tape recorded and transcribed later. Informal and
casual discussions were held at lunch times and weekends,
especially with the researcher's peers and former
students, in order to obtain a clearer picture of the
situation. Thus, the evidence was validated by adopting a
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variety of approaches; this process is known as
triangulation (Denzin, 1970).
Other than the above, evidence was also collected
from the Department files of records of JTM Budget
Committee Meetings and other related files, classified
documents such as Business Plans, Monthly Management
Reports and other relevant reports. In assessing and
analysing the accounting systems of JTM, the researcher
was able to obtain the detailed report made by the
Consultant appointed by the government to study the
feasibility of privatising the Department in 1982. The
study was carried out jointly by Kleinwort, Benson
Limited, Arab-Malaysia Merchant Bank Berhad, and a local
auditing firm, Hanafiah Raslan & Mohamad. The report was
completed in late 1984 and was published on 28th December
1984. Other information obtained was from the Annual
Reports of JTM and STM, articles and newspaper cuttings,
both local and international, and also central government
agencies' reports.
Thus the process of triangulation took place
through:- the interpretative approach, where various
documents were used as mentioned above and semi-
structured interviewing, which is an open-ended approach,
was carried out; and a conventional empirical approach
was also partially used, whereby outcome evidence was
used to validate the other approaches.
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While engaged on the industrial attachment at STM
with the Laughlin analytical framework in mind, the
researcher found that commercial and financial influences
were being felt not only in budgeting, but also in
marketing and customer services, a division mainly
managed by engineers who were formerly from JTM.
Therefore, the researcher interviewed some of the
engineers working in this division to find out more about
the changes that took place with privatisation.
1.3.5.4 The fourth and final phase
The researcher went back again to Malaysia in May
1993 to collect further evidence on the organisation
under study for a period of three months. Most of the
time was spent on observing and holding in-depth
interviews with the engineers and accountants, using a
structured interview schedule. A total of 31 participants
(25 engineers, four accountants and two from other
division in the organisation) were interviewed during
this period of stay. The purpose of the interviews was to
obtain evidence on any change in the orientation of
values and beliefs of the engineers from engineering
criteria to commercial and financial criteria as a result
of the processes of organisational change taking place
from the JTM days to the post privatised era. In looking
for this evidence, the Capital Works Programme of the
Local Network Development in the Central Region was taken
as an example, concentrating on the Capital Projects done
by the engineers in the local network areas in planning
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for new exchanges and following through the capital
investment approach using Pike and Dobbins (1986) to
trace the dynamics of the changes that took place from
JTM5 days up to the post-privatised era.
1.3.6. Data Analysis
In analysing the data collected for the research
work, Laughlin's model (1991) was used as an analytical
framework. The study analysed changes in the accounting
system longitudinally, i.e. from 1971 to the present.
However, the main focus was to look at changes in the
budgeting system.
Most of the data from the JTM period were obtained
from former staff of JTM or through interviews with these
personnel. Photocopies were made of any document found to
be useful for analysis of the research study. Most data
relevant to the research during STN's time were
photocopied and brought back to the U.K.
With respect to interviews conducted, most of the
interviews were recorded on a tape, then transcribed
manually by the researcher himself, to ensure that all
information obtained was recorded and transcribed for the
research analysis. A different file was kept for each
interview. However, a few personnel did not want their
interviews to be taped. For these cases, handwritten
notes were taken during interviews and transcribed
afterwards.
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Each interview question was analysed separately and
a sununary of the responses on each question was produced
so as to look for pattern of answers and to see whether
any trends emerged. Cross-referencing of notes was made
to look for emerging trends and the flow of information
taking place.
As mentioned earlier, in analysing these data,
Laughlin's model (1991) and Hinnings and Greenwood's
(1988) movement of tracks were used as guides to study
the pattern of changes that took place and to establish
the emerging trends.
1.3.7 Overall validity and reliability of the
research.
As stated earlier, the study was conducted with the
aim of understanding the changes in the accounting system
arising out of privatisation of a government Department
to a public listed company. The study concentrates on
looking at accounting from the organisational point of
view, trying to understand and analyse the changes that
took place in an organisation as a result of different
levels of disturbances (Laughlin, 1991).
In undertaking this study, the case study approach
seemed to be the best available option, as detailed
analysis could be performed. The study not only describes
the changes taking place but also seeks to explain why
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these changes happened. It does not analyse the changes
in a snapshot manner, but rather studies them
longitudinally, i.e. through the various levels of
disturbance which affected the organisation (the same
sort of study done by writers like Pettigrew, Dent,
Laughlin etc). By analysing the processes of change, the
researcher was able to document the unfolding of certain
significant events and to establish the trends taking
place.
This case study is not intended as the first step in
a scientific sampling process, but as an aid to
understanding, in line with the interpretative approach
taken.
1.4 Limitations of the research
The researcher faced a number of constraints during
the process of undertaking this research:-
(a) Certain information/data are not available,
especially for the JTM period. For example, actual excess
cable (ECP) pair figures for the Central Region are not
available. However, the number of ECP for JTM as a whole
are available from 1975 to 1986 in the annual report.
Thus comparison was made based on these figures.
(b) Most of the files for JTM could not be traced,
since as soon as the organisation was privatised. New
files were opened and the old files removed. Discussion
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with certain officials revealed that although most of the
old files had been stored rather than destroyed, because
they had been moved from one place to another, they had
been misplaced. Some of the files, however, had been
given to the National Archives, and the researcher was
able, as a result, to obtain access to a few files
pertaining to the research. In the absence of detailed
documented figures, the researcher had to rely on
information/data given during indepth interview, and
lastly,
(c) some information, such as numbers of waiters for
STM as a whole and certain other information , could not
be obtained because of the company policy of
confidentiality.
1.5 Layout of the Thesis
The thesis is organised into eight chapters.
Chapter One constitutes an introduction discussing
the background, objectives, methodology and limitations
of the study.
Chapter Two reviews and describes the roles of
Public Sector / Public Enterprises as compared with those
of the Private Sector, with particular reference to the
financial and accounting aspects. These issues are
reviewed both in general terms, and as related
specifically to Malaysia. The concept'f —pri atisation,
25
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the aims of privatisation policy and the privatisations
which took place in Malaysia under the New Economic
Policy are then discussed.
Chapter Three reviews the literature on accounting
and organisational change. The analytical framework used
in this research is presented and explained.
Chapter	 Four	 reviews	 and	 describes	 the
Telecommunication industry in general, and in particular,
the Telecommunication industry in Malaysia. The chapter
presents an overview of the history of the organisation
under study, from its formation up to the present stage.
The next three chapters concentrate on the empirical
research. Chapter Five discusses the processes of change
taking place out of three phases of disturbance. The
chapter then discusses the role of accounting and finance
before and after privatisation, focusing especially on
the changes that took place as a result of the third
phase of disturbance.
Chapter Six describes and discusses the role of the
budgeting system before and after privatisation, as a
detailed illustration of where evidence of organisational
change may be found.
Chapter Seven analyses the dynamics of change during
the three phases of disturbance in the organisation
studied, with particular reference to the capital
26
budgeting system, focusing on the Local Network
Development unit at Central Region.
Chapter Eight presents an analysis of the outcomes
of the work directly related to the engineers on the
capital budgeting system of the Local network Development
unit at Central Region in order to show the extent to
which changes in values and beliefs took place among the
engineers. The findings are linked to Laughlin's model
and the outcome of the research explained in detail by
reference to the model used.
Chapter Nine summarises the findings and relates the
findings of the present research to those of previous
research work in the field.
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CHAPTER TWO
Public Sector/Public Enterprise, Private Sector
and Privatisation; and their Relations
2.1 Introduction
Since the company under study began as a public
sector enterprise, and was subsequently privatised, it
would be helpful to have some understanding of the nature
of each type of enterprise, of the rationale for
privatisation, and its impact. This chapter accordingly
discusses these issues, both in general terms and with
specific relation to the Malaysian context. This is
intended to shed light on the JTM and STM environment,
and on the organisational culture prevailing at each
stage.
The chapter begins by comparing the public and
private sectors:- in general; from a management
perspective; and from a financial accounting and
reporting, and management accounting perspective. The
characteristics of each sector are discussed and the
social, economic and political differences between them
analysed, to provide a clear basis for the identification
of changes, especially in the accounting system, that
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take place when an entity shifts from being a public
sector/public enterprise to a public listed company.
Public enterprises in Malaysia can be classified as
follows: a) government departments b) public corporations
normally referred to as statutory bodies, and c)
government companies. The Malaysian Telecommunications
Department (JTM) before privatisation came into the first
category. To facilitate understanding of JTM's role at
this time, this chapter discusses public enterprise in
general and specifically in the context of the Malaysian
environment. The reasons for their formation, their
failure to achieve objectives, and the problems created
for governments as a result, are explored.
One method governments have adopted to overcome the
problems of the public enterprises was privatisation. The
following section accordingly looks at privatisation in
general, defining it, explaining its rationale and
objectives and looking at the arguments for and against
privatisation. The chapter goes on to focus specifically
on privatisation in Malaysia, looking at forms of
privatisation, constraints and problems, and stages of
privatisation. Finally, the impact of privatisation is
discussed, particularly the increased importance of
accounting within the organisation and its influences on
the overall organisational structure, which will be
explored in depth in later chapters of this study.
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2.2 Differences between Public and Private Sector -
General and Management Perspectives
Since the present study is concerned with
privatisation and the change from a public enterprise to
a private sector enterprise, this section reviews studies
related to the differences between the public and private
sectors.
Drucker (1973), in support of his view that the
public sector enterprise is not very different from the
business enterprise, argues that,
"the public enterprise faces similar if not
precisely the same challenges in seeking to
make work productive. It does not differ
significantly from a business in its social
responsibility, nor does the public enterprise
differ very much from the business enterprise
in respect to the managers' work and job, in
respect to the organisational design and
structure to top management. Internally the
differences tend to be differences in
terminology rather than substance" (p. 45).
According to Drucker (1973), the only significant
difference between the public and private sector
enterprise is their source of finance. Businesses are
paid to satisfy the customer; they are only paid if they
produce what the customer wants and what he is prepared
to purchase. Satisfaction of the customer is therefore
the basis of performance and results in business. In
contrast, public sector entities are paid out of budget
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allocation; their sources of revenue are not tied to what
they achieve. As a result, performance in the public
sector is judged on the ability to maintain or increase
one's budget allocations.
Other writers, such as Rainey, Backoff and Levive
(1976) disagree with Drucker. In reviewing studies on the
differences between public and private sector
organisations in the United States , Rainey, Backoff and
Levive (1976) found that several authors agreed on the
differences rather than siiniliarities between public and
private enterprises. These differences relate to factors
such as environment, organisation-environment interaction
and internal structures and processes.
With respect to environmental factors, differences
exist in the degree of market exposure, legal and formal
constraints and political influences. The public sector
is seen to be less exposed to market forces, leading to
less incentive to reduce costs, operate efficiently and
to perform effectively. This may lead to less allocative
efficiency, lower availability of market indicators and
information such as monthly / quarterly management
reports.
As for administrative procedures and spheres of
operations, the public sector is seen to have more
constraints, as administrators have little or no
flexibility in making choices on procedures and
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operational methods. The public organisation is seen to
have a greater tendency to multiply formal specifications
and controls. There are also more external sources of
formal influence where these sources of influence are
fragmented. Politically, a public organisation is seen to
have greater need for support of constituencies and have
greater diversity and intensity in respect of external
informal influences on decision-making.
With respect to organisation-environment
interactions, the studies reviewed by Rainey, Backoff and
Levive found that the services rendered by the public
sector are closely monitored. Public servants performed
their services with more fairness, responsiveness,
accountability and honesty. With respect to coerciveness,
the study found that the public sector was more likely
than the private sector to be subject to coercive powers
from the government.
With respect to internal structures and processes,
the study found great differences exist between public
and private sectors. The public sector is seen to have
multiple and diverse objectives and evaluation and
decision criteria, leading to vagueness and intangibility
of objectives. Further, the studies found that the goals
in the public sector tend to conflict with each other and
that more trade-of fs exist. With respect to authority
relations and the role of the administrator, public
officers were found to have less autonomy and flexibility
37
in decision-making and weaker and more fragmented
authority over subordinates, since subordinates can
bypass them and appeal to alternative authorities. Added
to that are the constraints of the merit system available
in the public sector. Public officers were also found to
have greater reluctance to delegate authority, more
levels of review and greater use of formal regulations.
This could be because of difficulties in supervision and
delegation and also because of the vagueness and
intangibility of objectives and evaluation and decision
criteria. The public sector officer is expected to make
politically and professionally sound decisions, whereas
private sector managers need be concerned only with the
professional implications of their decisions. This does
not mean that private sector managers are not concerned
with the political implications of their decisions, but
rather that a public officer must combine administrative
expertise with political adroitness (Stockfisch, 1972).
On organisational performance, the studies reviewed
by Rainey, Backoff and Levine found that public
organisations tend to be more cautious and rigid and less
innovative. Moreover, public officers have greater
difficulty in devising incentives for effective and
efficient performance and surprisingly lower valuation of
monetary incentives by the employees. Instead, the public
sector officers place more emphasis on non-monetary
rewards such as job security, involvement in important
affairs and 'power and glory'.
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In terms of personality, needs and values there was
some evidence that differences exist between the private
and public sectors. According to the studies reviewed,
public sector officers show lower work and need
satisfaction, lower organisational commitment, higher
need for achievement and lower need for affiliation.
Frankel and Manner (1980) found that public sector
managers are concerned about unemployment, social welfare
and equity and are less concerned than private sector
managers about the profitability of the economic
enterprise.
In the private sector, management is about doing the
thing right, since the profit motive is a clear, high-
level goal and the leadership has to consider customer
satisfaction. In achieving this, the management need to
look at product development and market research and to
consider the long term effects. In contrast, in the
public sector, aims are primarily political, with the
motive of getting reelected. Even though there is
professional training and experience, this does not
necessarily provide a guide as to the right thing to do.
Bank (1990) further stated that government
activities are concentrated where the market is non-
existent; hence, resource allocation cannot be driven
solely by efficiency, considerations, and cost-benefit
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analysis has to be carried out differently than in the
private sector.
2.3 Differences Between Public and Private Sector -
Financial Accounting and Reporting, and Management
Accounting
2.3.1 Nature of public sector accounting
Public sector accounting is different from
accounting as implemented by the private sector. Most
public sector entities are budget-financed, receiving
funds from the central government after the budget
examination. Public sector organisations are subject to
various rules and regulations from the central government
about matters such as the level of funding, pricing
policy, purchases of items, especially capital
expenditure items, and other factors which limit their
free market operations.
Since the public sectors are budget financed from
the central government, their powers are thus obtained
from the Parliament and their responsibilities are
ultimately to Parliament. However, according to Henley et
al (1989), below this authority lies a variety of
networks, both formal and informal, which influence the
way the public sector organisation works. These include
federal government ministers, civil servants, elected
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members of Parliament, the appointed board and other
pressure groups. Thus, the public sector organisation has
to a certain extent to be aware of the influence of these
groups of people, which could lead to changes in its
activities. From this one could also conclude that the
interested parties who use the accounting information in
the public sector are more numerous and diverse than
users in the private sector, since the latter include
only the shareholders, creditors and employees of the
organisation, whereas in the case of the public sector,
in addition to those already mentioned, are politicians,
taxpayers, electors and the service recipients (Glynn,
1987).
2.3.2 Objectives of public sector accounting
According to the Report of the Committee on Not-for-
Prof it organizations, 1972-73 quoted by Henke (1988,
p.93), the primary objectives of accounting in the public
sector organisation should be designed:
"1. To provide the information necessary for
faithful, efficient and economical management
of an operation and of the resources entrusted
to it. This objective relates to management
control.
2. To provide information to enable managers
to report on the discharge of their
responsibilities to administer faithfully and
effectively the programmes and use of the
resources under their direction; and to permit
all public officials to report to the public on
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the results of government operations and the
use of public funds. This objective relates to
accountability".
However, according to Henley et al (1989, p.9) the
the objectives and functions of public sector financial
reporting includes 'compliance and stewardship,
accountability and retrospective reporting, planning and
authorization information, viability, public relation and
source of facts and figures'.
Both the above statements of the objectives of the
public sector seem to emphasise management control and
accountability. The question then arises whether the
above objectives are being practised by public sector
organisations. From the studies done, most public sector
organisations do practise accountability, but they lack
systems of management control, especially with respect to
management accounting systems and reporting. Much of
management accounting in the public sector, has been
concentrated on the requirement of budget preparation and
control only (Pendlebury 1989).
2.3.3 Differences between public and private
sector accounting and reporting practices
The differences in the accounting and reporting
practices between the public and private sector lie in
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the fundamental differences in the economic, legal and
political environment of the entity (Ingram et al 1991).
From the economic point of view, a private sector
company is profit-oriented, and its operation lies in the
market and competitive environment. Thus costs, quality
of the products and profits are important factors to the
organisation, because this information is reported back
to the owners who have a vested interest in the
performance of the organisation and demand a satisfactory
rate of return on their investment.
In the case of the public sector, the economic
environment is totally different from that of the private
sector. The prices of goods and services are often set by
an authority which is beyond the control of the public
sector organisation. Thus the prices are not deteriitined
by the forces of supply and demand, as in the private
sector environment. Because of this, such enterprises do
not compete in a market of a competitive nature.
As was commented by Ingram et al (1991 p. 5),
"many of the unique features of governmental
and nonprofit accounting and reporting result
from the special needs these organizations have
for controlling resources and costs and for
providing accountability in the absence of
market forces".
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The public and private sector also differ in their
legal and political environments. In the case of the
public sector, authority to spend the budget comes from
the federal government and it comes with strings
attached, especially from a political point of view.
Usually, additional funds from outside can only be
obtained with legal constraints on their use. The rules
or laws as to authority for action are usually derived
from a political process. Accountability and reporting
practices are influenced by political demands, as
mentioned earlier, rather than the accounting information
being used to monitor the performance of the
organisation, as in the case of private sector
organisations. Thus, in government accounting and
reporting, the main purpose is to comply with laws,
regulations and political agendas, whereas in the private
sector, the purpose is to comply with the Companies Act
and shareholders'requirements. Henke (1988, p. 4) defined
public sector organisations' operating objectives as,
"to provide socially desirable services without
the intention of realizing a profit. Nonprofit
organizations have no ownership shares that can
be sold or traded by individuals and any excess
of revenues over expenses or expenditures is
used to enlarge the service capability of the
organization. They are financed, at least
partially, by taxes and/or contributions based
on some measure of ability to pay, and some or
all of their services are distributed on the
basis of need rather than effective demand for
them".
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In contrast, the private sector is driven by profit
objectives. Shares are transferable and traded in the
open market in the case of public limited companies.
profits made by the company are often shared by staff
through declaration of bonuses. Some are retained in
order to be used for the expansion of the company and
some are given to the shareholders in the form of
dividends.
2.3.4 Management Accounting
While both private and public sector organisations
are influenced by economic considerations, public sector
organisations must also consider social and political
factors. Thus according to Han (1991) management
accounting in the public sector should concentrate on the
three objectives of the value-for-money criterion:
economy, effectiveness and efficiency which he defines as
follows:
"Economy is concerned with obtaining and using
quality and least-cost input factors to yield
maximum results. Effectiveness refers to the
degree to which the set of predetermined
objectives is achieved i.e., reaching the goals
set. And efficiency is indicated by the
productivity ratio of input/output" (p. 7).
It is difficult to achieve these objectives. One way
to do so may be to use standards and budgets to compare
with the actual data, for both accounting and non-
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accounting information. However, in order to implement
this method successfully, the organisation needs to have
a sound accounting system and management information
system, in order to be able to produce reliable and
accurate management accounting reports. This will in turn
help the managers of the public sector organisation with
proper decision-making, planning and control of the
organisation. According to Anand (1988, p. 263-5),
management accounting reporting in the public sector
should	 possess	 the	 seven	 characteristics	 of
comprehensiveness, reliability, validity, 	 relevance,
output-relatedness,	 decision-integratedness	 and
timeliness. Han (1991) added four further properties:
acceptability, comparability, responsibility and
exceptionality. He further stressed that management
accounting in the public sector should provide an
adequate information flow in respect of direction, size,
frequency and quality. Size refers to the importance and
quantity of information; frequency refers to the speed of
flow and intervals within it; and quality refers to the
reliability and relevence of the information.
However, as yet, management accounting in the public
sector is being practised minimally and it is only from
the 1980s that government have looked at it seriously
(Pendlebury 1989). Public sector organisations,
especially in the developing countries, often do not
prepare management accounting reports. Where reports are
prepared, they are often insufficiently detailed and
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produced only once a year for the purpose of meeting the
external audit requirements and for statistical
requirements. This is because, as stated earlier in this
chapter, there is no proper guideline on monitoring and
performance measurement. Often, there are no posts for
management accountants in public sector organisations.
The role of the public sector accountant is custodianship
rather than management. The planning and monitoring of
the performance of the organisation is usually done by
non-accounting personnel.
In contrast, management accounting systems are
implemented fully in well-managed private sector
organisations. This is partly because the objectives of
private sector organisations are clearly and explicitly
expressed by the top management. Added to that is their
competitive environment, whereby performance is assessed
on profitability and the daily movement of the company
share price in the Stock Exchange, in the case of a
public listed company. A reliable management accounting
reporting system therefore becomes necessary to
facilitate measurement of each unit's performance within
the organisation.
2.4 Public Enterprise
Having discussed the differences between the public
and private sector in general and in management and
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financial accounting reporting, let us now discuss the
concept of public enterprises and why governments are
moving away from this approach to the concept of
privatisation. This discussion is important to the
present study since the organisation under study by the
researcher originally fell into the category of public
enterprise.
Public Enterprises have been established by
governments all over the world, whether they practise a
capitalist or socialist system of economy. Jones (1982)
defines the public enterprise as a hybrid organisation
which requires a multi-disciplinary perspective. As an
'enterprise' it sells its output and therefore performs
functions such as production, marketing and finance. As a
'public' organisation, it is owned and controlled by the
government or its representative. Thus it has to report
directly or indirectly to bureaucrats, politicians and
the public at large.
2.4.1	 Reasons	 for	 establising	 Public
Enterprises
The reasons why governments establish public
enterprises differ from country to country, according to
the political, economic and social situation. Abdul
Rahinan (1982) lists two main reasons why governments
establish such enterprises. The first is ideological;
through the establishment of these enterprises certain
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activities are brought under government control which
suits their concept of an economic system. The second
reason is pragmatic and dependent on situational
considerations, whereby the government establishes public
enterprises to facilitate economic development, defence,
security and strategic needs, to improve efficiency, and
for administrative, social and political reasons (Hashim,
1986).
2.4.2 Problems of managing Public Enterprises
Public Enterprises have many problems; not only
those related to the management of any organisation, but
some problems that are unique to themselves. These
problems include:
(1) Conflicting goals
Most public enterprises have dual roles to play,
which sometimes conflict with each other. The dual roles
are with respect to policy, where the organisation
depends on government, and in business management, where
it must play a role like that of a private sector
organisation (Hashiin, 1986). This was also commented by
Anastassopoulos (1984), where he highlighted that Public
Enterprises also tend to have several diverse goals to
pursue. Most common and yet always in conflict are the
socio-economic and financial goals.
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This dual role is problematic, since running the
organisation to meet government-imposed social, national
and economic objectives, may conflict with the practices
and objectives of a commercial entity. This leads to the
organisation having unclear objectives and directions
when compared to the private sector.
(ii) Cultural differences between managers of
public enterprise and the officers of the
ministries concerned
The second problem relates to the cultural
differences that exist between the managers of the public
enterprises and the controllers of the ministries
concerned. Since their motivations and behaviour patterns
differ, according to the characteristics of their work,
differences exist between the two which cause the
management of public sector to become frustrated and
demotivated. This to a certain extent affects the
performance of public enterprises (Heath 1983).
(iii) Measuring performance of the Public Enterprise
Measuring the performance of the public enterprise
has been a problem because of the conflicting and diverse
roles it has to play. However, in the final analysis, the
amount of resources put into fulfilling these conflicting
roles needs to be justified and controlled by the
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government. Some believe that public enterprises should
be treated the same as those in the private sector, since
government regulations affect both sectors. Others
disagree, saying that the managers of public enterprises
have less power than their private counterparts,
especially with respect to resource allocation and choice
of strategy (Kingshott, 1975). Furthermore the public
enterprises are not subjected to pressure from the
stockmarket movement and their financing charges are
lower than those of the private sector, since loans are
being guaranteed by the government.
(iv) Regulation and control of Public Enterprises
Another problem faced by the public enterprise is
with respect to regulation and control. Being a public
enterprise, the organisation is given autonomy from the
government in running the organisation. However, at the
same time it must be accountable to the government for
its activities. The main problem here is to keep a
balance between autonomy and accountability. In recent
years, there has been constant government interference
through increased supervisory control and additional
regulations issued to the public enterprises. This has
indeed created an imbalance between autonomy and
accountability and has hampered the smooth running of the
organisation.
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2.4.3 Public Enterprises in Malaysia
Public Enterprises in Malaysia were established
during the colonial days and the early post-independence
period in the 1950s and 1960s in the agriculture, social
and physical infrastructure sectors. The main reason for
establishing these agencies was basically for the
development of the country.
However, the rate of establishment of Public
Enterprises increased tremendously in the early l970s as
a result of the implementation of the New Economic Policy
which was introduced to restructure the society and
correct the imbalance of the economy according to racial
composition. By establishing the Public Enterprises, the
government hoped to play an active role in the industry
and commerce sector.
According to Zakaria, A.H. (1984), there are three
types of organisation in Malaysia that fall under the
definition of public enterprise. They are:
(1) Enterprises managed by government
departments which are required by law to keep
their accounts on commercial lines, like
telecommunications and civil aviation;
(ii) Public corporations or statutory bodies
established under the different statutes both
at federal and state levels; and
(iii) Government companies established under
the Companies Act 1965, such as Malaysian
Airline System.
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The distinction between the three types is
important, since private sector orientation and work
values already exist in types (ii) and (iii), and it
might be expected, therefore, that privatisation of these
categories would present fewer problems of cultural
adjustment than privatisation of category (i)
organisations. It is this category (i) into which the
company under study fell before privatisation.
2.4.3.1 Relationship of Public Enterprise with
government's organisation
Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between the Public
Enterprise and the government's organisation. In order to
co-ordinate, monitor and evaluate the activities and
performances of the Public Enterprises, each enterprise
is answerable to a particular ministry. Telecommunication
Department, for example, used to report to the Ministry
of Telecommunication, Post and Works.
The Chief Executive Officer or Director-General was
usually appointed from the civil service, but in
technical Departments such as the Telecommunication
Department, the appointment might be made from personnel
within the organisation, by the ministry concerned. The
Chairman and between six to twelve of the board members
were also appointed by the ministry. These board members
were usually selected from within the government
structure, such as representatives of relevant ministries
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or organisations. However, since the early part of 1980s,
there was a slight change in the appointment system, with
a few professionals from the private sector being
appointed to the board. Nonetheless, overall, the
government thinking and approach still dominated the
board meeting, since the majority of its members were
government representatives. With this approach, the
government, through its representatives, was well
informed about the activities of the public enterprises.
2.4.3.2 Reasons for the poor performance of
Public Enterprises in developing countries,
including Malaysia.
Aylen (1987) attributes the poor performance of most
government enterprises in developing countries when
compared to the private sector to the fact that they
follow the Bureaucratic Model rather than the Market
Model (see Table 2.1). As was stated by Aylen (1987,
p.16):
"It is not ownership but rather market
environment, firm organisation and management
incentives which determine the performance of
companies".
However the market model does not exist in the case
of public enterprises in developing countries, as shown
in Table 2.1.
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Clear commercial
and social
objectives.
Operating independence
Performance monitored
by outputs.
TABLE 2.1 : Public Enterprises in Developing
Countries
MARKET MODEL
	 BUREAUCRATIC MODEL
Financial autonomy
	 Finances overlap with
with emphasis on
	 budget. Losses accepted
profitability,	 for social reasons.
Confusion about objectives
and political interference
in decisions.
Close scrutiny of input
decisions (employment,
investment) and attention
to politically sensitive
outputs (prices). Lack of
concern with overall
enterprise efficiency.
Potential competition	 Tariff barriers and import
from domestic rivals
	 licencing to limit
and imports.	 competition. Legal restri-
ctions prevent market
entry by potential
domestic competitors.
Source: Aylen, Lloyds Bank Review, Jan, 1987
p. 19.
According to Puthucheary (1984), the reasons why the
public enterprises' performance in Malaysia is
unimpressive are: -
(1) There is a general pattern that most of the
public enterprises operate under high gearing ratios.
This is due to the fact that most public enterprises
receive their funds in the form of loans either from the
federal government or from an international agency such
as the World Bank. In addition, the public enterprises
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easily obtain loans from local commercial banks, which
are owned by the government. There is a close link
between the two parties, since both are owned by the
government. Thus, even though the interest rate on these
loans taken by the public enterprises is low, because the
amounts borrowed are so great, the result is high
financial expenses which could lead to reduced profits,
or even losses for some public enterprises.
(2) There is no proper planning and control with
respect to the evaluation of proposed capital investment.
The approval of the capital investment is made without
proper guidelines as to its viability. No detailed study
as to the returns on the capital investment are made.
There is also an absence of expertise and experience
available. In short, most capital investment projects are
launched without adequate pre-investment studies as to
their viability, and with a lack of managerial and
technical know-how.
(3) The public enterprise managers seem not to know
what they are expected to do and do not know how to
measure their performance, since there are no proper
guidelines and monitoring on this matter. Rajandrain
(1990) claims that the failure of some Public Enterprises
in Malaysia is due to diffusion of controlling authority,
weak financial discipline, and casual and indifferent
decision-making. He goes on to say that managers in these
enterprises have too many bosses to report to, including
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the board of directors, the parent company, the
controlling department or statutory body or ministry, and
central agencies such as the Treasury and Economic
Planning Unit of the Prime Minister's Department. In many
cases, the board of directors is found to be not
effective, being influenced by one strong personality and
autocratic in character. In other cases, there is a
general lack of experience and professionalism.
As a result of the above mentioned points, coupled
with the conflicting roles of public enterprise, it is
not surprising that the performance of these public
enterprises is unimpressive. Further, the lack of systems
of control and monitoring, and guidelines as to what they
are expected to do and methods of performance
measurement, leads to loose accountability within the
organisation. A tremendous amount of discretionary power
is given to managers, which sometimes leads to misuse of
power for personal gain (Puthucheary, 1984).
Some public enterprises blame the social role that
they are expected to play, especially when the
investments they undertake fail to realise the expected
profits or to meet the expected target date for services
to be rendered to the general public. According to
Puthucheary, (1984),
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" In such cases one usually finds that the
financial costs involved are too high to
justify the social benefits."
From the above discussion, we can see that the role
of public enterprises in trying to achieve both social
and profit objectives has to a certain extent resulted in
an unsatisfactory outcome for the government. For this
reason, governments all over the world are reviewing the
role of the public enterprises and are looking for
alternatives. One popular alternative advocated by
various governments is privatisation, that is the
transfer of some of the activities which are run by the
government through the transfer of a public enterprise to
the private sector. This may be done by forming
government owned companies (i.e. through corporatisation)
and then privatising the entity by way of various methods
such as contracting-out, buy-out, or selling some of the
equity through issue of shares to the public at large or
through employees' share schemes.
In Malaysia, the government has been keen to return
to its original or traditional areas of responsibility
and leave the commercial activities in the hands of the
private sector (Rajandram, 1990). This altitude has been
reflected in the recently-released Privatisation Master
Plan and in the privatisation of some public enterprises.
2.5 PRIVATISATION
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Privatisation is the transfer of government
investments to the private sector or the rolling back of
activities of the state to the private sector. Heinmings
and Mansoor (1988, p.1) defined privatisation as:
"a transfer of ownership and control from the
public to the private sector, with particular
reference to asset sales"
As identified by Pine (1985-86), the techniques of
privatisation available are quite extensive. They
include: selling the whole; selling a proportion of the
whole; selling to the workforce; giving to the public;
contracting out the service to private business; and
withdrawal from the activity.
At the present time, Privatisation is favoured by
many government over the world. Dieter Bos (1986, p. 25-
33) identified four theoretical reasons for this
popularity. They are:-
(i) Ideologically, capitalist replaces the
socialist ways of thinking in the sense that
privatisation will lead to wide-spread
ownership of shares.
(ii) Economically, greater efficiency is
predicted because private sector discipline
will receive priority in all planning and
actions.
(iii) Financially, the government receives
money from the issue/sale of shares of the
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enterprise concerned and expects relief from
its obligation to finance public enterprises'
deficits.
(iv) The trade union movement is expected to be
weakened as a result of the privatisation,
since the privatised enterprise is expected to
be less inclined to give in to trade union
pressure to increase wages.
Heald (1982) identified two main elements of
privatisation. The first is that referred to above,
namely denationalisation, i.e. the sale of the
government's department or enterprise assets/shares; the
second is liberalisation, i.e. the relaxation or
abolition of statutory monopoly powers.
2.5.1 PRIVATISATION IN MAlAYSIA
Privatisation began in Malaysia in mid-1983 when the
Malaysian Prime Minister announced the adoption of this
policy by the government. This policy was adopted as a
result of rising public sector budget deficits, poor
performance of some government agencies and the need to
stimulate the growth of the economy through participation
of the private sector (Md. Salleh, 1991).
In essence, Privatisation in Malaysia not only
includes the transfer of the government investment but
also the transfer of the government's responsibility for
providing goods and services to the private sector. Thus
it not only involves the transfer of public enterprises
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but also includes the transfer of departmental entities
or statutory bodies to the private sector.
According to the Economic Planning Unit, Prime
Minister's Department, Government of Malaysia (1985 p.
17-18), the objectives of privatisation include the
following: -
"Privatisation has a number of major
objectives. First, it is aimed at relieving the
financial and administrative burden of the
government in undertaking and maintaining a
vast and constantly expanding network of
services and investments in infrastructure.
Second, privatisation is expected to promote
competition, improve efficiency and increase
the productivity of the services. Third,
privatisation, by stimulating private
entrepreneurship and investment, is expected to
accelerate the rate of growth of the economy.
Fourth, privatisation is expected to assist in
reducing the size and presence of the public
sector with its monopolistic tendencies and
bureaucratic support, in the economy. Fifth,
privatisation is also expected to contribute
towards meeting the objectives of the New
Economic Policy (NEP), especially as Bumiputra
entrepreneurship and presence has improved
greatly since the early days of the NEP and
they are therefore capable of taking up their
share of the privatised services".
The first four objectives are commonly cited by
countries worldwide as a rationale for privatisation. The
fifth objective is unique to Malaysia.
Since privatisation started in 1984, 32 projects
have been privatised, out of which 22 were government
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enterprises (Tsuruoka, 1990). Of these, eight were new
projects, six were privatised through divesture of
ownership by the sale of shares to the public (Sports
Toto, Malaysian Airline System, Malaysian International
Shipping Corporation, Tradewinds, Cement Manufacturing
Sarawak) or by way of private placement (Kiang Container
Terminal). The others were privatised in other ways,
including leasing, management contracts and through
corporatisation. Some of the projects were the North
Kiang Straits Bypass, Jalan Kuching - Kepong Highway
Interchange, Water Supply to Labuan, Kuala Lumpur Roads
and Interchange, North-South Toll Expressway, Labuan
Beaufort Interconnection, Commercial TV Station (TV3),
City Hall's waste disposal. The Malaysian
Telecommunication Department came into this last
category.
2.5.1.1 Constraints and Problems
In privatising the public enterprises in Malaysia,
the government encountered a number of constraints and
problems. They were:
(a) Administration
Since the enterprises were run as non-commercial
enterprises, some information, especially financial
information, was not available in an organised manner for
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analysis purposes. As an example, a precise appraisal in
terms of profit and loss was normally not possible.
(b) Legal problems
Some laws, drafted before privatisation of
government Departments was envisaged, created unintended
obstacles to the privatisation programme. Certain
Departments undergoing privatisation were subject to
their own specific legislation. The Department of
Telecommunication, for example, operated under the
Telecommunication Act 1950 (Revised 1970). All the
employees of government departments and statutory bodies
(with the exception of employees of government-owned
companies) come under the pension scheme and are eligible
to receive their monthly pension allowance after
retirement, as they were serving the government at the
age specified in the service contract. These rights and
benefits of the employees are covered in the Pension Act.
At the same time, article 147 of the Constitution
protects the existing pension rights of employees. Even
land is an issue, as it is controlled by the various
states rather than the federal government, which controls
most of the enterprises to be privatised.
(c) Valuation of assets
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Because of improper record keeping, and poor
management control, valuation of assets may take some
time to achieve.
(d) Resistance from employees
Because there is a higher degree of job security in
the government compare to the private sector, there is
bound to be resistance from the employees of the
enterprise to be privatised. In order to overcome this
problem, the government has imposed two conditions to
protect the interests of the employees upon
privatisation: no employees will be retrenched as a
result of privatisation, and all employees of the
enterprise to be privatised will be offered terms of
service no less favourable than those currently enjoyed
by them. As from December 1990, nearly 100,000 employees
(which represent 13% of the current work force of the
public sector) is expected to be transferred. And nearly
half of that number have already been transferred to the
privatised companies (Tsuruoka, 1990).
Table 2.2 - Stages of Privatisation of
Government Department / Statutory Body in
Malaysia
Commercial isation	 Corporatisation	 Divestiture
government	 self	 state-owned	 private
department accounting corporation
	 sector
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entity	 company
Source: Privatisation Masterplan (1991 p. 43),
Government of Malaysia.
2.5.1.2 Stages of Privatisation in Malaysia as
shown in Table 2.2
According to the Privatisation Masterplan, the
privatisation of Malaysian government Departments is a
three-stage process:
1st stage
The department concerned will pass through the
commercialisation stage, where user charges, commercial
accounting and performance are introduced for the first
time. This is when the department will be classified as a
self accounting entity.
2nd stage
The department or statutory body concerned will
become a state-owned corporation through the process
known as corporatisation.This stage involves the transfer
of all the assets and liabilities from the government
department concerned to a government-owned company formed
under the Companies Act, 1965. The government-owned
corporation will from now on conduct itself along
commercial lines.
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According to the Privatization Masterplan (1991),
several changes will take place at this stage in order to
improve productivity and efficiency. These include
"replacing bureaucratic administration with
commercial management; introducing clear
financial and operational performance targets
and commercial accounting; and replacing
centralised production-oriented decisions with
consumer	 and	 market	 driven	 decisions"
(Privatisation Masterplan, (1991, p. 44)).
3rd stage
At this stage, ownership of the government-owned
company will be changed from the public to the private
sector by one of several methods : public floatation,
private sale, management buy-out or employee share
ownership plan.
In the privatisation exercises implemented so far by
the Malaysian Government, the period taken to complete
the process has differed from one entity to another
because of the different methods used.
2.6 Impact of Privatisation
The impact of privatisation have been claimed to
have been substantial. The exposure to the discipline of
market forces is said to have led to increased efficiency
of the enterprises concerned. Other suggested impacts
67
include reduced political interference, changes in
property rights, liberalization so as to foster
competition and new roles for the regulator of the
industry concerned (Hemming and Mansoor 1988).
To the government, the fiscal impact of
privatisation includes a reduction in government
expenditure through the sale of government assets to the
privatised organisation, reduction of the number of
government employees when these employees join the
privatised organisation and reduction in other related
expenses.
In this study, our concern is to analyse the impact
of events arising out of privatisation, not to evaluate
the event of privatisation itself. Whether or not
privatisation is an appropriate course of action for
governments to take, is a matter outside the scope of
this research. However it is believed that as a result of
privatisation, accounting is likely to have become more
visible and to have made an impact on the organisation
under study, as a result of the change in the
mission/objectives of the company. The present research
is intended to reveal whether that is, in fact, the case.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter, the differences between the public
and the private sector in general and from an accounting
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point of view were discussed. The chapter also discussed
the concept of public enterprises, reasons for their
establishment, and problems associated with them in
general and specifically in Malaysia. These issues were
highlighted to aid understanding of the organisation
under study, JTM, which fell into this category.
It was found that failures and weaknessness of the
public enterprises caused the government to look for
alternatives, one of which was the introduction of the
privatisation policy.
The research which the researcher has reviewed so
far, especially with respect to differences between
public and private sector organisations suggests that
there are substantial differences in culture and methods
between the two sectors, such that members of the company
might have difficulty in accepting the new culture,
especially since the organisation was originally a fully
government Department, i.e. fell under category (1) of
Zakaria's (1984) definition of Public sector and was in
the first stage as discussed in section 2.5.2.2. In the
adjustment to the new culture, it seems likely that
changes might be seen in the role and influence of
accounting, which could increase in importance. This
possibility will be explored by means of an in-depth
study of accounting in JTM as a government Department,
and after privatisation.
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To provide a theoretical framework for that study,
the following chapter will review literature on
accounting from an organisational point of view, and
explain the analytical model to be used.
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CHAPTER THREE
Literature Review and Analytical Framework
3.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews literature on organisational
change and explains the rationale for the selection of
Laughlin's model as a framework for determining the
process and impact of change in the accounting system of
the organisation under study. Literature on accounting
change from an organisational and other points of view
and previous research on accounting and culture are also
reviewed.
The chapter then explains in detail the analytical
framework used, i.e Laughlin's model (1991) and the
typology of change under the model, and also discusses
other literatures used by Laughlin such as Levy (1986),
Greenwood and Hinings (1988) etc in developing his model.
3.2 ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE
3.2.1 Literature on organisational change
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Before we consider literature on accounting in its
organisational context, it is important for us to review
work done on organisational change itself. As Laughlin
(l988a, p. 3) put it,
starting looking at change in organisations
more generally is the most meaningful way to
understand accounting change".
Goodman and Kurke (1982) review thoroughly
organisational change, whether concentrated at the
individual, group, organisation, or organisational-
environment interface. They define change in
organisations as widely as possible so as to embrace all
change in an organisational context, and not just planned
change.
Olmosk (1972) identified a number of change
strategies, on the basis of their underlying assumptions,
the needs of participants, and the power set-up of the
group concerned. He outlined the strengths and weaknesses
of each including any issues or questions ignored or
supressed by particular strategies. The work is basically
descriptive, aiming to aid in the recognition of the
strategies being used, and hence, the adoption of new
strategies as appropriate to a particular situation.
However, there is no general analysis of the dynamics of
the change process.
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In reviewing the literature on organisational
change, Goodman and Kurke distinguish two categories of
change: planned organisational change and adaptation.
They refer to planned organisational change as 'a set of
activities and processes designed to change individuals,
groups and organisation structure and processes' while
adaptation 'concerns modification of an organisation or
its parts to fit or to be adjusted with its environment'.
In summary, study of planned organisational change
deals with the basis of change, concentrates on change
within the organisation and emphasizes the process of
actually creating change. The literature concentrates on
the methods and techniques of change. Literature on
adaptation focuses on sources of change, primarily
looking at the population of organisations and at
organisation-environment interfaces, and tending to
theorize about the processes and outcomes of change.
Most of the work written about organisational change
concludes that change occurs through change agents and /
or environmental pressure. This leads a few writers to
look at this topic from a different angle, that is away
from context-free description of change techniques to
more processual studies of change over time (Laughlin
1991). One of the major works done on longitudinal
studies is by Pettigrew (1985) who undertook processual
and contextual studies on organisational change in a
company, Id, over a period of 20 years.
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3.2.2 Literature review on the various
organisational change models and rationale for
selecting Laughlin model (1991)
According to Van de Ven (1992), research on the
studying strategy process of change requires the
definition of the meaning of process; clarification of
the theory of process; and design the research process
which will be consistent with the definition and theory
of process.
Writers have presented a variety of organisational
change models which can provide a theoretical framework
for study of organisational change. A brief overview of a
selection of such models is presented here.
An important influence on organisational change
theory has been Smith's (1982) article viewing change as
part of the organisational life-style. Smith identifies
two types of change: inorphogenesis, the type of change
that occurs in natural evolution, where the 'genetic
code' is altered and the change is acquired and reflected
in all future generations; and morphostatis, where change
is superficial and often impermanent, or where it occurs
as a natural expression of the developmental sequence.
The influence of these ideas can be seen in the work of
Pettigrew (1985), Smith and Tranfield (1988) and Laughlin
(1991), discussed later.
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The organisational development model sees change as
proceeding by small, incremental adjustments, and as
synonymous with growth. Typically, strategies for change
are advocated which seek to ensure consensus among the
key parties affected by means of widespread employee
participation. In reality, however, organisational change
is often achieved coercively.
Dunphy and Stace (1988) challenge the organisational
development model with an all-encompassing process model,
in which organisational approaches to change are
classified by type and mode, as follows:
Type 1: Participative Evolution - Incremental
adjustment, achieved by collaborative means. This
approach is used when the organisation is in 'fit' but
needs minor adjustment, or where the organisation is out
of fit, but time is available and change is favoured by
key interest groups. These conditions are more prevalent
in times of stability or steady economic growth.
Type 2: Charismatic Transformation - Large scale
discontinuous change, achieved by collaborative means.
This is used where the organisation is out of fit, time
for extensive participation is lacking, but there is
support within the organisation for radical change.
Type 3: Forced Evolution - Incremental adjustment
achieved by coercive means. This is used where the
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organisation is in fit but needs minor adjustment, or
where it is out of fit, time is available, but key
interest groups oppose change.
Type 4: Dictatorial Transformation - Large scale
discontinuous change, achieved by coercive means. This is
used when the organisation is out of fit, there is no
time for extensive participation and no support for
radical change, yet such change is necessary to the
organisation's survival and mission fulfilment. This type
of change is more common in turbulent, recessionary
times.
Pettigrew (1985) crticises much research on
organisational change as being preoccupied with the
intricacies of particular changes, rather than the
variety and mixture of causes of change and the contexts
in which they occur. He advocates research which is
contextualist and processual in character.
Smith and Tranfield (1988) consider the management
of change within the organisation, specifically the
extent to which the management hierarchy supports
innovation and is prepared to accept and identify the
structural and cultural changes which accompany rapid
technological change. They contend that morphostatic
change is effective where the technology requires only an
incremental adjustment, such as skills training, within
an overall system which remains the same. In contrast,
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morphogenic change produces a logically different order
from that which came before. It comes into play when the
technology does not make the system more efficient, but
transforms it. It requires a vision of the future horizon
toward which the organisation is moving. Because it is
generally seen as uncomfortable and generates high levels
of insecurity, there is often reluctance on the part of
managers to inaugurate it, and resistance elsewhere in
the organisation.
Greenwood and Hinings (1988) explain organisational
change in terms of movement along 'tracks' between and
through various analytical positions, delineated on the
basis of coherence (or otherwise) between beliefs and
values, on the one hand, and structures and processes, on
the other. It is this relationship between beliefs and
values and the structures and processes through which
they are implemented and reinforced, which constitutes
the 'design archetype' of the organisation.
Laughlin (1991) draws and builds on the work of
several writers in his model of organisational change.
Like Greenwood and Hinings, he uses the concept of tracks
to trace change in the design archetype, but he extends
the analysis to two layers of the organisation, between
which the design archetype is considered to fall. The
first of these is the invisible, abstract 'interpretative
scheme', which includes beliefs, values and norms,
mission and 'metarules' (see Section 4.5). The second is
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the 'sub-systems', tangible organisational elements in
which change can easily be identified. Laughlin's change
typology identifies five positions, from inertia to
evolution, according to the extent to which change
penetrates the three layers of the organisation.
In summarising the literature on organisational
change and in support of the adoption of Laughlin's model
(1991), it can be said that much of Smith and Tranfield's
(1987) work is derived from traditional organisational
change literature, adopting a rather prescriptive
attitude and seeing organisational change as
'programmable'. Greenwood and Hinings (1988) focus on the
design archetype, but since they do not follow the
changes through to the interpretive scheme or sub-
systems, their model does not adequately reflect the
distinction between first and second-order change.
Pettigrew shares Laughlin's concern for the dynamics of
change but Pettigrew's work is largely descriptive and
does not provide a clear theoretical framework for the
researcher. Laughlin (1991) draws on and brings together
previous ideas about organisational change (for example
the concept of first and second order change, tracks,
design archetype) adding the extra dimensions of 'social'
elements of organisational life and 'hidden' elements of
the change process.
As was mentioned in chapter 1, the objective of the
research is to study accounting change in an
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organisational context. Laughlin's model (1991) which is
a skeletal model, was found to be an appropriate model
for this research work for the following reasons:
(1) Since the study relates to change and its
dynamics in the organisation arising from three levels of
disturbance over a period of time, the framework used
needs to enhance understanding of the process of change
that took place and continues to take place. This is
relatable to the three elements classified by Laughlin,
namely, the interpretative scheme, the design archetype
and the sub-system.
So far, to the best of the researcher's knowledge,
the only studies using this model are Broadbent (1992),
Laughlin (1991) and Gray et al (1992), which all relate
to changes in accounting, looked at from an
organisational point of view. All of the previous studies
are done in the U.K. and reflect changes taking place as
a result of disturbances generated by the government and
its privatisation policy, a situation similar to the one
reviewed in the present study. Thus, use of the model
selected is intended to add to the literature in this
area, and apply the model for the first time to the case
of an organisation in a developing country.
(ii) Since the researcher was given access through
industrial attachment in the organisation, in particular
in the Finance and Accounting sections, this meets the
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requirement for using Laughlin's model, that the
researcher be as close as possible to the organisation
under study and if possible, to be a participant observer
within it.
(iii) As pointed out in the outline of the research
method (Chapter One), the study uses the interpretative
approach and analyses the changes that took place arising
from three phases of disturbance. This empirical study
therefore aims to enrich the theoretical model selected,
since Laughlin's model (1991) is an outline or skeletal
model, which needs to be filled out with discussion and
analysis. This methodological approach, which is derived
from Habermas's critical theory (Laughlin 1987), is in
line with Laughlin (1991) and Broadbent's (1992) argument
that in using the model,
"The aim will be to use the theoretical
insights provided by the models of change as a
basis for understanding the situation studied.
At the same time, the empirical findings have
the potential to extend the theoretical model.
It must be stressed that the case is not meant
to provide a site in which the theoretical
model is tested" (p. 344).
(iv) Laughlin's model was selected to provide a
clear understanding of the movement of organisational
tracks in the organisation under study arising out of the
three level of disturbances. In analysing this movement,
the work of Greenwood and Hinnings (1988), which was used
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extensively by Laughlin (1991), was also used by the
researcher.
3.3 ACCOUNTING CHANGE FROM ThE ORGANISATIONAL AND OTHER
POINTs OF VIEW
3.3.1 Introduction
Accounting is not a system by itself. It is part of
the overall organisation structure and is becoming
"actively drawn upon in the construction of new
organisational forms and boundaries" (Hopwood, 1990).
More and more research is being done to broaden our
understanding about accounting in its organisational
context (Hopwood 1987; Roberts & Scapens 1985). New
studies about accounting relate to its historical as well
as its economic, social and organisational contexts
(Scapens 1990). This is an important point to note as
accounting does not exist in isolation , rather it exists
within an environment and is subject to changes when the
environment changes. The accounting system changes due to
pressure from within and outside the environment. This
explains why accounting nowadays is being studied not
only from organisational but also from economic and
social points of view (Tomkins et.al , 1980; Roberts and
Scapens, 1985; Berry et al, 1985; Laughlin, 1991).
Laughlin (1991) acknowledged that accounting is shaped by
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these environmental influences, and can no longer be
viewed solely as a technical, context-free phenomenon
(Hopwood, 1983).
Indeed, this was recognized by Hopwood as early as
1974, when he stated that the accounting system
"has to be interpreted and used, and the
beliefs and motives, the pressures and
expectations, and the demands of the
organisational environment which prevail on
these eminently social processes make the final
effectiveness of the accounting system
dependent upon the whole human fabric of the
enterprise. It cannot be viewed in technical
isolation", (p. 14).
3.3.2 Accounting in an Organisational Context
Much of the work on accounting in an organisational
context started in the early 1970s. The initial idea came
from Horngren, 1972 who stressed the importance of a
close relationship between organisational design and
accounting system design. Later Hopwood (1978) stressed
the importance of the operation of the accounting system
and use of accounting information as an organisational
process worthy of study in its own right.
Hayes (1983) saw management accounting as an
artef act of
	 the organisation and argued that
organisational theory provides a context for explaining
and understanding management accounting. He emphasised
82
the ambiguity and changeability of the organisational
setting, and the uncertainty of goals. In such
circumstances, he argued, managerial accounting
facilitates action in the organisational setting. He
added that this is done through an organisational
language, mythology, basis for rationalisation, imageing
and experimentation.
Earlier studies show that change in accounting was
the result of the growth of modern business, where
accounting was no longer seen as a technical phenomenon
but rather as a 'cohesive and influential mechanism for
economic and social management of the post-industrial
society' (Gandhi, 1975).
Ansari and Bell (1991), in their case study of one
company in Pakistan show that accounting practices are
the result of the culture and world views of the
individuals, and it was culture, rather than economic
rationality or power, which determined the important
business decisions. They cited as examples the influence
of family and status considerations, rather than merit,
in making senior appointments, the lack of separation of
treasury and control functions; and the inability to
confront perceived inequities in reward sharing such that
rewards are based on needs and not performance.
A further study related to rationality was that by
Ansari & Euske (1987) who in a longitudinal study over a
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period of two years of cost accounting data used in 14
military repair facilities in the US, found that
accounting systems are dynamic. Over time, reasons for
using cost data changed from technical-rational to socio-
political and institutional. They concluded that in the
public sector, besides accounting data, other instruments
and symbols are used within the technical-rational model.
The third study related to rationality was provided
by Boland and Pondy (1983) in their case study of a
university budget, where they found that accounting
functions symbolically as well as objectively. Their
study emphasized that accounting systems change and that
change is not only guided by rational reasoning but is
part of a layer of organisational dialectic.
With respect to changes in the accounting system,
Laughlin (1988) in his work on a case study of the
accounting system of the Church of England, looked at
this issue by using Habermas' critical theory (1984). He
concluded that the social context shapes the technical
practices of accounting; specifically, in the context
studied, religious work provided the central and 'sacred'
ideologies which shaped accounting (taken from Brunsson's
work (1985)).
Hopwood (1987) in his article entitled 'Archaeology
of Accounting Systems' where issues of the process of
accounting change are addressed, utilized geneological
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analysis to determine how accounting systems developed in
three companies. He argued that accounting is responsive
and adaptive to changes and, over time, it becomes fixed
firmly in the structure and awareness of the
organisation. He concluded that accounting influences the
pattern of organisational visibility, significance,
structure and action.
Dent (1991), traced the change in a railway company
from what he called a 'railway culture' to a new
economics-driven culture. He concluded that accounting
acts as a formal communication and language system,
enabling change to happen and dominate as a core
objective of the organisation.
Thus, studies on accounting in its organisational
context see organisations as emergent social processes
which are created by individual participants. This is
because these participants have social selves which act
in ways that reflect their visible definitions of the
situation. Furthermore, their actions are intrinsically
endowed with subjective meaning; their actions are always
considered to be intentional. Therefore, studies in this
area look at explanations of issues being investigated by
focusing on norms, roles, values and expectations of
organisational members, whereby they decide on certain
alternatives in line with ongoing actions and
interactions. Thus, in the case of the accounting system
of the Church of England, Laughlin (1988b) found that
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social context shapes the technical practices of
accounting while Dent (1991) in the case study of the
effect of introducing business managers (i.e. business
elements) in a railway company, found that accounting led
and played a dominant role in the process of cultural
change.
3.4 Accounting and Culture
According to Schein (1985 p. 19-20), culture is
defined as:
"a pattern of basic assumptions invented,
discovered, or developed by a given group as it
learns to cope with its problems of external
adaptation and internal integration - that has
worked well enough to be considered valid and,
therefore, to be taught to new members as the
correct way to perceive, think, and feel in
relation to those problems".
Hofstede (1986, p.1) surmnarizes this idea when he
defines culture as a form of collective mental
programming by which categories of people are
distinguised, one from another.
Kilmann et al (1985, p. ix) defined culture as
"the shared philosophies, ideologies, values,
assumptions, beliefs, expectations, attitudes
and norms that knit a community together - i.e.
the way things are done around here".
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The above three definitions have in common the
element of belief that certain things are done in a
particular way, i.e. that there is an accepted system,
shared by the majority of members of a particular group.
This notion can also be applied to the organisation,
where the term corporate culture is often used.
As was defined by Tunstall (1985) a company's
culture is its set of shared values, behaviour patterns,
norms, symbols, attitudes and ways of conducting
business. He argues that it is these, rather than its
products or services, which differentiate one company
from another. Corporate culture has become a popular
topic in study of the organisation as it is believed that
the right kind of culture facilitates effective and
efficient management (Schein, 1985).
It is often argued that 'strong' cultures are more
likely to be related to effectiveness than 'weak'
cultures, and that a strong culture can be deliberately
created (Schein, 1985; Ouchi, 1981; Deal and Kennedy,
1982; Peters and Waterman, 1982).
Most of the literature on organisational culture has
portrayed culture as a new phenomenon which can help the
management to manage the company effectively. As a
result, managements have begun to explore how to change
the culture of organisations so as to make them more
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competitive (Ouchi, 1981; Peters and Waterman, 1982; Deal
and Kennedy, 1982).
Studies on this issue have been done by various
writers/researchers. Pettigrew (1979) suggests that since
leaders are the 'creators' of culture, cultural change is
accompanied by a change in leadership; thus leadership
succession is the essential ingredient in cultural
change.
In contrast, O'Toole (1979) argues that culture is
embedded in organisational structure such as a company's
reward system or hierarchy of authority. Thus, the key
structures supporting a given culture must change for a
culture to change. Others, like Ouchi (1981) and Peters
and Waterman (1982) believe that culture can be changed
by developing a new set of values or 'management
philosophy', which is then inculcated into the employees.
The process of change will involve the development of new
company goals and ideals and need both old and new
employees to integrate the new set of beliefs.
The creation of new symbols as a change strategy has
also been discussed by Peters (1978). He argues that
leaders can change culture by changing their activities,
agendas or interpersonal styles to reinforce new
behaviours. Thus, management of symbols and their
accompanying meanings becomes the agent of cultural
change.
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According to Dyer (1985) values are the evaluations
people make of situations, acts, objects and people. They
reflect the organisation's general goals, ideals,
standards etc, for example, 'sales growth';
'aggressiveness'; 'career employment'; 'promote from
within'. They are often expressed in statements of
organisational identity or management philosophy.
According to Dent (1991 p.7), the process of
cultural change in organisations has been poorly
understood. Though there are many ways and posibilities
for a change in culture to take place, in his research
work he conceptualises cultural change as disconnection
of organisational action from one culture and its
reconnection to another (cf Greenwood and Hinnings, 1988;
Hedberg, 1981). He further stress that organisational
culture usually emerges and unfolds over time (Pettigrew
1985, Feldman 1986); cultural change is sometimes likened
to a political process; sub-cultures compete with one
another for legitimacy and dominance (Pettigrew, 1985);
and culture may also be imported from outside the
organisation through new disturbances or actions (cf
Starbuck and Hedberg, 1977) e.g. out of privatisation
policy.
3.5 Laughlin's Model of Organisational Change (1991)
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Laughlin (1991 P. 1) developed a model of
organisational change in which he stressed that
"organisational change can only be understood
by tracing the process, track or pathway a
disturbance/kick/jolt takes through an
organisation".
According to Laughlin (1991), organisations are
change-resistant, especially where there are strong
elements of ideology, i.e. beliefs, values and norms.
Therefore, it is only through a 'disturbance' / 'kick' /
'jolt' / 'noise' that a change happens in the
organisation. The degree of change that takes place will
depend on how strong the 'disturbances' / 'kicks' /
'jolts' are and these 'kicks' may follow different
'tracks' (Greenwood & Hinings, 1988; pp 294) or pathways
for a period of time before settling down to a particular
track where the changes are said to occur. If the
resistance to change is strong, there may be a reversion
to the original track or a strong tendency to inertia
(Miller and Friesen; 1984).
The types of change described by Laughlin are
'inertia' (no change), first-order change and second-
order change. Basically, first-order change or
morphostatic change involves an appearance of difference,
while the underlying situation remains much as it has
always been.
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In	 contrast,	 the	 second-order	 change	 or
ntorphogenetic change
"penetrates so deeply into the genetic code
that all future generations acquire and reflect
these changes" (Smith, (1982 p. 318)).
Using Laughlin's model of organisation as shown in
Figure 3.1, organisations will be conceptualized as being
an amalgam of an 'interpretative scheme', a 'design
archetype' and 'sub-systems'.
'Sub-systems', as basically tangible organisational
elements, are easily identified. Thus it is relatively
easy to identify the tangible organisational changes
taking place in the organisation resulting from
privatisation such as increase in fixed assets arising
out of increase in capital expenditure, increase in
number of staff, increased equity and increase in the
number of activities / projects.
According to Greenwood and Hinings (1988 p. 295), a
'design archetype'
"is a set of ideas, beliefs and values that
shape prevailing conceptions of what an
organisation should be doing, of how it should
be doing it and how it should be judged,
combined with structures and processes that
serve to implement and reinforce those ideas".
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The 'design archetype' plays an important role in
the sense that it is between the 'interpretative scheme'
and the 'sub-system', from which come the set of ideas,
beliefs and values of the organization and the tangible
organizational elements according to which the
organization's structural arrangement and processes can
be described, resulting in the latter having pattern and
coherence.
The concept of an archetype, taken front Miller and
Freisen (1984), was derived from the idea that
organisations operate according to a limited number of
outlines of structure, strategy and environment. They
further stressed that organisational designs should be
considered in terms of the patterning or coherence of
component elements because the structural attributes and
processes of an organisation frequently have a coherence
or common orientation forming an archetype.
Greenwood and Hinings (1987) defined interpretative
schemes as containing beliefs and values about domain,
organisational form and criteria for performance
evaluation. They suggest that it is the coherence between
these beliefs and values on the one hand and structural
arrangements and processes on the other, which provides a
basis for the delineation of the organisational design
archetype (Greenwood and Hinings 1988). They further
provide clear examples of how organisational form is
derived from the underlying ideas and beliefs, from their
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studies of 27 municipal organisations in the UK from 1967
to 1983. In their study, they identified two competing
interpretative schemes, namely the professional
bureaucracy model and the corporate bureaucracy model.
These alternative conceptions of domain (community
governance versus local administration) and of evaluative
criteria (analytical appraisal of programmes versus
professional judgement and discretion) hold implications
for organisational form.
The interpretative scheme, according to Laughlin
(1991) is divided into three levels, namely, beliefs,
values and norms; mission/purpose; and metarules (the
meaning of which will be explained later in the chapter).
Laughlin adopted this from Ranson el al (1980), building
on the work of Schutz (1967) and Giddens (1979) who
called these values and beliefs an 'intepretative
scheme'. However, other writers have used different
names/terms such as 'ideology' (Brunsson 1985), 'life
world' (Habermas 1984), 'culture' (Smircich 1983),
(Allaire and Firsiruto 1984).
Bartunek (1984, p. 355) identified 'interpretative
schemes' as:
"the cognitive schemata that map our experience
of the world, identifying both its relevant
aspects and how we are to understand them".
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She went on to suggest that such schemes operate as
shared basic assumptions about why events happen as they
do and how people are to act in different situations.
Such assumptions are not always explicit, however.
The 'Interpretative scheme' from Figure 3.1 is
considered to be 'intangible' (Laughlin 1991) or
'unnoticed' or 'abstract' (Levy, 1986). This means it is
difficult to express clearly, though nonetheless, very
real and something that will hold together a particular
organisation. In order to clarify the nature of these
invisible elements, according to Smith (1982) and Morgan
(1986) we have to resort to 'metaphors'.
3.5.1 Definition and Characteristic of First
and Second- Order Change
Smith (1982), borrowed from biology the terms
morphostatis (First-Order Change) and morphogenesis
(Second-Order Change). He defined morphostatis as
encompassing two type of change: those that enable things
to look different while remaining basically as they have
always been; and those which occur as a natural
expression of the developmental sequence, i.e. the
natural maturation process.
This kind of change, first-order change, does not
affect the system's core and happens as the system
naturally grows and develops.
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Second-order change, in contrast, is defined by him
as a forni of change which penetrates deeply into the
genetic core, to the extent that all future generations
acquire and reflect those changes. Because the change is
in the very essence and core of the organisation, it will
be maintained without any special action or effort. It is
not reversible.
The characteristics of First-Order and Second-Order
change in organisations are shown in Figure 3.2.
According to Levy (1986), there are four dimensions of
elements in the organisation. He classified them as 'core
processes', 'organisational culture', 'organisational
mission and purpose' and 'organisational paradigm'. The
'core processes' include the organisational structure,
management throughput and decision-making procees,
recognition and rewards and communication patterns; the
'orgariisational culture' includes the organisation's
beliefs, values and norms, together with symbolic action
and elements such as myths, rituals, ceremonies and the
style of management and relationships; 'Orqariisational
mission and purpose' includes more clearly programmes for
direction of action. It also includes statements about
'what business we are in' and the strategies for
achieving the organisational mission, goals and policies.
The 'organisational paradigm' includes 'metarules',
propositions or underlying assumptions which, though not
tangible or explicit, shape the perceptions, procedures
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and behaviour of the organisation. The model is as shown
in Figure 3.3.
According to the model, changes in the paradigm will
result in a change of mission, culture and core
processes; whereas changes in the mission will result in
change of the culture and core processes but will not
necessarily change the paradigm; changes in the culture
will result in change in the core processes but not
necessarily in the paradigm and mission; and lastly,
changes in the core processes will not necessarily lead
to changes in the organisational paradigm, mission and
culture.
Thus, according to the model, in order for second-
order change to take place, the change must happen in all
four dimensions, namely in core processes, mission and
purpose, culture and organisational paradigm. According
to Levy (1986, p. 19),
"the less visible the dimension, the deeper the
change and the greater the possibility that the
change will be irreversible".
3.5.2 Orgariisational Tracks
Laughlin's model of organisation (in which he
identified five types of organisational change) makes use
of the concept of organisational 'tracks' from the work
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of Greenwood and Hinings (1988). 'Tracks' are defined as
the mapping, reason, nature and cause of movements and
the absence of movement between archetypes.
In developing the language of 'tracks', two points
must be noted. The first point is that when mapping and
explaining the movement of the tracks, one should study
the movement of the organisation over a period of time.
This is because organisations do not pass through
transitions nor do they have the same set of stages and
nor do they depart from similiar positions or have common
destinations. By studying the organisation change over a
period of time, it is possible to see various
possibilities of movements from radical transformations
to abortive shifts between design archetypes up to the
absence of change. The second point to note in developing
the language of tracks, is that interpretative schemes
become important since they will strengthen or support
the design arrangement. The presence of the
interpretative scheme will help to explain why
organisations facing the same 'crisis' may be moving
along different tracks.
Greenwood and Hinings (1988), classified tracks
according to the movements of the organisation between
and through several analytical positions, as follows:-
(1) 'archetype coherence', where structures and
processes of the organisation design consistently reflect
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and influence the ideas and values of an interpretive
scheme.
(ii)'embryonic archetype coherence', where
structures and processes consistently reflect the ideas
and values of an interpretive scheme but structures and
process in the design elements are in disagreement.
(iii) 'schizoid incoherence' where tension occurs
in the structures and processes as a result of the
presence of inconsistent and contradictory ideas and
values.
The several analytical positions can be shown
diagramatically below:-
Archetype	 Ebryon10	 Schizoid	 Rzbzyonic	 Archetype
Coherence (A)	 archetype	 iiscoherence	 archetype	 Coherence (B)
Coherence (A)	 Coherence (B)
According to Greenwood and Hinings (1988), the study
of organisational tracks involves monitoring the
movements between these five analytical positions as
shown above. An organisation that moves from one
coherence position to another is said to be in the
process of 'interpretive decoupling' and as it moves to
another alternative position it is said to be in the
process of 'interpretive re-coupling'. The number of
possible variations of movement from one position to
another is large, but for the purpose of the paper, the
authors visualised four types of tracks, namely, 'track A
- Inertia'; 'track B - Aborted Excursions'; 'track C -
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Reorientation' (Transformation) subdivided into (i)
linear progression, (ii) oscillation, (iii) delayed ;and
'track D - Unresolved Excursions' as shown in Figure 3.4.
(i) Track A: Inertia
In this case, the organisation remains within the
status quo. The organisation demonstrates consistency and
upholds attachment to one interpretive scheme. There
could be some structural process change, but that will
only affect the design archetype. There is no
interpretive decoupling as the beliefs and values of the
organisation remain strong and intact.
(ii) Track B: Aborted Excursion
This is the case of an unsuccessful excursion. The
track moves from the original 'archetype A' to the
'embryonic archetype A' and according to the definition,
at this stage the organisations structures and processes
are in disagreement with the introduction of any new
ideas and structures. For whatever reasons, eventually it
will move away from the 'embryonic archetype A', back to
its original position, i.e. 'Archetype A'.
(iii) Track C: Reorientation (Transformation)
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In this case the organisation decouples (moves) from
one position to another position, i.e. re-couples. This
takes place when one system of ideas and values loses its
credibility. It is then replaced with a new interpretive
scheme which carries a different set of structural and
process elements from the earlier one.
On this track, the organisation could transform in
any one of the three ways described below. Under linear
progression, the organisation moves from the 'embryonic'
position to the 'schizoid' position and then settles to a
new 'archetype B'. The process of change may take place
over a long period, but the change happens in an ordered
and consistent manner. In practice, however, this process
does not take place except, perhaps, in a planned
organisational change (a topic discussed by many authors,
including Levy, 1986). Other types of change under track
C are 'oscillation' and 'delayed' as shown in Figure 3.4.
In both these cases, an organisation may stay for a short
or long period of time in a particular position before
moving eventually to the new 'archetype'. In this case,
the process of change does not occur in an orderly and
consistent manner; this phenomenon is more common in
practice than the linear progression (Greenwood and
Hinings, 1988).
(iv) Track D: Unresolved Excursions
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This is the case where the organisation remains in
an intermediate position over a long period of time, due
to tension between two contradictory sets of ideas and
values. The process of decoupling takes place, without
the recoupling stage being completed.
Figure	 3.5	 :
Organisational Cli
Type of Change
No Change
First Order Change
(Morphostatic)
Second Order Change
(Morphogenesis)
Laughlin's Typology of
Effects on Types of Change
(i) 'inertia'
(ii) 'Rebuttal'
(iii) 'Reorientation'
(iv) 'Colonisation'
(v) 'Evolution'
Source: Laughlin (1991).
3.5.3 Typology of change under Laughlin's model
As is shown in Figure 3.5, within Laughlin's
typology of organisational change, there are three main
alternatives : no change, first order (or morphostatic)
change and second order (or morphogenetic) change.
In the no-change situation, the organisation is in
the state of 'inertia'.
Under the first-order change, two different types of
pathway or tracks can happen, i.e. either 'rebuttal' or
'reorientation'. Under this first order change, the
pathway or track will move from one archetype to another
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without affecting the 'interpretative scheme'. Basically,
this change will involve a shift of the sub-system and
the design archetype, changes in the latter being the
most extreme. This type of change is considered as
cosmetic change, since it is morphostatic in nature.
Under the second order (or morphogenetic) change,
the pathway or track will shift and affect all the three
elements in the model shown in Figure 3.1 : not only the
'sub-systems' and 'design archetype', but also the
'interpretative scheme', being the core elements that
hold together the beliefs and value system in a
particular organisation.
Let us now consider Laughlin's typology of
organisational changes in detail.
(1) No change - 'inertia'
This is where the organisation remains in the status
quo, in the sense that the organisation consistently
demonstrates and upholds attachment to the present system
of beliefs and values which hold it together. This is the
same as Greenwood and Hinings's (1988) concept of
inertia, discussed in relation to organisational tracks.
(ii) First Order Change - Rebuttal
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This is where disturbances occur and involve some
changes in the design archetype but the changes are not
successful. This is similar to what Greenwood and
Hinnings (1988) called an 'aborted excursion' track and
what Smith (1982) called 'repetition'. According to
Greenwood and Hinnings (1988), as shown in Figure 3.4,
the track moves from the original 'archetype A' to the
'embryonic archetype A' but at this stage the
organisation structure and processes are in disagreement
with the changes. With the original 'archetype A'
remaining strong, the organisation moves back to its
original 'design archetype' after a period of time. Thus,
the excursion is unsuccessful.
(iii) First Order Change - Reorientation
This is where the excursion results in a successful
change, but only in the 'design archetype' where there
are some changes in the internal organisational
structure, decision process and/or communication system.
The 'interpretative scheme' or core elements of the
organisation however, remains intact. This is similar to
what Smith (1982) called the 'development' model of
change and what Greenwood and Hinings (1988) called
'reorientation'. Laughlin (1991) departs from Greenwood
and Hinings in referring to this type of change as
transitional change, whereas the latter referred to it as
transformational change.
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(iv) Second Order Change - Colonization
This is the situation where the change happens in
all three elements namely the 'sub-system', 'design
archetype' and 'interpretative scheme'. The reason for
this type of change is related to the work of Jurgn
Haberinas on societal development (see Laughlin (1987) and
Broadbent et al (1991)). In the Habermas model (1984) of
social evolution, the modern society can be theoretically
defined as consisting of 'life worlds', 'steering media'
and 'system'. Broadbent et al (1991 p. 3), describing the
Habermas model of societal development, explain these
terms as follows:
"In broad terms 'life worlds' are the
communicatively formed (over time) life
experiences and beliefs which guide attitudes,
behaviour and action. 'Systems' on the other
hand are expressions of these life worlds in
terms of functionally definable, tangible
organisations. According to Habermas, these
economic and administrative 'systems' are
guided to follow life world concerns. At the
same time these systems are held together,
despite differences of function and nature, by
what he calls 'steering media' such as money
and power."
Since modern society is expected to grow and become
very complex in nature, there is a possibility that the
'life world' changes over time, with the 'steering media'
acting as disturbances, along with the 'system' change.
This change will lead to internal colonization (as
Habermas calls it). Laughlin related these ideas to the
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micro life world such as in the case of the organisation.
Thus, for second order change to happen, the change can
take place initially in the 'design archetype' and
'subsystem' elements, leading eventually to change in the
'interpretative scheme'. According to Laughlin, this type
of change is similar to that which was described by
Greenwood and Hinings as a 'reorientation' or
'transformation' track. In this situation of change,
arising out of the environmental disturbances, there is a
small but powerful grqup who successfully lead the way to
a real change in all the three elements, both visible and
invisible, in the organisation. This may result in the
existing participants who are change-resistant either
leaving or accepting the new value system and staying in
the organisation. The change under 'colonisation', if
successful, could result in what Laughlin (1987) calls
'positive' inner colonisation, in the sense that the real
change is accepted by the participants, which in a way is
beneficial to the organisation.
(v) Second Order Change - Evolution
In this type of change, the shift occurs initially
in the 'interpretative schemes' which are assumed to be
chosen and accepted by all the participants in the
organisation, openly and without force. Thus, along the
line, there will be a shift in the 'design archetype' and
'subsystems'.
109
3.6 Summary
This chapter has presented a review of literature on
organisational change, and on accounting from the
organisational point of view. It was shown that
Laughlin's model provides an appropriate analytical
framework for the study.
It is considered important to study change from an
organisational point of view, as few studies so far have
been conducted on this area; in particular, there is a
lack of research on organisations in developing
countries.
The next chapter overview the telecommunication
development and describe briefly the history of the
organisation along its network development,
organisational and management structure, its services
provided to the customers, the two environment and
financial development.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Description of the Industry
and the Organisation
4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides background information
necessary to an appreciation of the nature of the
organisation studied, the disturbances affecting it, and
the changes to be analysed in later chapters.
We begin with an account of the transformation which
has affected the telecommunications industry worldwide,
in recent years: far-reaching and rapid technological
advance, accompanied by economic expansion; deregulation
and liberalisation, sometimes to the extent of
privatising the industry; and the development of new
products and services. The study of teleconununications
company must inevitably take account of this worldwide
development and transformation, as it constitutes a
source of environmental disturbance, and may well have
implications for the role and status of both engineers
and accountants.
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Having examined the international context in which
this study takes place, the chapter goes on to consider
the situation of the telecommunications industry in the
country of study, Malaysia. Not only is the Malaysian
telecommunications industry affected by worlwide
developments, but it is also the target of specific
government policy, as it is seen to play a significant
role in the country's social and economic development.
Finally, an overview is presented of JTN (known
after privatisation as STN), the company in which the
empirical	 study	 takes	 place,	 looking	 at	 the
organisational environment, management structure,
services provided and financial developments, from 1968
to the present.
4.2 Development of the Telecommunications Industry as a
Whole
The telecommunication industry, which is
traditionally run as a government monopoly organisation,
has transformed itself into a lucrative and profitable
enterprise due to technology and economic changes. These
changes have led to many entrepreneurs becoming
interested in having a share in the industry, which has
led to fierce competition. As was said by Carr (1990 p.
1),
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"Until recently telephone companies were little
more than glorified postmen - fetching and
carrying messages. Now technology and
competition are snapping at their heels".
4.2.1 Reasons for the transformation of the
Telecommunication Industry
The reasons for this transformation are as follows:-
(i) Technological change in the industry
The Telecommunications has developed from reliance
on simple technology to adoption of the most advanced
technology as the result of the computer revolution
(Rohwer 1985). In the early days, data-processing
machines were built out of single transistors wired
together on circuit boards, and telephone calls were
switched electroinechanically; thus, the computers and
telephones were not linked to each other. However, with
the changes in the technology, both use microchips and
run according to computer programs; thus, they are linked
to each other and have become technology twins.
Because of this linkage, developments in computer
technology brought developments in telecommunication
equipment, resulting in improved price performance and
creation of new markets within the industry. Also, with
this new development in the industry, the functions of
processing information and transmitting information
overlapped with each other, to the extent that most
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managers in the telecommunications industry now say that
they are in the business of 'information movement and
management' rather than 'the phone company' (Rohwer,
1985).
This rapid technological change, i.e. from analogue
to digital, has brought more effective ways to cope with
the increase in traffic volumes and lighter, cheaper and
more mobile means of telecommunications are created
(Johnstone, 1990). Another new development with respect
to the technological change is the development of an
interface called Integrated Services Digital Network
(ISDN), which offers customers a wider range of voice and
non-voice messages such as data, text, images and video
services, which are transmitted through the same lines as
an integrated system. This is possible because the
transmissions can be connected by using electronic 'bits-
binary' digits.
(ii)	 Deregulation,	 Liberalisation	 and
Competition
The telecommunication industry in most countries is
run or has been run by the government, either directly or
indirectly, through the formation of a public enterprise
as a public monopoly industry. This is because of the
high capital investment needed to run the industry, to
provide for economies of scale, and social and national
security (Hashim 1986). However, with the rapid changes
114
in telecommunications technology and the linkup with
coinputerisation and information systems, governments have
been forced to deregulate the industry by opening up
certain types of services to allow new entrants to the
industry, thereby creating competition. Some government
like the U.K., USA, Japan and Malaysia, to name a few,
have gone further by privatising the organisation though
the government still usually maintains a majority stake
in the newly- privatised company.
Other reasons which have led governments to
deregulate are the increased automation in manufacturing
industry, the transformation of office automation and
also the pressure from consumer groups, particularly
corporate users, who have ready access to a wide range of
information, e.g. factor prices, exchange rates, movement
of shares prices and the like, as a result of this rapid
change in technology. The result has been a free and
continous flow of information which gives more integrated
and efficient markets.
The telecommunication sector as a whole is not a
monopolistic industry. The sector can be classified into
three parts:-
(i) supply of equipment
(ii) the running of networks
(iii) the supply of services
When we say that most telecommunication industries
are monopolistic in nature, this is usually in the
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running of the network, which is usually the preserve of
the government or its agency.
So far, the USA has liberalised in this matter, in
the sense that there is a free entry in all the three
areas. The UK has also followed the same approach, the
government having allowed another company, Mercury
Communications, to compete with British Telecom in the
running of networks, while there is no restriction in
competing for the supply of equipment and services. In
Asia, Japan is the most liberalised with respect to all
the three parts of the telecommunication sector. In 1985,
the Japanese government privatised the former state
monopoly, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, and allowed two
other companies to compete for internal long-distance
calls. In 1989, it issued licences to two other companies
to compete for international calls (Johnstone, 1990). It
also has a large number of operators competing for other
services, including mobile phone and value added services
(see below). In Malaysia, before privatisation, i.e.
under JTN, the government liberalised the supply of
telephone equipment such as telephones and teleprinters,
as early as July 1984. The government also contracted out
the construction of the network on a large scale to the
private sector under the turn-key projects from 1982
onwards, as will be discussed in a later chapter of this
thesis. The liberalisation of other services, including
Value added services started in 1985 with radio paging,
for which four private companies were issued licences. By
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1987, the number of licences issued for this service had
grown to thirty-two.
Overall, the deregulation of the industry has
resulted in the strong growth of domestic
telecommunications business as well as export-earning
technology in countries such as USA, Britain, and Japan.
Other countries are following suit, either by relaxing
regulations or by privatising state-owned industry,
thereby dismantling the monopoly power of this industry.
As was said by one of the top officials in Asia
(Johnstone 1990, p. 39),
"Countries which insist on maintaining their
monopolies will inevitably fall behind".
With liberalisation of the telecommunication
industry, there exist competitors among service
operators, especially in the new services of the
industry. Thus, with the change in the economic
environment and expanding technological capabilities of
the telecommunications industry, the monopoly enterprise
can develop and maintain the actual physical
infrastructure, whereas new entrants to the industry can
provide new services such as VANS to customers by
attaching computer modes that communicate with
subscribers using the network developed by the monopoly
enterprise.
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Initially, liberalisation of some services of the
industry (resulting in the entry of new service
operators, thereby creating competition) was a threat to
the monopolistic telephone enterprise. However,
eventually, it turned out that such threats became
opportunities to the monopoly enterprise. It can be seen
in countries that have adopted liberalisation, that this
policy provides the owners (i.e. the government) with the
incentive to restructure their organisations or privatise
in order to adapt to the market environment.
As was reported in the Economist (October 5th 1991,
p. 6), in a survey of Telecommunications:
" As with technology, so with the economics of
the industry: new patterns of demand have made
increased competition unavoidable. The impact
on both prices and products has been dramatic.
Business customers in competitive America,
Britain and Japan can now rent private lines,
for example far more cheaply than their
counterparts in continental Europe, where the
industry is largely in the grip of state-owned
monopolies".
(iii) New Services
With the improvement in the technology and
deregulation of the industry by the government, new
products and services are being developed, in more
imaginative, productive and cost-saving ways. The new
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products/services include mobile phones and outdoor
cordless telephones, which are cheaper and lighter.
Other new services include value-added network
services (VANS). VANS is a network that acts as an
interface between people sending messages to each other
over telephone lines. According to Johnstone (1990), VANS
originated as an offshoot of computer time-sharing
networks (via which remote users would send data for
processing at a central location). The providers of VANS
are computer makers, telephone companies, systems
integrators, software houses and independent networks,
while the services they provide under VANS include
messaging through electronic mailing system, protocol
conversion between incompatible computers and terminals,
data collection, user management packages such as
accounting and statistics packages, and facsimile
interfacing. The benefits of these services are greater
efficiency and lower costs in message-handling and
storage, such as customised billing, a 24-hour service,
and streamlined production, added to which there is no
need for in-house specialists.
(iv) Economic expansion
Economic expansion is one of the reasons for the
development and transformation of the telecommunications
industry, especially in Asia (Westlake, 7 March 1991).
This, together with deregulation, has resulted in a high
119
growth of demand for both the basic services and
sophisticated products such as digital networks, mobile
communications, dataline and so on.
Table 4.1 shows the number of main telephone lines
per 100 people in the Asian countries, where as far as
Malaysia is concerned, it has improved from 4.3 (in 1982)
to 8 (in 1988).
Table 4.1
Main telephone lines per 100 people
1982	 1988
Japan	 35.9	 41
Hong Kong	 28.2	 38
Singapore	 25.3	 35
Taiwan	 16.5	 33
S. Korea	 11.3	 25
Malaysia	 4.3	 8
Thailand	 0.8	 1.8
Phillipines	 0.7	 1
Indonesia	 0.3	 0.5
India	 0.4	 0.5
Source (1) OECD (1990)
(2) International Telephone Statistics, 1984
(v) Privatisation
Privatisation is one of the changes that are taking
place in the telecommunication industry of many countries
in the world (The Economist, Feb 2 1991). The reasons why
the national monopoly of the teleconununication enterprise
has been or is in the process of undergoing privatisation
differ from one country to another. In some countries,
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the reasons include the proceeds received for the
government treasury, and government inability to afford
to modernise the enterprise without private sector
participation, especially with the rapid technological
change.
Privatisation is also adopted as an answer to the
poor performance of state-owned enterprises and, in some
countries, in order to change the attitudes of workers
(Campbell-Smith, October 5th 1991). However, in general,
the rationale for privatising the telecommunication
industry is to increase efficiency and responsiveness,
creating new markets for the industry, to generate more
funds from the private capital and to reduce the burden
of funding from the government sector, especially in an
industry where changes are vitally needed in order to
keep up with a fast-growing technology.
4.3 The Telecommunication services industry in
Malaysia
4.3.1 Background
The telecommunication services in Malaya started as
early as before the second world war, during the British
rule, when postal, telegraph and telephone services were
under the control of the Superintendent Engineer. In 1895
there were 21 telephone lines in Kuala Lunipur. From then,
the telconimunications system progressed rapidly and in
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1908, a Department was created to merge postal and
telegraphic services. The two services were separated
during the Japanese occupation. After the second world
war, the two services remained separated and in 1946 the
Malayan Telecommunications Department was formed to
regulate and provide telecommunications services in
Malaya. Following the formation of the Department, the
Telecommunication Act 1950 was enacted, which formally
spelled out the powers of the Department.
After independence, the government decided to take
over the department from the British government, on 1st
July 1968 the Malaysian Telecommunications Department was
formed to incorporate the Malayan Telecommunications
Department, the Sabah Telcoiiununications Department and
the Sarawak Telecommunications Department, which existed
until 31st December 1986. In 1987, STM was incorporated.
4.3.2 Factors influencing the development of
the telecommunication sector in Malaysia
The factors influencing the development of the
telecommunication sector are as follows:
(a)	 Maintaining	 and	 improving	 the
telecommunication services
Teleconununication is an important factor for the
development of a country. When the British left Malaysia
after Independence, the telecommunication infrastructure
was in good condition, and the government continued to
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maintain and improve the telecommunication sector,
allocating a substantial sum of money for purchase of the
latest equipment and iuodernisation of the department to
keep up with changes in technology. From 1966 to 1970 a
total of M$196 million was spent on telecommunications
representing about 12.7% of the total expenditure for
transport, communications and utilities (Fong, 1989).
Government appreciation of the role of
telecommunications in the development of the country, can
be seen from the budget allocation to the sector in
successive 5-year plans, shown in Table 4.2. The revised
allocation for 1971-1975 was M$515.55 million, followed
by M$l,200 million for 1976-1980, a total of M$2900.44
million for 1981-1985 and original allocation of
M$9572.38 for 1986-1990. This is attributable to the
rapid increase in demand as a result of the
industrialisation policy and growth in the commercial and
financial sector of the economy, thereby increasing the
standard of living of the country, as well as inodernising
telecommunications.
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Table 4.2:- Original and Revised Allocations
For the Telecommunications Sector under the
various Malaysia Plans (M$Million)
Year	 Original	 Revised	 Actual
Allocation	 Allocation Expenditure
1966-70	 142.50	 146.20
1971-75	 298.30	 515.55	 494.91
1976-80 1080.00	 1200.00	 1112.67
1981-85 1399.52	 2900.44	 2400.48
1986-90 9572.38	 4210.9
1991-95 5391.3
Source : lst-6th Malaysia Plan, Government of
Malaysia
(b) New Economic Policy and Industrialisation
The second factor relates to the New Economic Policy
(NEP) whereby the government decided to diversify its
earlier concentration on agriculture to cover
industralisation also. The process of industralisation
was achieved by allowing foreign investors to come in,
especially in export-oriented industry. To encourage the
desired foreign investment, the government offered
concessions such as pioneer status, and undertook the
building of infrastructure in new locations for foreign
investors to set up their industries, including
telecommunication services. Thus, in the early part of
the 1970's, there was an influx of foreign investors into
the country to take advantage of the generous pioneer
status granted to them and the relatively cheap labour
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force available. As a result of this, there was
tremendous demand for telecommunication services such as
telephone, telex and other related services. The
industrialisation policy has been successful up to the
present time, especially with respect to the electronics
industry. Foreign companies have set up companies in
Malaysia and engaged in the production or assembly of
television sets, receivers, radios and other household
electrical goods, for both local consumption and export.
Table 4.3 shows the increase in the demand for telephone
lines from 1971 to 1987, including the number of
potential subscribers on the waiting list (waiters).
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Table 4.3:- Total Demand Including Waiters for
Telephone Lines From 1971-1986
Year Number of	 Number of
	 Total
Subsribers Waiters
	 Demand
(Customer)
1971	 110,019	 11,924	 121,943
1972	 121,603	 13,674	 135,277
1973	 136,494	 20,591	 157,085
1974	 149,458	 35,085	 184,543
1975	 169,538	 48,306	 217,844
1976	 194,359	 65,303	 259,562
1977	 227,564	 76,438	 304,002
1978	 271,010	 84,247	 355,257
1979	 325,154	 105,699	 430,853
1980	 395,640	 133,609	 529,249
1981	 488,675	 149,945	 638,620
1982	 585,378	 189,808	 775,195
1983	 700,097	 199,831	 899,928
1984	 849,129	 190,542	 1,039,669
1985	 958,598	 332,000	 1,290,598
1986 1,042,827	 348,000	 1,390,827
Source : Taken and calculated from Department
of Telecommunications (JTM) annual reports from
1971-1986.
(c) Improvement in the standard of living of
the country
As mentioned earlier, the increase in demand for
telephones tends to correlate with the growth of the
economy, ie the increase in per capita income. In
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Malaysia, economic expansion and regulation of certain
types of services in the telecommunication industry have
led to increase in demand for basic telephones and non-
basic products. As can be seen in Table 4.1, the
telephone lines per 100 people in Malaysia increased from
4.3 in 1982 to 8 in 1988 and increased to 11.6 in 1992
(STM Annual Report, 1992). The number of subscribers,
increased from 395,640 in 1980 to 1,131,719 as shown in
Table 4.3; and further to 2,091,578 in 1992 (STM Annual
Report, 1992).
At the start of the Sixth Malaysian Plan, the
government and the privatised company (i.e. STM)
allocated $5,350 million for network development. With
these developments, the number of telephone lines per 100
people in the country is expected to go up to 13 by 1995
(Sixth Malaysian Plan, Government of Malaysia, 1991).
4.3.3 Network development
In the 1960s, cable schemes and microwave radio
links facilitated the introduction of a subscriber trunk
dialling system and operator-assisted trunk calls in
major towns and villages of Malaysia. However the
'crossbars' used for local and international exchanges
were limited in function and failed to match the demands
for telephone service.
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Since the 1970s, there has been development of more
sophisticated exchanges to cope with the increasing
demands for telephone services. In 1980, the first fully
electronic exchanges, which marked the beginning of
computerization of telephone services, facilitated the
introduction of international subscriber dialling (ISD).
In 1984, another development was the introduction of
MAYPAC (Malaysian Packet Switched Public Data Network)
and in 1985 there was the introduction of ATUR (Automatic
Telephone Using Radio). Since then, development efforts
to improve telecommunication networks have been
progressively carried out. It was at the stage of
developing fibre optic technology that the Malaysian
Telecommunications Department handed over to STM.
STM continue to modernise and expand its
telecommunications network to take advantage of the
latest developments in telecommunications. Much of its
investment has been in the digitalisation of the network,
such as the introduction of digital microwave and
fibreoptic systems in STM's trunk and junction longlines
network. Half of the existing trunk and junction circuits
are being digitalised, enabling STM to offer better
quality and more cost-effective services. The earth
satellite station in Kuantan has been replaced with a
digital fibre-optic submarine cable which will further
improve the quality of international services. STM is
also contemplating constructing an ASEAN optic fibre that
will provide links to all the six ASEAN countries.
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The long-terni focus is on the development of
Integrated Services Digital Network, which would enable
voice and non-voice messages such as data, text and image
to be transmitted through the same lines. Figure 4.1,
under the title of 'Development in the Telecommunications
Sector' suinmarises the developments of telecommunications
in Malaysia which have taken place from 1967 till to
date.
Figure	 4.1	 -	 Developments	 in	 the
Telecommunications sector
From 1967-1970
Extension of microwave system linking major
west and east coast towns with the rest of the
Peninsular. Also, installation of automatic
exchanges. Kuantan Earth Satellite Ground
Station completed, making possible direct
dialling between major towns in Peninsular.
From 1971-1975
Subsribers Trunk Dialling (STD) extended to
some rural areas of the peninsular (i.e. about
70% of Peninsular Malaysia). Automatic Telex
exchange introduced for Kuala Lumpur, Kuching,
Kota Kinabalu and Penang. Kuantan Earth
Satellite modified for INTELSAT-TV Satellite.
From 1976-1980
Expansion of microwave system in Peninsular
Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak to a total of
380,000 miles of circuits. Direct satellite
link between Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and
Sarawak, enabling simultaneous TV broadcasting.
Expansion of international telex, telegraph and
telephone service. Proposal made on the
installation of 'A' type Satellite Earth
Station in Malacca which would cover 18
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countries and provide 160 satellite earth
circuits. Participation in ASEAN
telecommunication network involving laying of
undersea cables.
From 1981-1985
Microwave trunk telephone network extended in
Peninsular Malaysia connecting all major towns.
Direct telecommunication links established to
various countries using satellite and submarine
cables. Commissioning of: (1) new international
telephone exchange using computer controlled
equipment - ISD to 65 countries; (2)
Coinutonwealth Indian Ocean submarine cable
linking Penang and Madras; Asean Malaysia-
Singapore-Thailand submarine cable; and Penang-
Medan	 submarine	 cable.	 Introduction	 of
videotax, telefax and ATUR.
From 1986- 1990
Telephone network increase to 1.58 million.
With Privatisation, a shift from basic
telephone services to advanced business
services to support the move towards higher
value-added manufacturing and service-oriented
activities. Data services, such as Malaysian
Packet services (Maypac), Circuit Switched
Services (MAYCIS) datel, telefax and Mobile
Radio Communication services such as the
automatic telephone using radio (ATUR) system,
Trunked Radio and paging system experienced
rapid growth.
With total investment of M$4,000 million in the
network infrastructure and about 266,000 trunk
and Junction circuits digitilised, total ELC
capacity increased to 2.3 million lines. In
terms of regional and international
integration, an fibre optic cable link between
Kuantan and Kota Kinabalu was implemented as
part of the ASEAN submarine cable system to
meet the demand for improved telecommunication
services. Telecommunication services expanded
to rural areas. The ELC increased from 1.8
million in 1985 to 2.7 million in 1990 and ECP
from 2.2 million to 3.7 million throughout the
country. Increase in rural payphones from 250
to 6770 during the Fifth Plan period.
130
From 1991-1995
A total of M$5350 million is invested by STM in
the subsector for the digitalisation of the
domestic and international networks, the
commissioning of the digital microwave network
running from north to south; and the launching
of the Integrated System Digital Network (ISDN)
on a commercial basis. With these developments,
the ELC is targeted to increase from about 2.54
million in 1990 to 3.43 million in 1995.
With regional development and international
integration, about M$l020 million expected to
be invested on Switching and building new
exchanges, as well as upgrading the exchanges
from analogue to digital. The digital microwave
transmission will continue to be expanded and
the fibre optic system will be implemented to
enable high speed digital links between
exchanges and for trunk links nationwide. As
for the international network, M$475 million
will be spent on digital switching and cable
and satellite facilities to support the rapid
growth in international traffic. In addition,
new, fully digital international telephone
gateways will also be implemented. The
extension of telecommunications services to
rural areas will continue with an investment of
M$l390 million.
Source : Malaysia Plan, various issues (i.e
1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991), Government of
Malaysia, Government Printers
4.4 Brief history of J'TM/STM
4.4.1 Organisational and management structure
4.4.1.1 The early days
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Since the Department was started by the British in
1874, most of the technical and managerial staff were
naturally British expatriates, while the lower-rank
staff, consisting of technical assistants, technicians
and clerks, were Malaysians. Thus, in the period from
1946 to 1957, there was an urgent need to train more
Malaysians, especially at the technical and managerial
levels.
After the formation of Malaysia in 1963, the
teleconununications department came under the control of
the Ministry of Works, Telecommunications and Posts at
federal level. The Posts and Telegraphs Departments in
Sabah and Sarawak were combined into one region, directly
under the control of the Regional Director of
Telecommunications, who in turn reported to the
Secretary-General of the Ministry of Works,
Telecommunications and Posts. The Act was amended in 1968
to incorporate these changes.
4.4.1.2 From 1968-1977
Manpower development and training were the main
priorities. Many staff were sent abroad to acquire
professional qualifications and many more were encouraged
to take the London City and Guilds Examinations, with a
view to creating more qualified Malaysians at the
technical and managerial levels. By the late 1960s, there
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were enough Malaysians to fill the technical and
managerial posts in the department. Among the new posts
created (after changes in the organisation in order to
meet the rapidly-expanding demands of the
telecommunications industry in the late 1960s) were those
of Director-General, Deputy Director-General and several
directors at the top level (see Figure 4.2 for the
organisational structure of the department from 1968-
1977) Under the directors, there was a group of
Controllers of Telecommunications, each having his own
responsibilities. The controllers were assisted by the
Assistant Controllers who were qualified professional
engineers. Below them, in a descending hierarchy, were
the	 Technical	 Assistants,	 the	 technicians,	 and
maintenance and installation staff. (Fong C.O., 1989).
In the early 1970s, when the government allowed
foreign investors to enter the country and also to take
part in the running of some businesses, demand for
telephone, telex and other related services grew rapidly.
However the telecommunications Department had not forseen
these demands or the new direction in the economy towards
export-oriented industrialisation and services. The
changes in the organisational structure of the Department
in the 1960's, had not taken the above trends into
account, and there was a shortage of staff, especially in
the technical sections. To overcome this problem, the
Department decided to employ new recruits and organise
crash courses for them.
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Despite the increase in the number of staff, the
installation targets could not be met, and complaints
were made by the general public and the business
community about the inefficiency of the Department,
especially with respect to the long waiting period to
obtain lines and repair work, and lack of attention paid
to overcharged bills. These problems were also attributed
to continued shortages of equipment and cables. Problems
also arose in relation to land acquisition for telephone
exchanges since the Department had to obtain permission
from the various state governments. This could be a
lengthy process, taking up to two years. moreover, state
governments were often reluctant to give permission for a
land use from which they would receive no revenue.
4.4.1.3 From 1978-1986
In order to solve these problems, the government
made drastic changes to the Department in 1978. The first
change was with respect to the ministry itself. The
government decided to split it into two Departments. With
this change, the Teleconununication Department came under
the Ministry of Energy, Teleconununications and Post. The
second change was with respect to the Department, where
extensive reorganisation was made. Instead of dealing
with 13 states separately the government decided to
regroup into seven regions: Central Region consisting of
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Federal Territory and Selangor; North Region consisting
of Perak, Penang, Kedah and Perlis; South Region
including Negeri Sembilan, Malacca and Johor; East Region
including Pahang, Terengganu, and Kelantan; Sabah Region;
Sarawak Region and External Region. (Malaysia,
Telecommunications Department Annual Report 1979). The
rationale for creating regional offices was to delegate
some of the authority, thereby giving greater regional
autonomy so that certain decisions could be made faster
by the Regional General Manager without going through
Headquarters.
As at 1978, The Malaysian Telecoms Department (JTM)
administrative structure as shown in Figure 4.3 was made
up of three divisions :
(1) National Headquarters
(2) Regions
(3) Districts (Areas office and Telecom Shop)
The function of National Headquarters was to
administer the overall operation and development of the
telecommunications network in line with its
responsibility to provide an efficient and effective
domestic and international telecommunications service.
This involved planning, control and coordinating between
regional and district offices.
The Director General was the head of the Department.
He was directly responsible to the Ministry of
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Telecommunications and was assisted by two Deputy
Director Generals. The National headquarters was divided
into eight divisions, each headed by a Director who
reported either direct to the Director General or to one
of his Deputies.
The divisions were as follows:
i) Administration
ii) Training and Research
iii) Switching
iv) Local Networks
v) International
vi) Stores and Workshops
vii) Traffic / Public Relations
ix) Finance and Accounts.
The Regional Headquarters was responsible for the
administration of telecommunication services in the
regions, including linking with national and overseas
networks. Other functions included planning, engineering,
operating and maintaining the telecommunication services
in the region concerned. Each region was divided into
development, operation and accounts divisions. There were
six geographical regions: North, Central, South,and East
regions of Peninsular Malaysia, and Sabah and Sarawak.
A Regional Director headed each region. He came
under the guidance and close supervision of the national
headquarters. Each region was further divided into
districts. The district office came under the control of
area controllers who were responsible for day to day
running of operations, maintenance and engineering of the
local offices.
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With	 the	 privatisation	 of	 the	 Malaysian
Telecommunications Department, the administrative
structure of the Department was reorganised by the newly
formed company (STM) in 1987.
4.4.1.4 From 1987 to date
STM organisational structure, as shown in Figure
4.4, consists of:
1) National Headquarters
2) Regional Headquarters
3) Local Headquarters
4) Counter Services, and six main regions (Central,
North, South, East, Sabah and Sarawak)
Headed by the Chairman and Executive Director, the
overall corporate headquarters organisation of STM as
shown in Figure 4.4 is divided into four main divisions:-
i) Operations
ii )Technical Services
iii)Administration and Human resources
iv)Finance
The reorganisation above was initiated to transform
a government department into a market-driven and customer
oriented company, operating the nations
telecommunications service and at the same time to
provide motivation for its employees. As shown in Figure
4.4, the organisational structure at that time was
functionally and regionally structured, and did not
eniphasise marketing or the optimal use of infrastructure.
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However, in 1989, the structure was reorganised, to
meet changing demands. Under the new structure, as shown
in Figure 4.5, the post of Chairman was expanded to
Executive Chairman with four divisions reporting to him,
namely:
1)Internal Audit
2) Corporate Affairs
3)Human Resources
4)Finance
As from 1/1/1991, the post of Director of Finance
was upgraded to Executive Director, reflecting the
increased importance and role of finance and accounts in
the organisation.
Reporting to the Executive Chairman is the Executive
Director who heads the four sections:
1)Customer Services and Marketing
2)Network Services
3)Support Services
4)Information systems
4.4.2 JTM / STM Services
The Malaysian Telecoirmiuflicatons department is
engaged in the activity of establishing, maintaining and
providing telecommunications and a variety of related
services, both within Malaysia and internationally. JTM
services can be divided into five categories:
1) Voice Communication (Telephone, Public
Payphones)
2) Text Communication (Telegram, Telex, Telefax,
Biorf ax)
3) Data Communication (Datel, MAYPAC)
4) Radio Communication (ATUR, Karf on, Radio Call
141
0	 0
-I
I.. -
0.
o	 00	 0
C
E
I-
'C0
>
0
w
0I,
I-
0
0
E
x 0CC
0
I-
00
C
C
I-
I-
I-
0.
00
I-
0
4.
-C,
00
'-C
00
>
C
Ui
I-o
0. u
-OC
E0
0
0=
C
0
0
a
I-
C
0
C
a
I..
0
DO0.0.
I-
0)
0)I-
I-
0)
0
4-I-
0
a.
0
€0
C
C
0L.
0
0)
I-2
'eu.
P Lj
0
= 0 0
C
=
CO 0 =
0
.0
0 0=
z
-	 -
0 C VC '-C 0
i0	 C
- •- .C- 0
0
'C CC 0
.0 >	 I-
Ol_	 C
V
C
00,
DC
I..
C
I-
0,
C4..
	
C	 C
	
>1'C	
.!.	 CU
	
CC	 i..0 0,0
00
	
'-C	 C	 LU0.0
I-
0
	
•	 I-	 I..	 C
	
o	
-
.	 a-
	
'-	 ...0 .	 i	 _4.IC CE00 1C -
o	 0- o- CC	 C
•	 C CZC 0,E0 0C_	 ;C
	
0...	 ....Q...0.CQ, •C...VC
	
z	
11
C
00
I_ I00
C
service (HF), Radio Maritime Service, Radio
Paging Service)
STM, as well as improving the above services,
introduced new services in line with its mission to
provide quality and efficient service to its customers.
These include:
1) Private Leased Lines
2) Customised Services (Customer Automated Services
System).
3) Other related services such as rural services,
international services.
Table 4.4 shows the growth of telecommunications
services in 1990 and forecast figures for 1995 (Sixth
Malaysian Plan, Government of Malaysia, 1991). Of these
increases, not all are provided by STM. The government
has allowed other telecommunication company to enter the
market as will be discussed in Chapter Five.
Table 4.4 : Growth of Telecommunications
Services by Types in Malaysia
Type of Service	 Subscribers Average 	 Annual
1990	 1995	 Growth
Telephone	 1579634	 3028446	 14%
Telex	 8115	 6280	 -5%
Cellular (ATUR) 	 87000	 250000	 24%
Paging	 36000	 160000	 35%
Maypac	 1125	 2640	 19%
Trunked Radio System 	 1250	 12000	 57%
Datel	 5678	 21702	 31%
Leased circuits	 15071	 39574	 21%
Telefax	 36716	 120000	 27%
Source: Sixth Malaysia Plan, Government of
Malaysia (1991).
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4.4.3 Environment of the Organisation before
and after Privatisation
The environment of the organisation before and after
privatisation is shown in Figures 4.6 and 4.7. As can be
seen from these two figures, the main changes that took
place are as follows:
i) Under JTM environment, the main owner of the
Department was the governient. Thus the policies /
direction in running the Department came directly from
them. Funds were either provided by the government in the
form of loans or loans taken from the financial
institutions with guarantees from the government. This
changed when the Department was privatised, and the
shareholders became the owners of the newly privatised
company. The funds still come from financial institutions
through short-term or long-term borrowings but without
guarantee by the government. However, since the
government still hold a majority stake in the company, it
still influences the company's direction and policies
through its representation on the board.
ii) With respect to Human Resources, under JTM, the
workers were subject to the standard government
conditions of services. Under STM environment, the
employees are governed by trade union rules and
regulations, and conditions of service for non-executive
employees depend on negotiations between the unions and
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the management of the company. However, for executives
and above, the condition of services are usually tied to
performance.
iii) Overall, under JTM, the emphasis was service-
oriented whereas under STM, it is driven by profit
motives, as shown in Figures 4.6 and 4.7.
Financial Developments
With respect to accounting systems, a major change
took place regarding the loan agreement with the World
Bank to finance certain telecom projects. In compliance
with one of the conditions of this agreement the
government decided to install a commercial system of
accounting as from April 1971 to replace the traditional
Treasury Accounting system (Malaysian Telecommunication
Instruction, 1971). Another reason for changing to a
commercial system was the fact that the department is a
revenue generating organisation. It was found that under
the traditional treasury accounting system, the
department was over regulated and thus was not able to
respond quickly enough to meet customer demand for
services. Under the new system, the objective was not
only to make the department self- sufficient but also to
earn a targeted rate of return on capital of at least 8%
every year.
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As can be seen from Table 4.5, the objective of self
sufficiency was not met from the initial year, that is in
1971 when the Department was made a self- accounting
entity following commercial principles, until 1986, just
before privatisation. Even though the revenue of the
Department increased over the years, (especially the
telephone revenue as can be seen in Table 4.6) so did the
total expenditure (operating and development
expenditure). Thus, the Department could only cover the
operating expenditure and part of the development
expenditure, and had to rely on government for its
development expenditure over the years from 1972 to 1986.
f5 Summary
In this chapter, the telecommunication industry and
the organisation was described and discussed. With
respect to the industry, it has grown as a result of many
factors.	 These	 include	 technological	 change,
deregulation, liberalisation and competition, new
services and economic expansion. In addition, the
development of the telecommunication sector in Malaysia
was influenced by government policies such as NEP and
industralisation. Other factors included improvement in
the standards of living of the country which demanded
improvement in telecommunication services. It was also
pointed out in this chapter that when the environment
changed through privatisation, differences emerged with
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respect to the objectives and purposes of the
organisation.
After having describe the organisation i.e. analsing
the context of the organisation,and following Pettigrew's
data collection framework shown in Table 1.1 of Chapter
One, the next three chapters will analyse the content and
process of change. We begin in Chapter Five by analysing
the three phases of disturbance that affected the
organisation in general, with special focus on the third
phase of disturbance, the privatising of the
organisation. In particular, the role of accounting
before and after privatisation will be examined.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Process of Change arising out of the Three
Phases of Disturbances; and the Role of
Accounting and Finance Before and After
Privatisation
5.1 Introduction
The information presented in the previous chapter
corresponded to the first level of Pettigrew's data
framework, whereby the researcher examines the external
context of change. In this chapter we move on to the
second and third levels of Pettigrew's framework, the
internal context and content of change, taking data from
Department/Company and System levels respectively.
The chapter discusses the process of change
happening from the time of JTN up to STM, arising out of
the three phases of disturbance. JTM began as a
government Department, formed in 1972 with a loan from
the government. The Department was directed to follow
commercial principles and required to meet a return of 8%
on capital.
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Using Laughlin's model of organisational change, the
first phase of disturbance came from the liberalisation
of the telecommunication services. This liberalisation
took place for many reasons, arising out of the New
Economic Policy (NEP), the shift from an agriculture
based economy to one of mixed agriculture and
industrialisation, an influx of foreign investments, and
rapid technological advancement of the industry itself.
However later, with poor performance shown by the
Department through, for example, long waiting lists and
under-utilisation of network exchanges, the emergence of
new and aggressive 'bumiputra' entrepreneurs in the
industry led to the government awarding a major expansion
programme of the telecommunication networks to the
private sector through turnkey projects. This could be
considered as a second phase of disturbance to the
Department, in that most of its core jobs were taken away
from it and given to the private sector. This led to
frustration and demotivation of the staff of the
Department since the effect of the turnkey projects was
to reduce their chances of promotion and overtime work.
The third phase of disturbance came when the
government decided to privatise the Department in 1987.
This resulted in a drastic change taking place in the
organisation. Privatisation led to an 'invasion' of
outside people with a commercial background, who filled
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not only top positions, but also positions at middle
management, executive and officer levels in most of the
non-technical areas especially accounting and finance and
as a result, accounting emerged as visible in the
organisation.
The Chapter is divided into two parts. The first
looks at the company overall (the second level of
Pettigrew's framework) while the second narrows the
focus, looking at the role played by the accounting and
finance division during JTM days to date. This will lay
the groundwork for the detailed system-level analysis to
be presented in subsequent chapters.
5.2 External Influences Affecting JTM
The introduction of the New Economic Policy directly
affected the Department, JTM, through:-
(a) Rapid expansion of the entire government sector
including JTM, with a massive intake in the l970s and
1980s of employees as can be seen from Table 5.1.
(b) Industrialisation through creation and expansion
of rural industrial estates and free trade zones
resulting in increased demand for telecommunication
services. There was an upsurge in demand for
telecommunication services arising from:
(i) general improvement of the economy of the
country;
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(ii) increased urbanization of Malaysia from 27%
(1970) to 34% (1980) (Malaysian 1987 Year book);
(iii) a change in the industrial sector to export
orientation, (Kennedy, 1991).
Table 5.1 : Number of Staff of JTM fron 1972-
1984
Type of Group	 1972	 1978 1980	 1982	 1984
Group A-Technical 134
	 279	 428	 518	 604
Non-Technical 61
	 61	 102	 193	 236
Group B-Technical 465
	 464	 529	 675	 759
Non-Technical 96
	 117	 191	 312	 330
Group C- Total	 6868	 9677	 8449	 11744	 12369
Group D- Total	 5485	 7649	 15588	 16368	 15946
Total	 13109 18247
	 25287	 29810	 30244
Source: Annual Report of J1rM of various years.
As can be seen from Table 5.1, there was a 131%
increase in total staff of the Department (both the
technical and non-technical) from 13109 in 1972 to 30244
in 1984. For the same period, group A staff (i.e.
executives and above levels) increased from 195 to 840,
an increase of 331%, which is higher than the percentage
increase in total staff. Furthermore, between 69-85% of
group 'A staff' during this period were from the
technical group. This comes as no surprise, as the
organisation is a technically based company. Even in the
non-technical division of the company, more than 75% of
staff had engineering qualifications and experience as
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evidence shown in tha annual report of various years and
interview with some of ex-JTM staffs.
The reason for the above trend was that, as the
Department expanded, there were many new administrative
posts of managerial rank, for which preference was given
to internal candidates. Therefore, it was mainly
engineers who were selected to fill these administrative
posts. However, when it came to filling the vacant posts
created by promotion, the hiring process was conducted by
the Public Service Department (PSD), and the successful
candidates were determined by the PSD personnel rather
than by the Department. Because of lack of qualified
engineers available at that time, this hiring process
took a long time, sometimes more than a year.
This policy on intake of staff brought frustrations
to the JTM top management as they could not hire trained
engineers. Also,
	
the large intake of unskilled
technicians in the l970s created problems for the
Department in coping with the training that it had to
provide for them (interview with ex-JTM senior staff,
December 1991).
5.3 Weaknessess/Problenis in Organisational set-up of JTI4
as a Government Department
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The organisational structure of JTM was briefly
outlined in Chapter Four. JTM was a government Department
depending heavily on the central government, especially
with respect to capital expenditure funds, which were
provided in the form of loans from government or other
agencies at a 'cheap rate'. It depended fully on the
Public Services Department for the approval and creation
of new posts as well as recruitment of staff. For
accounting personnel, it relied on the Accountant-
General's office, whose staff were seconded to the
department. The same went for the computer department
whose staff were seconded from the Prime Minister's
department.
Its service structure was identical with that of the
government civil service structure with respect to pay
scales, promotion, service scheme and other benefits such
as housing loans, car loans and pension scheme. The
organisational structure of JTN was divided into the
National Headquarters and six Regional Headquarters as
shown in Figure 4.3 of Chapter Four, as from 1978-1986.
The function of National Headquarters was to plan,
coordinate and control the overall development and
operation of the network of the organisation. The
objectives laid down by the Department were not only to
provide an efficient and effective domestic and
international telecommunication service but also to earn
a minimum 8% return on capital.
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The six Regional Headquarters covered the North,
Central, South and East Region in Peninsular Malaysia and
Sabah and Sarawak regions in East Malaysia. The function
of the Regional Headquarters was to plan, engineer,
operate and maintain the telecommunication services in
the region concerned. Each was divided into development,
operations, and accounts. The regions were further
divided into a number of areas. In each area was a
controller who was responsible for the services in that
particular area.
Problems and constraints existed in JTM at that
time, while it was directly under the control of the
government. The Department's main problem was its
inability to meet customer demands, while at the same
time having a highly underutilised network as can be seen
in Tables 5.4 and 5.5. This could be the result of poor
planning and, to a certain extent, political interference
in the decisions on network locations. Also, in a
service-oriented government Department, the concepts of
demand and financial viability of projects were not the
main consideration and in many cases were not taken into
account in deciding on the building of networks.
Other constraints were with regard to the funding
for capital projects like the network, which came from
the Treasury. As discussed earlier, the Department was
not able to supplement the funding for its capital
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projects from internally generated funds, since it did
not make much profit. Thus it was dependent on funds from
the Treasury, and therefore subject to Treasury
constraints and red-tape. Morever as a government
Department, JTM was not able to increase the tariffs and
rental at the prevailing rate in order to reflect
commmercial conditions.
As for purchasing of equipment, especially
computers, not only did this have to be approved
internally, but a bigger hurdle still was to obtain
approval from the central agency. Because of bureaucratic
procedures, this process took a long time. This was one
reason why the organisation was not able to computerise
many aspects of its administrative affairs.
With respect to recruitment, as was mentioned in the
previous section, the Department had no power to recruit
its own staff. This was handled centrally by the Public
Services Department (PSD). Recruitment under this system
took a long time, sometimes running to more than one
year, and at times, the suitability of candidates was
questionable. Further, the Department had to conform to
the rigid and unattractive service schemes of the
government. Establishment of new posts had to be approved
by outside bodies, i.e. the PSD and the Treasury. Getting
new posts established was not too difficult, but
employing experienced personnel, especially from the
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private sector, was difficult, in view of the problems
described earlier.
The secondinent of accounting personnel from the
Accountant-General's (AG) office usually covered a period
of two to three years. This system was criticised by most
people from the organisation because it led to
conflicting loyalties. Staff from the AG office owed
their loyalties to that office rather than to the
Department, since they knew that they were only
temporarily based there. This was because promotion came
within the AG pools. Moreover, in JTM, dominated by
engineers, the accountants were looked on as 'alien' to
the organisation, in the sense that they were seen as the
watchdogs or policemen of the government.
The next problem relates to the temporary period of
appointment. No sooner did seconded staff become familiar
with the system, than they were transferred to another
government organisation by the AG, and were replaced by
new recruits who needed to learn the system. Thus,
continuity was lost and improvement of the system was
difficult. Instead of being solved, these problems were
allowed to build up.
In addition to the accountants, accounting officers,
book-keepers and key-punch operators were also seconded
from the AG. Because of this situation, in order to
maintain continuity, clerical staff were also given
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accounting functions, as well as their administratative
duties. As most of the officers, formerly ex-JTM staff
complained:
"It was not fair to give them accounting
duties, when no training was given to them".
An example of the effect of this situation on the
company may be seen with regard to the bank
reconciliation; monthly reconciling was done, but whether
or not it balanced was a different matter. The concern
was simply to perform the task as required. This is
because the work was done by clerical staff who did not
understand why it was being done and did not know the
implications if the cash book and the bank statement did
not balance. As time passed, this resulted in accumulated
discrepancies (Interview with the Accountant at the
Central Region).
5.4 The Three Phases of Disturbance Affecting the
Organisation
5.4.1 The First Phase of Disturbance - The New
Economic Policy and liberalisation of the
telecommunications industry (1972-1982)
With the introduction of the New Economic Policy,
the objective of which was to redistribute the income of
the country, the government saw an opportunity to achieve
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this objective through the telecommunications industry.
At the same time as eliminating some inefficiences in the
Department, liberalisation of some of the services/goods
which had been provided exclusively by JTN, provided an
opportunity for the expansion of bumiputra
entrepreneurship.
The first form of liberalisation was the franchising
of public pay-telephones by the Department to a bumiputra
telecommunications firm, Sapura Holdings in 1972. The
public pay-telephones in the early l970s, which were
about 2000 in number, constituted a problem for the
Department, due to the frequency with which they were
vandalised, jammed by uncollected coins or left
unrepaired when out of order (Interview with the
Assistant Director of Tariff and Rates of the newly
created regulatory department (the new JTM)). The local
newspapers gave coverage to public complaints about the
poor service. Then, a local company proposed to JTM that
the management of public pay-telephones be given to a
firm which would undertake not only the maintenance
works, but also installation and collection. This
process, known as franchising, led to the firm taking
over the total care of public pay-telephones from JTM.
The Department was happy with the proposal since it
reduced its responsibilities and allowed it to unburden
itself of an operation which was not attractive to the
Department at that time.
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A five-year contract (which was renewed later) was
signed by the Department with Uniphone, a subsidiary of
Sapura Holdings, whereby the company would install,
maintain and collect from urban public pay-telephones and
the revenues earned would be shared on a 50/50 basis in
Kuala Luinpur and Petaling Jaya. On this revenue-sharing
basis, Uniphone performed well in terms of profitability;
morever, the public pay-telephone service improved
tremendously. When the project was successful, it was
decided to extend the services to all cities in Malaysia
and the contract was renewed for a further five years;
because of its good performance, a third five-year term
was then granted. By 1990, there were more than 22,300
public payphones in use all over Malaysia (Arab-Malaysian
Merchant Bank, 1990). According to the Assistant Director
of Tariff and Rates of the newly created regulatory
department (the new JTM), after 15 years of services
(i.e. the initial five-year period plus two five-year
extensions of contract) and after STN was formed in 1987,
the government decided to give a 15-year licence to
Uniphone to provide public phone services to all the
cities in Malaysia (excluding services in rural areas,
which STM had to undertake). Under this new term, STM
collects M$35.O0 per public payphone line rental per
month in Peninsular Malaysia and M$25.O0 in Sabah and
Sarawak. In addition to that, the revenues earned would
be shared on a basis of 20:80, i.e. 20% to STM and 80% to
IJniphone (Arab-Malaysian Merchant, 1990).
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However, the government stipulated that Uniphone
must provide good services, for example by introducing
card-phones, extending research and development and
creating more outlets throughout the country. STM
management were displeased at the loss of 'ready
revenues' from these lucrative services, and the prospect
of losses on the rural pay-phone services.
As mentioned earlier, the expansion of the economy
increased the migration of population to urban areas and
the boost in the industralisation policy resulted in a
tremendous increase in demand for telecommunications
services. Because of this increase, the government
allocated substantial funds in the Third Malaysian Plan,
in order to cater to the demand and also to upgrade and
improve the telecommunication networks. This caused the
Department, which could not cope with the expansion, to
contract out some of its work to the private sector. Thus
in 1975, the Department awarded the work of cable
installation, valued about M$3 million, to two buiniputra
firms (FEER, 1979). In the same year, another local
bumiputra company was awarded the work of installing the
switching equipment. This was the second form of
liberalisation.
As for the building of the telecommunication
networks, jobs such as digging of trenches, laying of
ducts, erection of poles and placing of manhole covers
were usually contracted out to the Public Works
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Department (a different government department under a
different ministry) and sometimes to private contractors,
while JTM was responsible for the planning of the cable
networks and actual laying or hanging of the cable.
With the increase in demand for telecommunication
services and allocation of funds provided by the
government under the various Malaysian plans, there was
an increase in the civil works that needed to be done.
The PWD which could not manage the tremendous increase in
volume of civil works, began contracting out. The process
of approving and awarding contracts to outsiders was
lengthy, especially when the applications increased. Thus
the Department, with the agreement of the Treasury,
decided to introduce a new system whereby works would be
awarded to those who registered with the
Department/Treasury. This was possible since most of the
jobs had the same contract rate and specification. This
system, known as the 'Jadual Kadar Harga' (JKH)
(translated as Schedule of Standards and Rates) system
(which was introduced in 1975), led to an increase in the
number of registered contractors, where jobs were
allocated on an equitable basis (interview with former
JTM senior staff in December 1991).
It is interesting to note here that most of these
registered contractors were formerly ex-senior staff of
JTM (holding the posts of director, deputy director
general or director general). JTM's top management were
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in favour of this since it helped the Department to
overcome the problem of the waiting list which had
increased over the years. Other reasons were the desire
to help 'old friends' and implementation of the NEP
policy, since most of the companies were owned by the
bumiputra businessmen.
In 1979, the JKH system was modified, with the
registered contractors divided into various classes
according to their technical capacity and size of their
business turnover. The process was the same as the JKH
system mentioned earlier, but the firms were categorised
into Classes A, B, C, D, E, Ex, and F. (New Straits
Times, October 5, 1983, p. 6).
The fourth form of liberalisation was in late 1979
when the ministry announced that cables, telephone hand
sets and private exchanges would be provided by the
private sectors from 1980 (FEER, 1979). This took place
when it was found that some firms in the private sector
could supply the equipment if given the licence to supply
from the Ministry. JTM at that time was unable to supply
the equipment in large numbers, because it could not
handle high stock levels, as most of its limited funds
had to be spent on construction of the networks.
In order to meet the NEP objectives, the Ministry
decided to break the exclusive monopoly rights long held
by JTM. Being service-oriented, JTM personnel were quite
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happy with the liberalisation of some of their services,
as this meant a reduction in their responsibilities.
With the announcement of liberalisation came a rush
among telecommunication firms such as Sapura Holdings,
Malayan Cables Pernas Engineering and other international
firms such as Siemens from West Germany and Marconi
Italiana to enter the market. However, most of the
foreign companies sought partnership with Malaysian firms
in order to gain access to the market (FEER, 1979).
This was followed by liberalisation of VANS where 32
licences for radio paging were issued by the ministry
from 1985 to 1987 (interview with the Assistant Director
of Tariff and Rates of the newly created regulatory
Department (the new JTM)). However most of these licences
were given to buiniputra entrepreneur telecommunications
companies. Most of these buiniputra entrepreneurs were
former senior officers of JTM who had resigned/retired to
take advantage of the situation.
Next	 came	 the	 liberalisation	 of	 cellular
telecommunications. This was given to JTN/STN, Celcoin
under Fleet groups and other buluiputra companies, notably
Sapura Holdings etc. At this stage, licences were issued
not only to selected bumiputra companies run by formerly
JTN staff, but also to companies indirectly owned by the
ruling political parties.
With the liberalisation of the telecommunications
industry, some of the business activities of JTM were
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taken over by the private sector. This was unavoidable,
given the poor performance of the Department, which could
not cope with the challenge of running the
telecommunications industry as it became sophisticated
and faced rapid changes in technology.
The decision to liberalise came from the officials
from the Ministry of Telecommunications, who had the
final authority. However, at this stage, the Department's
top officials were supportive of this move as they had a
vested interest: upon retirement, they could join these
private telecommunication firms, run by their former
colleagues. As will be seen later, most of the work which
JTM sub-contracted out was done by ex-senior staff of JTM
who joined the small telecommunication firms upon
retirement or took early retirement. Some of the younger
ones resigned and formed companies to gain these
advantages, after acquiring business experience.
5.4.2 The Second Phase of Disturbance - The
Turnkey Projects (end of 1983-1988)
In late 1979, the government announced that future
telecommunication projects would be awarded on a turnkey
basis. The main reason for the government's decision to
implement the expansion of the telecommunication networks
through turnkey projects was due to the poor performance
of the Department over the decade (i.e. in the 1970s).
Because of lack of concern for commercial considerations,
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and poor planning, projects were not completed on time
and also there was a long waiting list. In fact, the aim
of the turnkey project was to achieve 'no waiting list by
1985'. As was said by the Minister of Energy,
Telecommunications and Post,
"By 1985 we hope to have 1.5 million
subscribers. We have to install many more
lines. We will have to move fast. We are
convinced that there is no other way to achieve
these targets but to get the private sector
involved on a turnkey basis" (Singh, October
15, 1983,).
Although most staff of JTM disagreed with this
concept, the Department had no choice, since the
directive came from the top level, i.e. from the Ministry
of Telecommunications. The implementation of turnkey
projects marked a downgrading of the Department,
especially to its engineering staff, because under this
concept, the turnkey contractors would be doing the
planning, material supply, installation and final handing
over to the government, thus taking away the 'core' part
of the engineers' operations, namely planning and
engineering.
The introduction of the turnkey projects was also in
line with the government's intention to modernise the
telecommunications industry in Malaysia like those of
other countries. At the same time, the aim was not only
to	 attract	 foreign	 investment	 in	 terms	 of
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industralisation but also to make the country the
financial centre of the region.
The work awarded under the turnkey projects, which
cost M$2 Billion, was with respect to cable-laying,
designing of systems and associated works. The other
aspects of the telecommunication system, such as
provision of exchanges and laying sub-marine cables
continued to be undertaken by JTM (New Straits Times,
27th September 1983).
The impact of the implementation of the turnkey
projects on the Department was very great. For the lower-
rank staff, the introduction of turnkey projects reduced
their pay, since overtime was reduced tremendously. For
the officers, especially the engineers, the turnkey
contractors took away their core function/role and in the
end stopped them from moving upward, since this led to a
reduction in promotion prospects (Fong C. 0., 1989). What
increased their frustration was the fact that, as a
result of these turnkey projects, they lost a lot of
staff who were poached by the four contracting companies,
which expanded tremendously upon receiving the turnkey
projects. The staff who worked with these contractors
were paid three to four times as much as their
counterparts in JTM.
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5.4.3 The Third Phase of Disturbance -
Corporatisation and Privatisation of the
Organisation
Privatisation of the organisation had a number of
important effects upon the company. First, the employees
who had agreed to transfer from JTM to STM moved from a
secure government job to a less secure one where rewards
were based on work performance. Secondly, the
organisation shifted in new directions and adopted new
approaches in line with its new mission. Greater emphasis
was placed on the need for experienced personnel with a
commercial background, and if they were not available
within the organisation, they were brought in from
outside. Thirdly, the organisation incurred additional
expenses. Since it was no longer a government Department,
it could no longer benefit from special treatment with
regard to postage, road tax for the organisation's
vehicles etc, and lost such benefits as housing loans for
workers. Fourthly, under the new organisation, STH was
evaluated by different criteria, as its main mission had
changed to commercial viability. Thus the management of
its resources required greater prudence and
sophistication in accordance with commercial values.
Finally, the company became subject to more stringent
service demands. Not only did customers become more
conscious of their rights to certain standards of service
made mandatory under the STM licence and to exert
pressure (e.g. through consumer associations) but also,
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STM was monitored by the new regulatory body set up by
the government.
5.4.3.1 STM during the period from 1987-1988
The first nine months after privatisation, was a
learning stage for the Chairman and the board of
directors, since most of them were new to the
telecommunication business, with the exception of Dr Syed
Hussein. Dr Syed Hussein was a former JTM staff member in
the early 1970s, and when appointed to the board as a
director, was also the Director of Corporate Planning of
Sinie Darby, a well-known company in Malaysia. With an
engineering degree plus some years working experience, he
was able to contribute during the initial monthly
meetings of the board. The former Director-General of IJTM
was appointed as the Managing Director of the new
company. However, in the monthly board meetings, it was
noticed that things were not moving as they should.
Eventually, the government, which was also dissatisfied
with the progress being made, decided to upgrade the post
of the Chairman to Executive Chairman and appoint Dr.
Syed Hussein Mohamed as the executive director (ED) and
chief operating officer of STM. This prompted the
Managing Director, Daud Ishak, who was supposed to report
to ED, to resign with 24 hours notice. Since his
resignation, the company has been managed by a top
management and board of directors coming from outside.
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This is in line with one of the recommendations made by
the consultant appointed by the government to look into
the feasibility of privatising JTM, that the recruitment
of STM'S top managers should come from the private
sector. With these changes, it was noticed later that in
non-engineering divisions such as in the accounting and
finance, marketing, information services and legal
divisions and to a certain extent within the engineering
division, especially at the executive level, more and
more people with commercial experience were recruited to
fill the newly-created posts, in line with the new
mission and objectives of the company.
The recruitment of outsiders for top, middle and
executive level posts within STM was an emotive issue to
the ex-JTh staff, especially the engineers, almost 99% of
whom were from the old organisation, i.e. transfers from
JTM to ST!'!. Their dissatisfaction was also due to the
lack of JTM participation in the decision-making related
to the privatisation process, most of which was done by a
committee formed by the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) of
the Prime Minister's Department. Both the management and
rank and file of JTM felt that they were held in low
regard by the government. Some of the managers,
(especially the technical group) considered the new
organisational structure and the recruitment of the top
people from outside as obstacles to their promotion and
meaningful participation in decision making.
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5.4.3.2 STh as from 1988
Among the first actions of Dr. Syed Hussein after
his appointment as Executive Director were to revamp the
Budget committee, form the corporate planning department
and increase the staff from four to 12. Several important
decisions took place along with this expansion:-
(a) a detailed monthly management report was
introduced which included both accounting and non
accounting corporate performance, prepared under five
sub-headings:- financial results, customer growth,
ratios, productivity and quality of service, as shown in
Table 5.2.
(b) a Business Plan of the company was introduced
which incorporated both the strategic and operating
planning of the business as a whole. It is prepared on a
1 plus 4 year basis which means that the 1st year is the
budget year and the next 4 years are the niediixni term
plan. However the business plan is a roll-over plan,
unlike the Malaysian government 5-year plan, which is
static but subject to a mid-term review. Many engineers
interviewed, who use the business plan, said that the new
budget process is very clear compared with that applied
in JTM's time, especially for those at the ground level
or project implementors. From the Regions' General
Manacers' point of view, the business plan has made the
project managers more accountable in the sense that they
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know exactly what they have got to do within the approved
budget and in a specified period of time and they also
know why they must do it, because they know the rationale
behind it. Even though the process of the business plan
starts from the bottom, i.e. from the project groups, the
top management will look at it using the top-down
approach and through the process of rationalisation or
cut-off procedure. The two will come together during the
GMs' Forum to discuss the targeted figures set by both,
so as to come to a consensus. In theory, the management
follows both bottom-up and top-down approaches but in
practice this seldom happens because usually the top
management will plan for a higher target. From the
company and management point of view, this is a good
approach since it would make the staff work harder in
order to achieve the targeted figures set by the
management. In a sense it would also indirectly
inculcates good business practice among the engineers.
Before, under JTM, the targeted figures were based on the
figures given by a bottom-up approach, with little input
coming from the top, and there was no proper system of
monitoring and control once the projects were started.
This was stated by one of the senior management staff of
STM who was in charge of the works programme during that
time. As he further said,
"If you set a lenient target, they might
achieve it by August, then they could relax and
reserve the additional projects or works for
the next year, but this does not happen in our
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company now, because after the mid-year review,
the management might push the target figures up
further".
Added to this, the company practices a flexible
budgeting system where the project engineers/managers can
spend beyond the approved amount and justify this later
in order to achieve the targeted figures, as will be
explained later in the chapter.
According to one of the assistant general managers
in one of the technical divisions, some engineers did not
take achieving the target seriously when this system was
first implemented, but, when they found that their salary
increment was based on their performance, they began to
try their best to achieve the targeted figures.
However, one senior officer in corporate planning
commented that profit-centres are at present not fully
implemented at regional level, in the sense that the
regions are not penalised if they do not meet the
targeted figures even though the reporting is done on a
profit-centre basis, in the sense that performance is
analysed according to regions in four areas namely -
financial results, customer growth, productivity and
quality of service as shown in Table 8.16 of Chapter
Eight, as an example, on Central Region. Thus we can see
that the company does not practise total accountability
as yet, as was said by the same officer:
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"It takes time to change the government
approach of thinking to a totally commercial
approach, especially for the engineers, the
majority of whom were ex-JTM staff ".
In the early days of the business plan, if a region
did not achieve the targeted figures, it gave the excuse
that it had had no part in setting the target in the
first place. Later, however, the situation improved. In
fact, the regions are now accountable and the sense of
responsibility and accountability have increased
tremendously, especially compared to during JTM days.
Evidence of this will be presented in a later chapter.
(c) Privatisation, brought a change in the
objectives of the company from being service oriented to
driven by market and profit motives, and new accounting
terminology emerged. The first change in terminology was
to refer to the company's clients as customers, rather
than subscribers, reflecting the new emphasis on the
market. Indirectly, it aimed to change the attitudes of
the staff, especially the ex-JTM staff, so they would see
the company as a business entity, rather than a service
entity. New terminology also appeared in the preparation
of the budget, especially the capital expenditure budget,
since this company is a capital-based company where more
than 60% of the budget is allocated to capital projects.
During JTM's time this budget was called the capital
works programme whereas now under STM it is called a
business plan, which again is in line with the new
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objectives of the company and the need to inculcate new
business habits among the project engineers and other
staff, especially those directly involved in the
preparation of the budget. Along with the new approach to
budgeting came the concept of idle cash, which had not
arisen before. Under the present environment, the
engineers have to have more of a businessman's attitude,
in planning and justifying expenditure. Still related to
the business plan, the budget meeting between top
management and regions/divisions to finalise the targets
and approve the business plan of the respective
regions/divisions, is known as rationalisation, i.e. to
rationalise the budget in order to achieve the objective
of the company, but to the project personnel, it is known
as the cut-off budget meeting.
5.4.4 Discussion of the three phases of
disturbances
Various	 outcomes	 arose	 out	 of	 government
intervention in the 1970s and l980s which affected the
telecommunications industry in general and the Department
in particular. The most visible outcome was the decision
to increase private sector participation in the industry.
This started with the liberalisation of certain
services such as supply of PABX, telex, modern and other
terminal equipment or customer premises equipment, paging
service, public telephones and rented coin boxes. Some of
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these services were provided by JTM but others were given
to the private sector after privatisation. As mentioned
earlier, the major reasons for liberalisation were the
Department's poor performance, increase in waiting lists
and unreliable billing system, leading to public
complaints (Report on Privatisation of JTM, 1984). Other
reasons were the supportive attitude shown by the top
administrators of the Department toward encouraging
private sector participation in the telecommunication
services. Later, as we have seen, these top officials,
after retirement, went out to form the same types of
business. By highlighting the weaknesses of the
Department and the strengths and achievement of their
companies, they succeeded in obtaining these government
contracts.
The poor performance of the Department during this
period can be measured by three indicators:- the number
of employees per telephone, which measures labour
efficiency; the utilization rate of exchange capacity;
and the demand for telephone services by the customers
compared to the availability of lines to be installed
(Kennedy, 1991).
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Table 5.3 : Number of Employees per 1000
Telephone
Year	 No. of	 No. of
	 Employees per
Staffs	 Telephone	 1000 Telephone
1972	 13109	 121603	 108
1978	 18247	 271010	 67
1980	 25287	 395640	 64
1982	 29810	 585378	 51
1984	 30244	 849129	 36
Source: Annual Report of JTM of various years.
With respect to the number of telephones, the
Department was able to supply 121,603 in 1972 rising to
585,378 in 1982, and and further increase to 849129 in
1984 as shown in Table 5.3. However, in terms of labour
efficiency as measured by employees per telephone (the
lower the number, the more efficient is the organisation)
the ratio was 108/1000 in 1972, and it improve form year
to year and was in the ratio of 36/1000 in 1984 as shown
in Table 5.3. But this was still way below the standard
of other advanced countries, for example, in US and
Canada the ratio was 6/1000 and for Western Europe it was
9/1000 (Guttman 1984, pp 34).
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TABLE 5.4 :- Percentage of Actual Subcribers
against Actual Effective Cable Pair (ECP) for
3PM as a whole from 1975-1986
Year	 Actual	 Effective	 Utilisation
Subscribers	 Cable	 Rate
Pair	 (%)
1975	 169538	 286100	 59%
1976	 194359	 346800	 56%
1977	 227564	 468594	 49%
1978	 271010	 621518	 44%
1979	 325154	 868012	 38%
1980	 395640	 1084635	 37%
1981	 488675	 1119170	 44%
1982	 585378	 1380425	 42%
1983	 700097	 1766982	 40%
1984	 849129	 1967964	 43%
1985	 958598	 2076455	 46%
1986	 1042827	 2529270	 41%
Source : Taken and calculated from Annual
Reports of JTh from 1975-1986.
As for utilization of exchange capacity using
Effective Cable Pair (ECP), Table 5.4 shows that the rate
went down from 59% in 1975 to 42% in 1980 and went down
further to 41% in 1986. This could have been at least
partly due to poor planning, where demand was not taken
into account. According to some ex-JTM staff interviewed
in December 1991, there was no integrated approach to
planning in the sense that there was no input from the
marketing and finance groups. This was because there was
no real marketing taking place at that time and the
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accounting and finance division played only a custodian
and paymaster role. In fact, all planning was done by the
engineers, who did not look at the financial viability
and marketability of projects. This resulted in highly
underutilized exchange capacity as certain exchanges were
built where there was little demand at that time.
Moreover, one must not overlook the fact that sometimes,
exchanges were built for political reasons.
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Table 5.5 : Number of Waiters for JTM as a
whole from 1971 - 1986
Year	 Number of	 Year	 Number of
Waiters	 Waiters
1971	 11924	 1979	 105699
1972	 13674	 1980	 133609
1973	 20501	 1981	 149945
1974	 35085	 1982	 189808
1975	 48306	 1983	 199831
1976	 65303	 1984	 190542
1977	 76438	 1985	 332000
1978	 84247	 1986	 348000
Source: Annual Report of JT14 of various years.
With respect to the numbers of waiters i.e customers
requesting and waiting for services, as shown in Table
5.5 the number on the waiting list increased over the
years from 11,924 in 1971 to 133,609 in 1980 and further
to 348000 in 1986. Again, this may suggest poor planning
and lack of analysis of market demand. Because this was a
government Department, the opportunity loss of revenue
earned by the Department was not in the minds of the
workers. Also, technically the money did not really
belong to the Department as it was put back into the
'Telecommunications Fund', access to which was difficult,
since the Department had to adhere to government
procedures with regard to spending it.
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The government was also supportive of the new
bumiputra entrepreneurs since they provided an
opportunity to achieve the NEP. However the downgrading
of the Department came when the government decided to
implement the turnkey projects. Contracts worth about
M$2.O Billion were awarded to four bumiputra contractors
firms owned by former JTN senior officials who were
closely linked to the ministry and higher up (New Straits
Times, 27th September, 1983).
Because of this decision by the government, the
turnkey contractors took away the 'core' jobs, i.e.
planning and engineering, from the department. According
to one senior official from the former JTh1, the award of
turnkey projects showed the comittment of the government
towards privatising the department. He added, further,
that the telecommunications industry had become a
political issue.
Under the government's new policy of privatisation
in the early l980s, the organisation was one of the first
targets. As was discussed in this section, the early
period of privatisation saw major changes taking place.
The organisation began to be measured by a different
yardstick, i.e. commercial viability. To fulfil the new
mission of the company, the organisation was restructured
in line with the corporate mission. The reorganisation,
which sought to cover every aspect of the company's
business, was integrated and concentrated on four key
185
areas, namely marketing,	 finance and accounting,
engineering and people.
So far, this chapter, in keeping with Pettigrew's
data collection framework, has considered the change from
JTM to STM from the company as a whole. After a brief
consideration of external influences on the company -
economic expansion, industrialisation, urbanisation and a
new export orientation - we examined the problems facing
JTM. It was seen that the company could not satisfy
demand, yet capacity was underutilised. These problems
were related to poor planning, political interference,
and lengthy bureaucratic procedures. The company was
financially dependent on the Treasury, accounting
personnel were seconded from the Accountant-General's
office, leading to lack of continuity and a certain
tension between 'insider' and 'outsider', and the service
orientation of the organisation took little account of
the concept of financial viability.
The three phases of disturbance affecting the
company were then discussed. The first phase brought
liberalisation of the industry and expansion of bumiputra
entrepreneurship, with contracting out of work, the
registration system, and the breaking of the Department's
monopoly. In the second phase, the turnkey system was
introduced. The third phase was the stage of
privatisation, with less secure jobs where rewards were
more performance-related;	 increased expenses;	 new
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evaluation criteria; more stringent service demands; and
a greater emphasis on commercial methods and expertise,
achieved by recruiting new personnel from outside, where
necessary.
Arising from the third phase of disturbance,
accounting started to play a major role in influencing
the organisation, as the organisation adopted economic
criteria as its major objective. In the second part of
the chapter, therefore, continuing Pettigrew's framework,
the role of the finance and accounting division is
discussed so as to analyse the change that has taken
place and continues to take place as a result of this
phase of disturbance.
5.5 The Role of the Finance and Accounting Division
before and after Privatisation
5.5.1 The Role of the Accounting Division
during the 1970s and the 1980s under J'I'M
(before privatisation).
Historically, the Department was set up to provide
services to the public, focusing on technical excellence.
There was little emphasis on cost, as will be discussed
later in this chapter and in Chapter Seven. Because of
this situation, accountants did not play a major role in
the organisation. Most engineers interviewed indicated
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that the accountants' role at that time was little more
than that of custodian and paymaster.
Prior to 1971, the Department was directly under the
control of central government and as far as accounting
practice was concerned, the Department was required to
prepare the following statements:
(i) Receipt and Payment statement known as
Consolidated Revenue Accounts.
(ii) Consolidated Loan Accounts showing a
statement of proceeds and repayments of loans
for the capital works programme of the
Department.
(iii) Trust accounts providing expenditure
figures on the capital works programme of the
Department.
(Source:	 Malaysian	 Telecommunications
Instructions 1965, p. 2).
However, this changed as from 1971, when the
Department was made a self-accounting entity following
commercial principles. The change was in compliance with
the World Bank loan requirement whereby the Department
was to provide, as at the end of the year, a balance
sheet, profit and loss statement and later a fund flow
statement, following Generally Accepted Accounting
Practices.
The implication of these changes was that the
government was serious in wanting the Department to
become a viable entity. This was shown especially by the
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government's dictating to the Department the need to
achieve at least an 8% rate of return on capital. (Annual
Report of JTM, 1982). However, at the same time, the
government still insisted on the Department following its
financial regulations and procedures in all financial
dealings, purchases etc, including the preparation of the
yearly budget, which the Department had to submit to the
government for approval.
With these changes, the Department was exposed to
the commercial environment in its day-to-day operations,
whereby revenue, cost and profit must be taken into
account in dealing with the Department's transactions.
Evidence of this development can be seen in the issue of
the Malaysian Telecommunications Instructions (issued,
May 1978, p.1) which spelled out the Commercial
Accounting system. The main features were:
(1) The system followed the accepted principles
of double entry bookkeeping together with
normal procedures for incorporating such items
as accruals, prepayments, depreciations,
provisions and liabilities into the account at
appropriate intervals.
(2) A supporting cost accounting system was
developed as a vital part of the overall
commercial accounting system to determine the
costs of the activities performed in the
various divisions of the department.
(3) A Budgetary Control System was also being
developed which would utilise the information
recorded and provided by the Commercial and
Costing groups to inform management on the
financial aspects of their operations, to
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prepare and review annual budgets of
expenditure and revenue and to analyse the
performance of various areas.
The new system incorporated commercial accounts, a
costing system, budgetary control and analysis. The
commercial accounts served as a guide in the preparation
of balance sheet, analysis of revenue and expenditure and
final accounts. With respect to the costing system, it
provided management with information on expenditure. It
ascertained, measured and recorded expenditure incurred.
As for budget preparation and analysis, it was hoped to
ensure that all areas of responsibility were involved in
formulating the yearly budget in an integrated approach.
This is important since under commercial principles the
Department needed to prepare not only capital and
operating expenditure budgets, but also a revenue budget.
In the final analysis the main objectives of the
commercial accounting system were:
(1) to produce at required intervals and at
least annually, the results of the financial
operations of the business in the form of a
profit and loss statement and balance sheet.
(2) to analyse and record the cost and earnings
of the business and ensure by the use of
control ledger accounts the correct recording
and balancing of detailed data in subsidiary
ledgers and records.
(3) to provide management at all levels with
financial information as an aid to management.
(Source:	 Malaysian	 Telecommunications
Instructions, issued May 1978, p.1)
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All the features/objectives of the commercial
accounting system were based on responsibility
accounting. Thus under this system, the Department
started to introduce areas of responsibility
corresponding to the organisational structure of the
Department.
Although in theory the commercial accounting system
seemed to be a sound system, this was not the case in
practice. There were weaknesses in the accounting system
of JTM which were brought to light when the Department
was at the stage of privatising. As declared by the
consultant appointed by the government to determine the
net worth of the Department before transferring it to the
government-owned companies (i.e. corporatisation) (Report
on Privatisation of JTM, 1984), the Department's
accounting and control system suffered from the following
problems:
(i) Lack of adequate system of internal control
and recording of transactions.
(ii) Failure to maintain the existing systems
by conducting regular control procedures.
(iii) The use of accounting concepts not in
accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles.
(Source: Report on Privatisation of JTh, 1984,
pp 26).
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Other problems related to fixed assets and stocks
held by the Department. With respect to fixed assets, the
auditor was not able to identify their records, physical
existence and value. This is quite alarming, as fixed
assets represented about 70% of the total assets of the
Department (Report on Privatisation of JTM, 1984).
Further, there was incorrect capitalisation of plant
and equipment. According to the Report on Privatisation
of JTM (1984), for plant and equipment, which represented
a major expenditure (since this included all completed
projects and work-in-progress) the amount capitalised as
fixed assets related only to cash-paid items. Thus,
depreciation was based on cash expenditure incurred
rather than on the accrual basis following GAAP. This
also resulted in inaccuracy of the profit and loss
statements over the years.
The reason why this happened in the 1970s and early
1980s was that the engineers were in overall charge of
the projects. They submitted to the accounts division the
figures for capitalisation of assets using the cash
basis, since to them an asset only becomes such when
expenses incurred in building the project are paid. All
this changed when the company was privatised. A detailed
discussion of the change in the method of capitalisation
of fixed assets, i.e. from cash to accrual will be
presented later in this chapter.
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With respect to stocks, the auditor had to do a full
physical stocktake. The consultant reported that the
system of recording of stocktake was not satisfactory.
They recommended that the Department should introduce a
proper stock recording system immediately to cover all
stocks and work-in-progress. From the financial
statements, they noticed that the stock levels were quite
high, which to a certain extent reflected 'idle cash' and
unsatisfactory financial management. As shown in the
Department's financial statement (Annual Report of JTM,
1979 and 1983), stock material for cables increased from
M$151 million in 1979 to nearly M$500 million in 1983.
This was due to the fear that unspent money approved to
the Department by the Treasury under the five-year plan
and yearly budget might be taken over or the Treasury
might reduce the amount of the current year's budget by
the amount of unspent grant. So the government Department
usually either spent early in the year or went in for
'christmas shopping' 1 at the end of the year. This
situation could have been avoided, had a satisfactory
budgeting system existed in the Department.
According	 to	 the	 consultant's	 report,
reconciliations of bank accounts and inter-agency
1 It is a common practice in government Departments in
Malaysia for this to take place i.e. to spent the
Departmental allocation before the new year begins,
since all unspent money will have to be returned to the
Central Government Treasury Office. Furthermore, since
the new year's allocation is usually based on the
previous year's expenditure, failure to spend will
result in a budget cut in the next year).
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accounts were not being done by the Department. In
addition, there were no reconciliations between the Kedai
Telekom's (Telecom shops') bank statements and their
respective cash books as the cash books were not prepared
by the Department. As was found by the researcher during
the attachment to the organisation, the reasons were as
follows: -
(i) During JTM's time, the general clerks performed
accounting functions in addition to other administrative
functions. Thus they failed to see the importance of
doing a basic accounting job like bank reconciliation.
The reconciliations were sometimes done, but not always.
Even when they were done, no action was taken on any
differences that emerged on reconciling between the bank
statement and the cash book. Since these clerks did not
have basic accounting knowledge, it was found that some
of the reconciliations made were incorrect. These
discrepancies accumulated over the years. There was
little or no supervision over the clerical staff, as
there were too few posts of Account Assistants (Division
II) to cope with the high volume of work. The low number
of Account Assistants was attributable to the system of
hiring personnel, for which the Department needed the
approval of the Public Service Department. This
Department could not see the importance and necessity of
more Accounting personnel as no monthly financial
statements were compiled and they thought these duties
could adequately be performed by the chief clerk, who had
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many other functions including checking the
reconciliation statements. Also, the Department at that
time was influenced heavily by the engineering culture.
The engineers' work was given greater priority and
emphasis than the accounting work as the accounting role
at that time was less influential.
(ii) The Telecom shops were managed by the marketing
group, which was comprised basically of technical
personnel, so their reconciliation also was spasmodic,
inaccurate and not acted upon.
Regarding debtors, according to the Report on
Privatisation of JTM (1984), there was a poor system of
collection and monitoring, which did not provide a
detailed ageing analysis of debtors. Morever, the debts
were quite substantial in amount. The provision used for
doubtful debts (5% of total debtors, rather than a
provision based on each category of debtors) was
unsatisfactory.
Accrued expenses were another problem area. The
system did not ensure that the outstanding amounts were
shown in the balance sheets as at a particular date. As
an example, accrued expenses as at 31 December 1983
increased from M$64 million to M$208 million as at 31
December 1987 (Source: Annual Report of JTM, 1983 and
1987). This situation was quite alarming since, as
mentioned earlier, most of these figures relate to
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capital work projects, where the engineers controlled the
sections.
As from 1972, the Department was allowed to borrow
from international institutions such as World Bank. The
calculation of losses or gains on translation of foreign
loans did not follow GAAP. As conveyed by the Report on
Privatisation of JTM (1984), had the loans outstanding at
31/12/83 been translated to foreign currency, the
department would have had exchange gains of about M$44
million. A similiar situation existed in suppliers' long-
term credit, where a net loss of M$61,000 would have been
incurred if losses on exchange rate of foreign loans had
been considered. The failure of JTM to recognise losses
or gains on translation of foreign loans was due to its
ignorance that the amounts involved could be substantial
and directly affect its revenue figures. Thus, the absent
of treasury unit in the Department during JTM days,
resulted in substantial loss to the Department.
These practices had existed since JTM days, as there
was little or no understanding of the importance of
'cost', 'idle cash' and other commercial/financial
considerations. This was because the mission/purpose of
the organisation was more service and technologically-
oriented. Furthermore, the majority of the top management
posts were held by the engineers, as discussed earlier in
this chapter. Thus the values and beliefs of the top
management/regional directors were concentrated on
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providing services to the public, especially at that
time, when the main aim was to reduce the high waiting
list, as discussed earlier in this chapter and in Chapter
Two. As was said by the GM of one region, who was also
the D/GM of the region under JTM and an engineer by
profession,
"During JTM days, we were not bothered how much
we made, how much we spent. Our view was more
service-oriented, we looked at what we could
give and not how to give, i.e. not so much at
the financial side".
When the researcher asked about the period after
1972, when the government amended the Act making the
Department a self-accounting Department following
commercial principles, the reply was:
"Yes, but even so, we were not bothered with
the profitability and viability aspect of it.
We were more concerned about clearing the
waiters and providing services.... The cost
part of it was secondary".
From the above, we can see that the values and
beliefs throughout the organisation were largely service-
oriented, in line with the expected nature of a
government Department. As discussed earlier, the
influence of accounting and financial values was minimal
given the fact that the role of the accountant at that
time was purely as custodian and paymaster, with little
emphasis on management accounting. The attitudes of
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'caution', 'avoiding idle cash', and 'cost saving' played
little or no part in the engineers' value system, which
was the dominant influence in the design archetype,
providing a strong link between the sub-system and the
interpretative scheme of the organisation.
With respect to capitalisation of assets, as
discussed in section 5.5.1, the engineers' understanding
of the accrual concept which is in line with GAAP was
non-existent. The influence of the accounting value
system was minimal; only the cash aspect of it was being
emphasised. As was said by one AGM, who is an engineer by
profession,
"Accrual methods of accounting took place with
respect to operating expenditure and revenue
but not on capital projects. That was our main
weakness. We are capital intensive, project-
oriented but still we do not take into account
the accrued figures".
Many engineers were of the opinion that even though
the accounting personnel adopted the accrual system
during JTM time, the engineers themselves, especially the
project managers who were directly responsible for
capitalising the assets, could not see why they should go
for the accrual concept. From this, we can see that the
accounting influence was minimal during JTM time as it
could not influence the top management. The majority were
engineers, and the engineering influence and ways of
doing things were very strong at that time.
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Also, according to the consultant's report, the
Department's accounting and management information system
were inadequate, especially to meet the needs of a
commercial system under a privatised company environment.
From the above, relating to Laughlin model, it can
be seen that the design archetype is a crucial link
between the sub-system and the interpretative scheme
(Broadbent 1992). And out of the first and second phases
of disturbance, the engineering system and perceptions
became the major elements in the design archetype, which
resulted in engineering values and beliefs remaining
intact in the interpretative scheme.
But towards the end of the second phase of
disturbance i.e. prior to privatisation, accounting did
try to reduce the influence of engineeering values as a
major element in the design archetype. This took place
when the Fixed Asset (FA) System was introduced in
1985/1986 after the consultant's report was produced.
This was a shock to the engineers, especially project
engineers, since with the introduction of the FA system,
all completed projects, including those already
installed, need to be calculated from the initial date of
installation, so that proper assetisation can be
determined. This created extra work for the engineers,
who felt that they were doing the work of accountants.
This, in a way, was where accounting first began to
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become part of the design archetype, which is expected to
become an important and major element of the design
archetype of the Laughlin Model (1991).
5.5.2 The Role of the Finance and Accounting
Division after Privatisation.
5.5.2.1 From 1987-1990
Upon privatisation of the organisation, the role of
the Finance and Accounting Division became visible and
more important with the realisation throughout the
organisation of the need to be more bottom-line
conscious. As we have seen, the Report on privatisation
of JTM (1984), on viability with a view to privatisation
had revealed the inadequacy of the accounting and
information system. It began to be realised that the
management needed more up-to-date financial information
to enable it to make better decisions and to ensure
timely corrective action in managing the organisation.
Another important factor was the need to improve the
billing system over time, so as to reduce the number of
billing complaints from the public, which were numerous
during JTM's time.
Moreover, under JTM, the Department had adopted a
public sector accounting approach in recording its
financial transactions. When it became a private company,
the earlier approach was not applicable and was replaced
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with commercial accounting following the lAS and GAAP,
using the accrual method of accounting, which as stated
in earlier had not been fully adopted by JTM, especially
in Capital Projects/assets. This was a serious weakness
in a capital-intensive organisation.
Another factor bringing about a change in the
accounting role was financing for the company's
expansion, where both debt and equity markets would be
major sources of funds. In order to price STh's debt and
equities fairly, reliable and up-to-date financial
information was needed, on which to judge the risk and
return involved in financing the company. With the
listing of the company shares on the KLSE, which took
place in late 1990, the company would be judged by its
financial performance and movement of its share prices.
Moreover, from 1991, the company had to pay corporate
income tax, requiring it to organise its financial
affairs in such a way so as to minimise its tax exposure.
During this period, financial and commercial
criteria became more important to the company, and the
influence of accounting was felt throughout the
organisation, with concentration on the accuracy of
monthly accounting information and the business plan.
Responsibility for the budget shifted, upon
privatisation, from the 'corporate secretariat' section
to the accounting and finance group.
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The overall financial plan involved commercial
objectives, prioritising the following areas:-
(i) concentration for higher growth in total sales
(ii) maintaining strict budgetary control of
operating expenditure
(iii) effective management of the loan
portfolio, concentrating on repaying/prepaying
existing loans, refinancing high-interest
loans, and conversion of government loans to
equity
(iv) efficiency in capital expenditure and
asset utilisation
(v) improving accounting and credit control
procedures
(Source: Business Plan 1990 of the Company
Document, p. 3).
The Accounting and Finance division thus expanded
both vertically and horizontally in order to achieve the
objectives of the company, which are profit and market
driven, and in order to fulfil the need for monthly
reporting and monitoring and controlling of the business
plan, including variance reporting.
At HQ level, as shown in Figures 5.1 (Organisational
Structure of Accounts and Finance during JTM days) and
5.2 (Organisational Structure of Accounts and Finance
from 1987-1988) the Accounts and Finance Group was
reorganised. The major change that took place was the
establishment of Budget, Management Accounting and
Financing & Treasury units which did not exist in JTM
days, with the exception of budget, which came under
202
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Corporate Secretariat as shown in Figures 6.2(a) and
6.2(b) of Chapter Six. Another major change was that four
senior accountants' posts were established, namely,
Systems, Operations, Billing and Finance as shown in
Figure 5.2.
Because of the importance of the role to be played
by Corporate Finance, the Accounts & Finance division was
split in 1989 into two separate divisions known as
Corporate Accounts and Corporate Finance, each headed by
a General Manager and both reporting to the Director of
Finance. The Corporate Finance division expanded further
from four to seven units, with the separation of
Financing & Treasury to become two separate units, and
the addition of Risk Management and Taxation units as
shown in Figures 5.3(a) and 5.3(b). As can be seen in
Figure 5.4, expansion occurred both vertically and
horizontally, in the sense that a few accountants were
placed in other divisions such as material management,
engineering services, property management, training
centre and network services at the HQ level, to advise
and help in the financial work. All the regional
accountants, including the international division,
reported directly to the Senior Accountants (Operation)
and GM (Corporate Accounts).
Even within the three departments, various sub-units
were established, and a number of accountants appointed.
The System Department became known as the Policy, System
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and Quality Department, incorporating two units : Account
System and Document/Procedure. The Operation Department
had two units, known as General Ledger Accounts and
Accounts Finance/Administration; it also oversaw the
functions of all the regional accounts and other accounts
groups. The Billing Department had two units known as
Accounting Billing-Telephone and Accounting Billing for
non-Telephone.
During this period, there was a change in the
accounting system as a whole, in line with the new
objectives of the company, i.e. moving towards full
commercial accounting. The aim of this change, along with
full computerisation, was to enable the system to produce
fast financial information in the form of monthly
financial and management reports, on which management
could assess the performance of the company and monitor
and control the business plan.
5.5.2.2 From 1991-to date
After the listing of the company on the KLSE, in
1990, the accounts & finance further expanded their
influence and functions in the organisation.
As for Corporate Finance, in 1991, as shown in
Figure 5.5(a), the Costing Unit was formed when top
management, saw the importance of a costing system being
established in the organisation. In that connection, a
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consultant was appointed early in 1992 to work with the
Costing Unit personnel and other staff to develop this
system.
During JTM days, even though there was some planned
form of costing system, it was never fully implemented as
there was no sense of need at that time. As one engineer
put it,
"I think (the attitude was) basically, why do
we want to know the cost? After all, whether
the tariff is there or not, you just provided
according to what JTM decided and the
government would usually agree as long as it
was not too high. And also at that time, the
government did not ask us the cost of each
product line, as the government was not
concerned with the changes in the tariff then".
Added to this, since funds were needed to try to
reduce the waiting list for telephone services, costing
was viewed as an undesireable diversion of funds needed
for other purposes.
However, according to one of the accountants,
basically the charging rate was based on the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) and economic factors which were
external to the department and not based on the actual
cost. From here we can see that for JTM as a government
department, the issue of determining cost was not vital,
since it was geared towards service and profit was
secondary at that time.
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In the absence of a full costing system, variance
reports are only concerned with administrative variances,
and do not measure the extent of variances as a result of
yield and price. It is hoped that this information will
be available once the costing system is fully
implemented, leading to analysis of technical/project
expenditure. According to one senior accountant,
"A lot of savings will take place in terms of
technical lines if we insist on total costing
method".
The costing system which is to be implemented by the
end of the year (i.e. 1993) will be able to capture and
identify all the cost elements. The so-called
costing/product model aims to facilitate the management
decision making process. It is important for the company
to know the basic elements of costs like cost per line to
install telephones etc, especially when it wants to
review its tariff structure. The telecommunication
industry is highly competitive, so the Company needs to
have a detailed costing system in order to justify
changes in tariff to the government and to prevent other
companies from taking over their business once their
licence expires.
As the costing system is expected to play an
important role in the company, the unit's name has been
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changed to Costing Information System (CIS) in line with
its new functions. In addition to this, the leadership of
the unit has been upgraded from a manager to AGM post.
The CIS will be implemented by the end of the year with
respect to product costing and transfer pricing. With
respect to the former, the system will measure the cost
per product, and product performance; cost per line, cost
per ECP, cost for local calls etc. With respect to
transfer pricing, whereby costs of internal services are
charged by the service provider to its respective users,
the first phase will be the implementation of five cost
centres, namely, training school, information system,
material management, engineering services and security
services.
Corporate Finance further expanded in 1992 as shown
in Figure 5.5(b), when the GM post was upgraded to Senior
GM, one of the top management posts, and the AGM post was
upgraded to GM. Two new AGM posts were created, one in
CIS and the other for the Treasury/Financing function
which has expanded from two to four units, the new units
being Foreign Exchange and Investor Research Units. With
these changes in the Corporate Finance Division, its role
is felt throughout the organisation, and especially
related to budget, management accounting and CIS. This
will directly affect the project engineers, as it is
expected to tighten their operations, especially with
respect to budget and cost efficiency on project
implementation.
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Corporate Accounts has also expanded since it has
separated from Corporate Finance. The number of
accountants has increased at HQ, regional and area
levels, and the division has also appointed some
accountants in other non-accounting areas, such as
material management, engineering services and property
management. Additional staff are also being appointed to
the training school, reflecting the increased number of
accounting & finance courses being organised for both
accounting and non-accounting personnel. This period has
witnessed a rapid expansion of the regional and area
levels of the accounting and finance group, reporting
directly to the Corporate Accounts Division of HQ.
Since timely and accurate financial and management
information is needed by the top management as a basis
for sound financial management, the company developed a
computerised financial accounting and management
information system for the usage of the company's
management, known as the FANIS system. FANIS is an
integrated accounting system covering all aspects of
accounting, including general ledger maintenance, fixed
asset accounting, payroll administration, project cost
control, budgeting and cost control and payment system.
Another system developed was the SISKIS system, which
plays an important role in reducing stock levels and
requires the engineers to plan more carefully in advance,
as will be discussed in Chapter Seven.
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The company also developed an internal control
manual known as Financial Instructions, in order to
ensure that adequate internal controls in all aspects of
the company's management are enforced. In order to make
sure that these are followed, the company decided to
strengthen the internal audit department from 11 in 1986
to 50 in 1989. With this in mind, an Audit Board
committee was formed to ensure proper accountability and
sound management of financial transactions in the
company. The engineers, especially those involved with
the projects, were not very happy and there were many
complaints from them to the accounting, finance and
internal audit staff. As the GM - Accounts Group said,
"Some of the engineers were saying it is like
working under policemen where they have to
follow strict instructions with respect to
financial matters of the company".
This is probably because during JTM days, they were used
to a relaxed environment as far as accounting and finance
was concerned. An example of the company's financial
instructions under STM is that it provides for penalty
costs in critical areas such as failure to process
financial transactions resulting in inaccurate
information / additional expenditure and could result in
disciplinary action being taken. The management view this
as very important, as these financial reports play a
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major role in decision making by the management and board
of directors.
One senior accountant recalled that the engineers
were reluctant to let the accountants take a leading role
in the company. JTM had been an engineering-based and
service-oriented Department, where technical excellence
was more important than cost. After privatisation, they
wanted to continue to take the lead, especially in
business decisions, i.e. where to buy and where to place
the additional networks. At present, these decisions are
still in their hands but the accounting and finance
personnel participate in the decision process, especially
when it affects the company financially.
The upgrading of the post of the Director of Finance
to ED (Finance) has considerably increased the status of
accounting, in the sense that the ED (Finance) is now a
member of the Board of Directors, the highest decision
makers of the company. According to some accountants, the
upgrading of this position to ED (Finance) has made the
accounting and finance head more respected. Now,
accounting personnel are represented at all levels,
vertically from the Board of Directors to the area
accountants, and horizontally, in other departments like
marketing, credit control, international groups and
project division. As an accountant puts it,
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"During JTM days, the accountant was like a
'mouse' (i.e. felt like an outsider) but now
they are like a 'cat' especially with the
introduction of the Financial Instruction".
Referring to the Laughlin model, it can be said that
the increase in influence of the accounting and finance
group throughout the organisation has implanted the
accounting system in the design archetype. But whether it
can succeed in changing the values and beliefs of the
engineers from engineering to accounting and financial
values and beliefs which will change the interpretative
scheme of the organisation is another thing.
5.5.3 The Regional Accounts and Finance Department
As can be seen from Figure 5.6, the role of the
accounts department was basically custodial, i.e.
paymaster and collection functions, and ensuring
compliance with the budget allocated to each code of
expenditure. This restricted role was due to the small
number of accounting staff, and their lack of accounting
qualifications and training (the researcher saw evidence
of this in a list of training programmes carried out by
JTM; very few were accounting-related).
When the company was privatised, the regional
accounting group's role also changed, with the
implementation of the new accounting system, business
plan, and monthly reporting system, and also with the
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region being made a 'real' profit centre (as compare to
JTM days, when the profit centre system did not work
properly, due to inadequate monthly reporting). The new
role is as follows:-
(i) Issuing and monitoring the annual operating
expenditure budget.
(ii) Presentation of the monthly profit and
loss statements of the region and explanation
of variances with the budget.
(iii) Ensuring proper and correct accounting of
the region's revenue & expenditure.
(iv) Maintaining internal check and control
within the existing accounting procedures and
systems.
(v) Continuous review and implementation of
existing procedures.
(Source: Company document and interview with
the Central Regional's Assistant Acountant).
With the increase in its role, responsibility and
activities, the accounting group was restructured to suit
the requirements of the company. Figure 5.7
(organisational chart of accounts & Finance of central
region from 1987-1990) shows the expansion. The
accountant post was upgraded to AGM level, and new posts
were created: three assistant accountants and a senior
accounts assistant. Because of the increase in the
accounting work at the area level, accounting units were
established in 1989, but placed in the accounting
department of regional HQ, where some of the clerical
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staff performing area accounting duties still reported to
the area manager, an engineer. This created some
problems; the accounting and reporting system was running
well but some of the information fed in by these clerical
staff was incorrect. The accounting department discovered
that the personnel who keyed in the information did not
understand the difference between the cash and accrual
bases of accounting, which affected the accuracy of the
information. The personnel concerned had no accounting
background, being in engineering, marketing etc. and,
although responsible for feeding this information into
the system, were not very concerned with accounting.
To overcome this problem, the management decided in
1991 to create a new finance/accounting group to be
headed by an Accounts Assistant (i.e. diploma holder) at
the area/services level to handle all financial
transactions. During JTM time, the accounts department
did not exist at area level; all the accounting work was
done by the clerical staff and then passed on to the
Regional Accountant. According to the GM - Accounts
Division,
"With the expansion of accounting personnel at
areas / services level, only then could we
achieve this monthly reporting; now, when you
analyse the monthly management accounts, you
know the variances are due to the performance
of the company and not because of incorrect
financial information".
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When these posts were created, the question arose,
to whom should they report ? This was quite a sensitive
question, since the answer reflects the relationship
between the accounting and the engineering groups. But of
course in the normal situation the person concerned
should report to his immediate superior. Thus the
accounts assistant normally reports to the Area Manager,
who is an engineer by profession. This reporting system
prevailed in all areas of all regions. However after two
years, there was a change in this system in the central
region whereby the accounts group was directed by the
Regional General Manager to report directly to the
Accountant at the regional level, because the accountant
at the regional level found that the accounts assistant
was not only doing the accounting work but also
undertaking other tasks like market research and market
study under the credit control section. The accountant
group at the regional level convinced the RGM that such
practice defeated the objectives of forming the area
accounts groups. The area manager and the engineers were
not happy with the arrangement, but came to accept it as
they saw its benefits.
As was stated by one of the Accountants,
"We are lucky because our GM sees the
importance of accounting and we for our part
have managed to convince him. And now, the
accountants in other regions want to do the
same but are not successful since they have not
got the blessing of their own bosses (i.e.
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their GMS) who are engineers by profession and
probably sided with the engineers".
Later, in 1991, the Accounts Assistant post was
upgraded to Junior Executive (Accounts) at area level, as
shown in Figure 5.8. With the appointment of a Junior
Executive (Accounts) heading the area level, the
functions have now expanded to include not only the
routine work, but also helping the area manager analyse
the various financial reports, e.g. analysing the sales
revenue by various exchanges, business subscribers,
resident subcribers, analysing the revenue as well as
expenditure and highlighting the variances to the area
managers. This work is at present handled by the regional
accountant, who looks at these issues from the point of
view of the region as a whole. The junior executives
(Accounts) at the area level are also expected to play a
big role in the implementation of the costing system once
the system is in operation which is expected to take
place by the end of 1993.
5.5.4 The move from a manual system to a
computerised accounting system
The organisation underwent computerisation upon
privatisation with the introduction of the monthly
management reporting and business plan. Since then, the
company has realised the importance of the information
system. This can be seen from the fact that the company
is currently the largest user of information technology
224
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in Malaysia; about M$l80 million was invested in such
technology between 1987 and 1990 (Hashim, 1992).
The following are the systems that have been
installed, especially related to producing monthly
financial and accounting reports and other non-financial
reports which have significance for the purposes of
planning, monitoring and control.
(i) SISWANG (OR FAMIS SYSTEM)
This is the acronym for all the commercial
accounting systems which comprise general
ledger system, capital project accounting
system, fixed asset system and accounts payable
system. These systems were developed to
facilitate the accounts and other divisions so
as to capture accurate and timely accounting
information in order to provide a true and fair
view of the financial statements. The capital
project accounting, fixed asset and accounts
payable systems are considered as subsidiaries
to the general ledger system. Data are updated
either daily, weekly or monthly to the general
ledger system.
(ii) Capital Project Accounting (CPA) System
This maintains project data, processes project
expenditures and monitors project status by
means of a status update in the system at the
project manager's instruction. All on-going
capital projects financial information such as
project number, type, description and location;
asset type, project budget, project expenditure
on current month, year to date and life to date
(if the project life is more than one
accounting year) expenditures; name of the
project manager and cost centre are recorded in
this system. The expenditure are categorised
into material, labour and incidental. The
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system is interphased to SISKIS and other
SISWANG system. The key identity in this system
is the project number. All completed projects
will have their status changed from on-going to
completed projects and will no longer appear in
the Capital work in progress.
(iii) SISKIS System
The system is to cater for stores control
materials i.e. those materials that are
procured through the Material Management
Division. The system helps the division to
properly manage the material requirement so
that all requisitions can be met in time and to
avoid long storage period. It also helps in
proper planning of procurements based on the
lead-time for each material and saves the
company's cash flow and reduces stock
obsolescence. The system also caters for
accounting transactions i.e. it can interphase
to the general ledger system and capital
project accounting system. Therefore, it
reduces the data entry input to each system and
this also reduces the human error between
systems. It also helps with the timely updating
of accounting entries.
(iv) Customer Automated Service System (CASS
System)
This is a fully integrated computerised system
that has a database which enables the
coordination of all activities involved in
providing the telephone customer service from
the day it is requested until the day service
is disconnected. Through CASS, complaints from
billing have dropped; order processing,
invoicing and receipt of payments have been
expedited and credit control improved.
Cv) Fixed Assets System (FA System)
This is a system which maintains record of
assets, and processes the capitalisation,
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depreciation, retirements and capital
allowances of the fixed assets, including all
completed projects.
(vi) Payroll System
This is a system which maintains employee data,
processes payroll, labour costing, medical
payment and handles staff loans and advances.
(vii) General Ledger System (GL System)
This is a system which maintains the chart of
accounts, processes journals and produces audit
and control reports. It also produces monthly
financial statements and responsibility
reports.
(viii) Accounts Payable System
The system maintains vendor data, processes
invoices and records payments made to these
vendors.
There are two main systems which are scheduled to be
completed and implemented by the end of 1993, which are
discussed as follows:
(i) Project Management Philosophy Technique
Training Tools System (PROMPT System)
This is a project management and control system
which will replace the Project Management
Control System. The objective are to ensure
effective project planning, monitoring and
control at all levels, including facilitating
effective decision making at senior management
level. One of the aim of this system is to
maintain the business plan, budgets and
financial progress of all the company projects.
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In addition, this system is expected to
provides interface functions to CPA, AP,
SISWANG and other systems.
(ii) Costing Information System (CIS System)
This is a new system which has been developed
in early 1992 and is scheduled to be completed
by the end of 1993. Out of this, the product
costing and transfer pricing will be
implemented.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, the external influences affecting
the organisation were discussed, along with the problems
facing the organisation as a government Department. The
chapter then discussed the three phases of disturbance
that affected the organisation, as a result of the change
in government policies.
It was found that the organisation was very much
influenced by the external environment, i.e. the
government's policies on the NEP and liberalisation of
telecommunication industry; the Turnkey projects and the
privatisation policy. These disturbances led to the
organisation being invaded by commercial people, as the
objective of the organisation moved from service to
profit-oriented.
One of the biggest changes resulting from the change
in objective of the organisation, was the increased
influence and visibility of finance and accounting in the
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organisation. Discussion of the role of finance and
accounting before and after privatisation revealed that
accounting and finance functions have expanded both
vertically and horizontally. The adoption and enforcement
of the new company Financial Instructions and the
tightening of the internal audit department also appear
to have contributed to the increase of accounting
influence.
But, how did this change system take place? To
answer this question, the researcher will take as an
example, the budgeting system. Thus, the following
chapter will discuss in detail the budgeting system under
the two environments, analysing the changes that took
place as a result of the high level of disturbance and in
particular the aim of the top management in changing the
budgeting system. This will provide the basis for a
discussion in one particular development group i.e. Local
Network Development group of the central region in
chapter Seven dynamics of change is analysed from the
three phases of disturbance and Chapter Eight will
analyse and discuss the extent to which the new capital
budgeting system has affected and changed the value
system of the engineers.
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CHAPTER SIX
The Budgeting System Under JTM and STM
6.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the changes that took place
in the organisation arising from the third phase of
disturbance, specifically the changes in the budgeting
system of the organisation. Changes to the budgeting
system are taken as illustrative of management efforts to
create real change. The system is analysed from JTM days,
through privatisation to form STM, up to the present. The
reason for using the budgeting system for illustration
purposes is that in a capital-intensive organisation such
as the one in question, the budget system has a real
effect on the engineers' work. During the period in
question, the capital budget process has undergone a
transformation in line with the new commercial
orientation of the organisation, and the accounting
sphere of influence appears to have increased, which may
have brought about change in the engineers' influence and
values.
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With respect to the JTM environment, the chapter
begins by describing the budgeting system of the
Malaysian Government (including PPBS, Five-Year Malaysian
Plan and the Yearly Budget) which JTM, as a government
Department funded from the Federal Treasury, had to
follow. The chapter then discusses JTM's budgeting system
and the associated monitoring and control procedures.
Then the chapter looks at the budgeting system under
STM, upon privatisation of the organisation, describing
in detail the business plan, as the budgeting system
became known under STM. The capital and operating
expenditure and the monitoring and control aspects are
discussed. We then describe and discuss the flexible
budgeting practice under the business plan. Finally, a
comparison is made between the JTM and STM budgeting
systems.
6.2 The Budgeting System under JTM
6.2.1. Background
Before we discuss the budgeting system under JTM, it
is important for us to review the historical aspect of
the budgeting system in Malaysian government Departments,
the five-year Malaysian Plan and the yearly budget plan.
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In Malaysia, the annual budgets are prepared without
annual plans. Instead, they are prepared by the
Government's Treasury Department on the basis of
reconunendation from the Economic Planning Unit (EPU)
which is responsible for formulating the National Five-
Year Plan of the government, called the Malaysian Plan.
In preparation of the annual budget by the Treasury, the
EPU's role is to reconcile the allocations of capital
expenditure for five years with current expenditure, for
annual budgetary purposes. This can be clearly seen from
Figure 6.1, which illustrates the relationship between
budget, planning and implementation.
6.2.2 Historical Development of Budgeting
System in the Government Department of
Malaysia.
Before 1969, the budgeting system in Malaysia was
inherited from the colonial government. This system,
which was based on an incremental approach was adequate
during colonial days, because the role of the colonial
government was primarily concerned with the collection of
revenue and the maintenance of law and order. In this
system, the main objective was to control, follow the
rules and ensure the legality of expenditure. This was
done through the itemization of objects of expenditure.
The system worked well to facilitate the enforcement of
legal accountability (i.e. the process of auditing items
of expenditure by the government auditors) but it did not
233
Five-year
planning
Annual Budget Planning
Treasury formulates budget
policy in consultation with
EPU and PSD.
Five- Year Dcv. Project Plannin2
EPU formulates 5- Year dcv
plan in consultation with
Treasury, PSD and other agencies
Figure 6.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUDGET, PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION
Annual Planning
Evaluation
	 Allocation
Execution
Performance Evaluation Treasury	 Annual Budget Allocation
EPU and ICU evaluate financial and
	
Treasury examining and
ph sical performance of programmes	 allocates annual budget in
and projects.	 consultation with EPU, PSD
and other agencies
Source: MAT,J, (1981).
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provide enough useful information for the purposes of
planning or management of the programme, i.e. government
planning for the development of the country. As was
stated by Joon-Chien (1981 p. 291),
"The basic objective of the current government
changed from custody to development. It had to
undertake new functions and expand the existing
ones".
As the role of government expanded, greater demands
were placed on the budget and accounting system, to
supply relevant information for the purposes of planning
and management. In the face of the people's hopes that
the government would develop the country, while only
limited resources were available, efficient utilization
of resources became necessary. This led to the government
decision to replace the incremental budget with a new
budgeting system which would meet the above criterion.
Thus, the government decided in 1969 to adopt the
Programme and Performance Budgeting System (PPBS).
PPBS was introduced by the government to answer the
following questions needed to monitor progress toward
government objectives:
(a) Why ? i.e. to determine the objectives
(b) What and How ? i.e. structure and
programmes
(c) How much ? i.e. cost of the programmes
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(d) How good is it or What is the achievement
in quantified form ? i.e. Programme Achievement
Evaluation
(Source : The Financial Management System Unit
(FMSU), Treasury Department, Ministry of
Finance, Malaysia, 1990 p.1)
6.2.3 PPBS in Government Department in Malaysia
In the early years of PPBS in Malaysia, agencies
suspected that the new budgeting system was intended
solely to meet the information needs of the Treasury,
because they were not consulted as to their views with
respect to the system (Joon-Chien, 1981). The budget
format of PPBS was determined entirely by the Treasury.
Thus, the initial emphasis was on formats, procedures and
form-filling. This resulted in much of the information
being under-utilised, since the generated data were not
necessarily relevant, and because little attention was
given to more efficient utilisation and management of
resources to accomplish programme objectives.
Overall, only the first two features of PPBS were
fully implemented by government agencies. Parts (C) and
(d) were not achieved at all because there was no
mechanism for the Department to come up with the
information (FMSU, 1990).
From the Department's point of view, parts (a) and
(b) of PPBS were implemented because these two questions
had to be answered by the Department when presenting its
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budget proposal to the Treasury. However, after the
budget was approved, PPBS was virtually abandoned. The
Department reverted to the old method of allocating
funds, because no monthly management accounting
information was available, thus monitoring of projects
was difficult. Any monitoring that did take place was so
loose that nobody took it seriously. As was said by one
of the senior engineers:
"Even though we had a plan during JTM days, who
looked into our plan? If nobody looks into the
plan, controlling and monitoring it, I also
don't care".
Morever, accountability of managers did not exist,
or existed only at the minimum level. Also, there were no
clear lines of authority. There was no implementation at
the Department level of the concept of 'let the manager
manage'.
As far as variances are concerned, no one had any
interest or purpose in reviewing and analysing them.
Thus, under JTM, PPBS only took place in presenting the
budget to the Central Agency, because of the rules that
all government Departments had to follow in order for
their budgets to be approved. However, implementation
continued to follow the functional approach. The budget
was still full of red tape and centralised at the
department level. Decentralisation of authority and
responsibility did not take place in any real sense.
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(FMSU, 1990). In the absence of programme evaluation and
achievement measurement, the following problems were
encountered :-
(a) The achievement of the objectives of
ministry and Department in terms of programmes
and activities could not be measured; and
(b) programmes and activities could not be
listed according to priority (FMSU, 1990, p 2).
This created problems for the Treasury (i.e. Federal
Treasury) while conducting budget examinations with a
view to making necessary reductions in allocations. In an
ideal situation, PPBS can work well if there is no
constraint on funds involved. However, in the real world,
it was not always possible for the Treasury to provide
all the funds needed for the programmes that had been
impressively formulated. (Abdul Samad, 1981). In this
situation, programmes which had been approved might have
to be postponed, which rather defeats the object of PPBS.
Moreover, some projects were approved for social and
political reasons. The commercial viability of projects
was not checked but they were approved with respect to
service objectives.
6.2.4 The Five-Year Malaysia Plan
Towards the end of a particular Malaysia Plan,
normally in the last year, JTM received a circular from
EPTJ and the Ministry containing guidelines on the overall
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policy of the government towards the forthcoming Plan.
Based on the guidelines laid down in the circular, JTM
prepared the overall five-year plan which was required
initially to be submitted to the Ministry of Teleconts,
Works and Posts and subsequently to the Economic Planning
Unit for approval.
Upon receiving the five-year plan from JTM, the
Ministry went through all the proposed capital works and
in the process some proposed projects might be slashed.
This was done after taking into account the objectives of
JTM for the coming five years, priority projects, the
Ministry's criteria and the overall view of the Ministry.
The plan was subsequently handed over to EPU for
approval. EPU examined the plan. During the examination,
EPU called the Ministry representatives, and all the
Departments under the Ministry, including JTM, for
discussion and finalisation of the plan. During this
session, proposed projects were agreed and eventually
ceilings were fixed for each Department in the Ministry.
The classification used by EPU with respect to
project evaluation and approval on the ceiling was as
follows:
(a) projects that would generate income i.e.
would bring benefits to the Malaysian economy
as a whole;
(b) projects related to the security of the country;
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(c) projects that were directed by the Cabinet;
(Source : Interview with EPU Officer in charge
of Five year Malaysian Plan)
After examination of the above inevitably JTM would
not get all they asked for. However, once EPU had decided
on the ceiling, if JTM was not happy with the decision
they could appeal to EPU, who would re-examine the
matter. Unless there was government intervention, usually
the figures approved initially would be maintained. In
this respect, EPU was authorised to have the final say.
On the other hand, JTM could request additional
funds during the mid-year plan review, which usually took
place at the half-way stage of the Malaysia Plan. From
Table 4.2 from Chapter Four, we can see that JTM was
given quite a substantial amount during the mid-year
review of the plan (i.e. from period between 1971 to
1985).
6.2.5 The Yearly Budget Plan
The yearly budget which was prepared by JTM in
accordance with Treasury and Ministerial guidelines was
presented to the Ministry of Telecolus, Works and Posts,
who vetted it as part of the consolidated yearly budget
of the Ministry submitted to the Government Treasury for
approval. The Treasury called the Ministry and JTM
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personnel for detailed budget examination where final
approval took place.
In approving the yearly plan, the Treasury liased
with EPU so that the long term plan ceiling set by EPU
was used to monitor the yearly budget asked for. EPU made
sure that the yearly budget asked for by the Department
was not more than had been agreed under the Malaysian
Plan.
However, even though the ceiling of M$x million (as
an example) had been agreed by EPU for a particular
project, the amount to be approved by the Treasury
depended on the financial position of the government, and
whether JTM could spend the given amount of funds for
particular projects in the coming year. JTM personnel
were usually able to convince the Treasury of their
ability to spend, given the fact that they used technical
jargon, so that sometimes the Treasury people depended on
the JTM engineering personnel for clarification. Thus, in
defending the budget to the Federal Treasury, the
engineers' values rather than those of the accountants,
were represented.
However, the financial insecurity of the government
was a drawback in JTM's time, since a project might be
under way and the money be unavailable, even though it
had been budgeted for and approved by EPU. Lack of
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government funds would impede the implementation of the
projects by the engineers.
6.2.6 The Budgeting Process under JTM
6.2.6.1 The Annual Budget under JTM (from
1.1.1971 to 31.12.1986)
The exercise of preparing the annual budget under
JTM, in total, involved :-
(1) the setting of clearly defined objectives
specifically related to the department's role
as the authority charged with the
responsibility for providing adequate and
efficient telecommunications facilities in an
expanding community;
(2) the planning of specific tasks and the
scheduling of these in approved programmes of
works which needed to be executed in discharge
of its responsibility;
(3) the planning of labour and material
resources for the effective implementation of
the programmes; and
(4) finally, the all-important tasks of
assessing and obtaining the funds which would
be required to finance the operations necessary
for the achievement of the planned objectives.
(Source: Malaysian Telecommunications
Instructions on Budgetary Control Instructions,
1978, JTM, pp 1).
6.2.6.2 The Budget Process
Under JTM, the preparation of the budgets, both
capital and operating, strictly followed the directives,
rules, procedures, and format of the government budgeting
system laid down by the Treasury Department.
242
Long term planning was usually done by the Economic
Planning Unit and Implementation Coordination Unit of the
Prime Minister's Department in conjunction with the
Malaysian Plan, even though certain inputs came from the
Department itself. This plan, which was for five years,
was a static budget.
The unit responsible for issuing directives,
procedures and circulars on budget preparation to JTM's
various department heads was the Budget Unit (from 1972-
1980) and was upgraded later to 'Urusetia Korporat'
(Corporate Secretariat) in 1980 which in turn reported to
the budget committee. The Budget Unit (later known as
Corporate Secretariat) was under the control of the
engineers as shown in Figures 6.2 (a) and 6.2 (b).
The Corporate Secretariat was formed in early 1980,
to function as a 'think-tank' to the Department. This
Secretariat played a major role in terms of providing
inputs to top management, with respect to organisational
issues such as departmental policies, reports which
included annual reports and budget reports etc. The
Secretariat was also responsible for monitoring the
physical and financial progress of all departmental
projects and ensuring that the government monitoring
system for projects was adhered to by the project
implenientators.
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The Secretariat was headed by the Assistant
Director, an engineer who reported directly to the
Director-General. Other members were four other engineers
with PhDs and three economists. In preparing the
Department's annual budget, the Secretariat was assisted
by lower level account officers and senior clerks. The
organisational structure of the Corporate Secretariat is
as shown in Figure 6.2(b).
As can be seen in Figures 6.2(a) and 6.2(b), the
Corporate Secretariat came directly under the Director-
General and its members were full-time JTM staff, rather
than staff seconded from the Central Agencies Department.
This is an important point to note as the full-time staff
were considered to be 'internal staff' and thus more
loyal to the organisation as compared to seconded staff,
who were considered 'outsiders' and more loyal to the
Central Agencies Department as discussed in Section 5.3.
The Corporate Secretariat was responsible for the overall
development of the annual financial budget. Its
responsibilities included:-
(1) initiating action for the preparation of
the annual works programme;
(ii) preparation of Budget Planning Letter and
associated budget instructions;
(iii) preparation of the estimates of revenue
in consultation with Director of Accounts;
246
(iv) co-ordination and consolidation of all
area budgets for submission to the Director-
General;
(v) submission of Annual Financial Estimates to
the Treasury and the Minister of
Communications;
(vi) submission of the Annual Statute Paper,
for presentation to Parliament, in support of
the Government Loan required for the year.
(Source: Department Internal Document -
Malaysian Telecommunications Instructions,
1978, P. 6).
From the above, we can see that the engineering
influence was very strong in the organisation as the
structure of the Corporate Secretariat was dominated by
engineers. This gave them a key role in the overall
annual financial budget, with the exception of estimates
of revenue and forecasted Profit and Loss and Balance
Sheet, which were prepared by the accounting group.
The Project Implementation / Progress Card of the
capital works programme was monitored by the appropriate
Assistant Director in HQ and submitted to the Corporate
Secretariat which was responsible for ensuring that the
projects were in the works programme and that funds were
available for the project specified. It would then
allocate the project a number and obtain approval for it
from the appropriate HQ Region Director. Copies of the
approved Project Implementation / Progress Card were
distributed to the regional Director / Controller,
appropriate Assistant Director in HQ, and Director of
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Accounts Division. One was retained by the Corporate
Secretariat. Thus, the capital works programme was
monitored by the engineers themselves, in line with
engineering values and beliefs. The accounting group
played only a minor role, confined to preparing the
revenue and forecasted final accounts.
The Budget Committee, a high level committee, was
responsible for the overall budget of the Department.
This committee was responsible for examining individual
departmental budgets, and had the final say with respect
to departmental allocations. It monitored and controlled
the budget in its monthly meetings.
The budget committee consisted of two Deputy
Director-Generals, all the directors in HQ and one
Assistant Director of the Corporate Secretariat. The
Committee was chaired by the Deputy Director-General(I)
and the Secretary, who was the Director of Finance.
6.2.6.3 Timetable for budget preparation
The preparation of the department's budget estimates
began each year following the issue of a Treasury
circular in February or March, calling for budget
submissions for the new financial year by June.
248
However in practice, budget preparation would begin
two years in advance of the budget year. The steps were
as shown in Table 6.1(a).
Table 6.1(a) - Process of Budget Preparation
Under JTM
1st September (Year- 2)
Regional / HQ Branch / Group Directors / Asst.
Directors / Controllers would prepare works
programmes and schedules of major material
requirements for switching, subscribers network
and trunk and junction plant, which the
department planned to connuence during the
coining budget year, based on the five year
plan. These work programmes would be submitted
to Headquarters by 30th November.
31st December (Year -2)
The Director-General would issue the Annual
Budget Planning Letter setting out policy
objectives and planning levels for funds.
Details of works programmes that had been
approved would also be issued with the Budget
letter.
1st January (Year -1)
All Regional Directors / Controllers and HQ
Branch Directors would receive instructions
from the Director Administration Branch to
prepare proposals for new staff. The list of
proposals for new staff would be forwarded to
the Director Administration Branch by 28th
Febuary for examination, review and subsequent
approval by the Budget Committee.
31st March (Year -1)
Details of new posts approved for inclusion in
the budget submission to Treasury would be made
known to Regional Director / Controllers, HQ
Branch Directors and Corporate Secretariat.
1st April (Year -1)
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Preparation of estimates of expenditure based
on approved works programmes and new posts.
These would be submitted by all involved:
Regional / HQ Branch / Group Directors / Asst.
Directors / Controllers to Corporate
Secretariat by 30th April.
31st May (Year -1)
Preparation of consolidated estimates of
expenditure for each Region / HQ Branch /
Group. As required by Treasury to support the
consolidated estimates, Director, Accounts
Branch would have to furnish financial
statements of accounts by 15th. June
June - July (Year -1)
Submission of overall Departmental Budget to
Director General for approval and subsequently
to Minister and Treasury.
Budget examination by Treasury. Also agreement
reached on the proposed borrowings from the
Treasury.
September (Year -1)
Review of works programmes to adjust to the
agreed level of Treasury borrowings.
Preparation of statute paper for presentation
to parliament by the Minister of
Telecommunications requesting the department's
borrowings.
January (Budget Year)
Allocations of funds by Corporate Secretariat
to all Regional HQ / groups / Directors /
Asst.Directors / Controllers.
(Source : JTM Document on budget preparation
issued to all divisions and departments)
(Note : -2 means two years before the budget
year; and -1 means one year before the budget
year.)
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6.2.7 Discussion of the budgeting system under
JTM
The budget committee consisted of 12 top managers,
of whom all except the Director of Finance were from
engineering backgrounds. Thus, the engineering viewpoint
i.e. 'as they see it' influenced the decision-making
process of the budgeting system under JTM. In fact, at
one time, it was proposed during a budget conunittee
meeting that secretaryship of the committee be taken over
by head of the Corporate Secretariat. However, this was
rejected on the basis of external criteria, as it was
standard practice for the head of Finance/Accounts in a
government Department to be the Secretary of the Budget
Committee (interview with a senior officer of the Federal
Treasury Department of the government of Malaysia). Thus,
instead, it was agreed that the Corporate Secretariat
should form a small committee to make 'working
arrangements' to monitor the progress of physical and
financial development projects (Minutes of meeting of
Budget Committee of JTM, 1983).
From the above, one could see that the role of the
Director of Finance was largely nominal. The actual
running of the budgeting system was done by the Corporate
Secretariat. The Accounts division produced the operating
and revenue budgets, while the budget for capital
expenditure was prepared solely by the engineers. There
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was little or no integration between the two. As said by
one of the former officers of JTM,
"I do mine and you do yours".
Whereas the operating budget prepared by the
accountants was on an accruals basis, the capital project
budget prepared by the engineers was on a cash basis, as
the engineers did not fully understand the accrual
concept or appreciate its importance at that time. Even
though the project engineers had some clerical staff to
help them in their administrative and accounting work,
they lacked the specialised knowledge to distinguish
between the cash and accrual concepts, and were given no
proper guidelines. This was a serious shortcoming because
capital works formed part of the major expenses of the
Department, yet annual depreciation was not properly
accounted for.
Since the engineering influence was so strong, the
accounting personnel were not able to convince them of
the importance of integrating the two types of budget.
The same goes with respect to the accrual concept in
managing capital projects. As indicated in the Report on
Privatisation of JTM (1984), the reporting of capital
continued to be based on a cash basis rather than accrual
basis, even thouqh the Department was made a commercial
Department in 197,2, since the engineers were actually in
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charge of the overall managing of the budgeting system,
from preparation to monitoring and control, which led
them to instill their values and belief system right up
to the time of privatisation.
Once the budget was approved, the allocation of
funds was once again done by the Corporate Secretariat.
This committee broke down the total amount for both
capital and operating expenditure by quarters and
apportioned them to the regions. Even though the total
amount approved was known, funds would only be released
quarterly in advance. Only at the end of the first
quarter, could a request be forwarded for the second
quarter's amount. This lack of flexibility in access to
funds created problems for the project managers,
especially when a project needed to be completed quickly
to meet demand in a particular area (Interviews with
project managers). It was very difficult to exceed the
budget ceiling as nobody wanted to take responsibility
for so doing. This contributed to project delays of two
to three years, and in rare cases, even ten years.
Another reason for the delays was bad planning in the
sense that there was no commitment from other units
within the Department or other government agencies such
as Public Works Department (PWD).
The operating budget, according to an officer who
was involved in Budgeting during JTM days was inflexible
in that it strictly followed the expenditure code given
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by the Treasury. The same did not apply to the capital
budget, where the department seemed not to follow what it
had initially planned for. For example, in 1979, the
Five-year plan for the years 1981-1985 prepared by the
top management was changed by direct intervention of the
government, which instructed that exchanges be installed
in certain estates where no exchanges had been planned.
Such intervention was quite frequent.
6.2.8 Monitoring and control of the budget
under JTM
For capital projects, the funds were given in the
form of loans by the government. Because of this, some
form of control was established at the Economic Planning
unit (EPU) of the Prime Minister's department to monitor
the usage of capital project funds by all government
Departments, including JTM. Progress reports in a
standard format were presented by the various government
Departments to EPU.
The procedures for implementation of projects and
submission of progress reports on JTM projects were as
follows: -
a Each project, before it could be implemented, had to
be approved by the chairman of the budget committee,
through forms BP1 and BP2.
b After receiving the approval from the chairman of
budget committee, the region/division needed to
obtain approval of the project from EPU through form
JPM1.
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c The progress reports were required to be submitted
by the region/division using form JPM2 to the
Ministry of Energy, Telecommunications and Posts and
Corporate Secretariat at Headquarters. The progress
reports needed to be submitted quarterly until the
project was completed.
(Source: Minutes of meeting of Budget Committee of
JTM, 1983).
The aim of the progress report was to make sure that
the country's top leaders knew the progress of the
projects from time to time. The information was vital for
the country which was undergoing economic transformation,
the success of which depended on telecommunications
infrastructure. However, monitoring did not work well in
the case of JTM, since the forms, designed to suit small
Departments, were too time-consuming to complete for a
Department which had over 4,000 projects at any given
time (interviews with a senior officer of EPU of Prime
Minister' Department and a manager of Corporate Planning
Department in STM who was in charge of coordinating the
forms and submitting to EPU). As a result of this, most
project managers reported on only a proportion of their
projects to EPTJ. In any case, the monitoring of the
project was mainly concentrated on physical aspects.
Monitoring and control of capital projects at JTh
was covered by the Budget Committee during the monthly
meetings, but the actual monitoring was managed by the
Budget Control Unit (later known as the Corporate
Secretariat). Since both the Budget Control Unit and
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Budget Coinittee consisted mainly of engineers,
engineering values and 'ways of doing things' dominated
the monitoring and control system during this period. The
accountants were basically confined to payment and
custodial roles. Even though the Director of Finance and
other accounting officers were present at both meetings,
they were limited to a basically subsidiary role in the
meetings at which the progress reports on projects were
presented and matters arising discussed.
6.2.9 Discussion on the monitoring and control
of the Budget under JTM
Most of the ex-JTM personnel interviewed felt that
monitoring and control of the budget under JTM
concentrated on the physical progress of the projects, in
order to reduce waiting lists. Overall, budgeting was not
stringent. The feeling was that 'money was not a
problem', since JTM could fall back on the government.
This was so as the engineering value system was high, as
the engineers dominated the functions and control of the
budgetary system during JTM days. Moreover, there were no
proper monitoring tools to control the budget since there
were no monthly management reports and variances were not
analysed.
The budgeting process, especially for the capital
budget, was based on a bottom-up approach in the sense
that the top management relied on the figures presented
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by the regions/divisions. Since at that time the emphasis
was service-oriented, there was no filtering by the
accounting and finance personnel, no study of project
viability, and the return/profitability of projects was
not known. Monthly accounts were incomplete or non-
existent, and profit centres were not fully implemented.
This led to difficulty in implementing profit centre
responsibility for the region. As was said by one of the
General Managers of the Regions with respect to regional
profit-centres:
"During JTM days, we were not bothered how much
we made and how much we spent. We were more
service-oriented, we looked at 'can we give?'
rather than 'how to give?' i.e. not so much at
the financial side".
He further added,
"Actually when I was in JTM, I never thought
about the costing part. Why should I care about
the costing part of it? I was concerned more
about how to provide the service at whatever
cost; that was not my concern".
With respect to the allocation of budget amounts,
once the amount had been approved by the government, the
projects could be carried out without any further
approval.	 Because	 of	 this,	 there	 was	 minimal
accountability.
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With respect to monitoring of projects, even though
there was a budget committee which met every month, the
actual progress of the projects was not properly
monitored in the sense that the progress report was
prepared only once a year. Since there were thousands of
projects, monitoring of them all was quite impossible to
practise to a satisfactory level. With respect to the
progress report submitted to EPU (Prime Minister's
department), most project implementators did not adhere
to the rules since there were too many projects and
filling in the forms was time consuming. According to one
EPTJ official interviewed, many project implementators did
not submit the quarterly reports.
With respect to the usage of budgeting reports, most
of the project engineers felt that during JTM, planning
of the projects was not done as thoroughly as later.
Instead the budget reports were used as a reference for
budget preparation. After that they were filed and used
less frequently. Previously also, projects not budgeted
for could still be implemented upon the approval of the
division/regional head, especially if they were justified
by political considerations.
Because of the above factors, the budget was not
seen as of importance to the organisation since there was
absence of accountability; enforcement was minimal and
further to that, little or no action was taken if the
budgeted amount was underspent; the question of idle cash
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did not arise. Because of the bottom-up approach to the
preparation of the budget, especially the capital budget,
most project iiuplementors would inflate the amount by a
certain percentage to include a contingencies figure in
the annual budget. All these factors led to the project
implementors failing to become effective planners.
Here, we can see that because of the greater number
of engineers and the status that was given to them,
especially in the Corporate Secretariat and the Budget
Committee, the emphasis was on engineering values.
Decisions were based on engineering convenience and
budgets was prepared by adding a percentage increment to
the current figures; and there was no appreciation of
financial values such as idle cash or the concept of
commercial viability in evaluating projects.
Referring to the Laughlin Model, it can be said that
there existed a strong element of the engineering system
in the design archetype which provided a key link between
the interpretative scheme (which possessed strong
engineering values and beliefs along with service
orientation as an objective of the organisation) and the
sub-system.
6.3 Budgeting System under STI4 - The Business Plan
6.3.1 Background
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Planning in STM is divided into corporate planning
(strategic planning) and operational planning. Corporate
planning is a process whereby the Board of Directors
determines the organisation's overall objectives and
strategies needed to achieve them.
The board of directors is assisted by the Corporate
Planning Department which is headed by a General Manager.
The task of the Corporate Planning Department is to
develop the overall corporate plan and to coordinate the
divisional and regional plans. Operational planning is
done at regional or divisional levels to achieve their
targets or objectives.
6.3.2 The Business Plan Process
The process of preparation of the business plan
(i.e. the budget year and four years of business plan)
begins each year following the issue of the circular and
guidelines by the Corporate Planning Department to all
the divisions/regions. This usually takes place in the
month of May. These circulars/guidelines include the
Business Plan Coordination Timetable as shown in Figure
6.3, notes on the preparation of the business plan,
management indication, schedule for the submission of the
business plan, format of budget/data to be submitted for
the business plan, and responsibility for submission of
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Figure 6.3 - Business flan Coordination Time Table.
__________ ________________	 CAPITAL WORKS PROGRAMME
Pead Office	 ñead Office / Regions
1)Manpower Plan
	 I	
& International
	
June	 (BPIO&1l)	 MARKETPLAN(MP)	 Capital Work Progranune For BusinessPlanl992.
2) Opex ( 13P 02)	 L_& SALES PLAN (SL)	 _______ ___________________________ -
Head Office Division: 	 * Rcgiona1
	
ul	
Business Plan 1992	 International
1) Strategic Plans	 Business Plan
2) Operating Expenditure.
	
1 8	 1991 Business Plan Mid Term Review
MANAGEMENT FORUM BRIEFING
Business Plan 1992
24 8	 CONSOLIDATE AND FORMULATE
(Corporate Planning & Corporate Finance)
30 8
	 EXAMINE AND ANALYSE
2/	 EXAMINATION BY THE HEAD OFFICE GROUP
14 9	 (Network Development ,Marketing, Human Resources, Support Services, etc)
30 9	 MANAGEMENT REVIEW (Head Office Group)
7 11	 1992 BUSINESS PLAN PRESENTATION TO MANAGEMENT FORUM
8 11	 SUBMISSION TO MCM
28 11	 SUBMISSION TO TELEKOM MALAYSINS BOARD
November I	 APPROVAL OF 1992 BUSINESS PLAN
* Including the Manpower Plan and Operating of functional group in the regions.
Source: Business Plan, 1992.
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the business plan (Company Document - Business Plan
Procedure 1992-1996).
The notes on the preparation of the business plan
are based on the target objectives and plans which become
the theme of the business plan. The guidelines include
standard format for data and information submission of
the budget for operating expenditure budget, manpower
plan budget, capital works programmes budget and revenue
budget (both market plan and sales plan). The process of
budget preparation under STM (Business Plan) is
summarised as shown in Table 6.1(b) below.
According to the Corporate Planning Group, the
business plan is derived from the mission statement
formulated by the top management. From there,
identification of goals through which to achieve the
mission statement takes place, by means of political
analysis and SWOT analysis, and driven by commercial,
financial, technological and business needs.
TABLE 6.1(b)
PROCESS OF BUDGET PREPARATION UNDER STM (BUSINESS PLAN)
Date Department
responsible
May Corporate
Planning
Department
and Board of
Directors
of STM.
Main tasks and responsibility
The board of directors will determine
the business goals for that budget
year, and the Corporate Planning
Dept. will prepare the board working
paper.
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Late Corporate	 The Corporate Planning Dept. will
May/ Planning	 issue a circular regarding the
early Dept.	 guidelines on the budget preparation
June	 to all RGM/Divisions who are
responsible for preparing the budget
for their responsibility centres.
June Responsibility The area managers and their
centres/ cost subordinates will prepare
centres	 the budget proposal
July RGM/Head	 Compiling of proposals from various
of Divisions responsibility centres:-
(1) for operating budget
coordinated by the Accounting Dept.
of the region
(ii) for sales and market plan
coordinatedby the Operation/Marketing
Dept. of the region.
(iii) for Capital Projects Budgets
coordinated by the Network
Development Dept. and Local Network
Development Dept.
1st Management	 Top management brief all RGMs on the
Aug. Forum Briefing business plan for the budget year and
Business Plan discuss the target set by the
for the	 management on forecast market and
budget year
	 sales figures for the telephone
direct exchange lines and major
services; and forecast gross opera-
ting profit based on the target set
by the RGMs and Head of International
Division. Outcome of this briefing-a
compromise between the two targets
is reached.
24th RGMs / Head	 First draft based on the compromise
Aug. of divisions targets of the business plan is
submitted to the corporate planning
dept/corporate finance dept at HQ.
	
30th Corporate	 Consolidation and formulation and
Aug Planning	 rechecking of all the figures
	
Dept. and	 submitted earlier by the regions
	
Corporate	 and divisions by the corporate
Finance Dept. finance dept. Then the Corporate
Planning dept. will form small groups
(i.e. specialised groups) at HQ level
to examine and analyse the first
draft of the business plan submitted
earlier by the regions and divisions.
2nd Examination	 First phase of rationalisation
Sept by the HO	 where the HO Group visit each region
to group headed to examine their budget proposal
14th by Corporate in detail and the RGM is asked
Sept Planning Mgr. to attend this meeting to
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and Corporate defend his proposed business plan.
Finance Mgr.	 Several changes take place at
this stage. Other members in this HQ
group include Network Development,
Marketing, Human Resources, Support
Services, etc. This took place from
1988-1990 only.
23th RGMs and	 The complete Business Plan of regions
Sept Head of	 and Divisions, prepared after
Divisions	 taking into account revisions
made in the first phase of
rationalisation, are to be ubinitted
to the Corporate Planning Dept.
24th Corporate	 These two depts. with the help of HO
Sept Planning Dept. group will analyse and come out with
to and Corporate various scenarios to be presented
29th Finance Dept. to the Budget Committee for their
Sept	 review.
30th Management
Sept Review by
to Budget
30th Committee
Oct with the
HO Group
7th Business
Nov Plan for the
budget year
presented to
the RGMs
during the
Management
Forum
Second phase of rationalisation takes
place where the Executive Director
chairs a meeting with the budget
committee and HO group. This is where
major slashes take place, especially
with respect to capital projects
budget. Once this is finalised, the
business plan will be presented to
RGM5 and Divisions at the Management
Forum. The second phase of
rationalisation will be tied to
the forecast sales and revenue plan
for the budget year and comparisons
are also made with the last year's
budget figures and current year's
latest actual accumulated figures.
The idea of presenting the
business plan to RGM5
is that most of the changes made
during the second phase of
rationalisation are with respect to
capital projects which affect them,
and thus they need to be informed
on the results of the
rationalisation process.
18th Business	 Once the business plan is finalised,
Nov Plan	 it is presented to Management
submitted	 Committee Meeting (MCM),
to MCM	 chaired by the Executive Chairman for
review, comment and
endorsement only. Minor changes take
place here, as the detailed part
has been done earlier.
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	28th Business	 Once the Business Plan for the budget
Nov Plan	 year is endorsed by the Management
submitted	 Committee in the MCM, then it is
	
to STM's	 submitted to the Board of Directors
	
Board of	 for their approval
Directors
	
30th Approval	 Once the budget has been approved by
	
Nov Business	 the STM's Board of Directors, then
	
Plan for	 the Corporate Finance Department /
budget year	 Corporate Planning Department will
inform the various regions /
divisions of the budget allocated
to them for the budget year on
the total amount approved.
(Source : Interview with personnel from the budget Unit
of Corporate Finance Division and, Corporate Planning
Department at Headquarters of the company).
* The dates are tentatively fixed and subject to changes.
The business plan of the company is a rolling plan
in which the budget is drawn up for five years. As an
example, for the 1992 business plan, the
regions/divisions need to prepare the annual budget for
the budget year i.e. for 1992 and also for the following
four years, i.e. 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996. When one
annual budget year is dropped, another annual year is
added to the business plan. This is what is known as a
roll-over budget.
Initially the regions/divisions prepare their
proposed business plans, which include capital projects,
operating expenditure and forecast revenue budgets. Each
region is divided into areas, which are responsibility or
cost centres, each headed by a manager. These cost
centres prepare their budgets and then submit these to
their respective regions. Usually in the region, the
accounting department is the secretariat and is in charge
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of the compilation of the budgets of their various cost
centres. At the regional level, until recently, the
accounting departments were involved in preparing the
operating budgets, whereas the capital budgets were
prepared by the network development and local network
development groups at the region. The marketing group at
the region will do the forecasting of the customer growth
and market plan, taking
historical data, economic
into account factors like
indicators, the country's
development programme, market orientation and
productivity improvement measures i.e. the top-down
forecast (interview with regional manager on December
1991).
But as from 1992, the head office has forecast a
preliminary set of market and sales figures for telephone
DELs and the major services for each region, based on the
region's performance for the first six months of 1991.
This forecast is used only as a guide by the regions in
estimating their revenues for the budget year and the
next four years. In addition, the management sets
operating profit targets for each region for the budget
year. Again, these are used as a guide in preparing the
business plan. These forecast figures are sent to the
regions in the month of June or early July of the year.
The management's targeted sales and market figures
and the gross operating profit are discussed with all the
Regional General Managers (RGM) at the August management
266
forum meeting (a monthly meeting held by the top
management with the RGMs on operational and other
matters. It is usually chaired by the Executive
Director). During this meeting, the RGMs are given the
chance to discuss their regions' forecasted figures in
relation to the management's target. Usually, after long
deliberation and discussion, a compromise is reached
between the top management and the various regions on the
targeted figures.
Once the targeted figures are agreed, the business
plan of each region is consolidated by its secretariat at
the regional level from the various sections/areas
involved in the capital projects, sales and market plan
and operating expenditure budgets including the manpower
planning. Then by the end of August, the region submits
the first draft of the business plan (consisting of data
in the format as given) to the Corporate Planning
Department at Headquarters. The Corporate Planning
Department passes it to the Corporate Finance Department,
which scrutinises the figures submitted by the
regions/divisions proposed budgets and consolidates them
into a business plan for the company as a whole.
After rechecking, the proposed business plan is
given back to the Corporate Planning Department, whose
head then calls a meeting with the relevant heads of
department (known as the head office group): the General
Manager (Corporate Finance), General Manager (Marketing),
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General Manager (Network Engineering), General Manager
(Support Services), and General Manager (Human
Resources). This meeting is held in early September. The
aim is to determine ways to rationalise the proposed
business plan submitted by the regions/divisions. The
Corporate Planning Department separates out specialised
areas for scrutiny by small committees, for example human
resources, marketing, etc. These committees examine the
budget proposals and resubmit them to the main committee.
From 1987 to 1990, an initial rationalisation of the
proposed budget took place in the month of September,
whereby the HQ group, led by the Corporate Planning
Manager and Corporate Finance Manager, visited each
region in order to examine and rationalise its budget
proposal.
This first phase of rationalisation involved
examining and questioning the budget plan of the region
in detail and looking into the inter-related functions.
The regional GM and his team attended a meeting to
justify their business plan, especially the number of
projects proposed, but also other related capital
expenditure, together with their revenue forecasts and
operating expenditure budgets.
After streamlining of the budget proposals, by the
end of September the regions will submit amended versions
to the Corporate Finance/Corporate Planning Departments,
based on commitments made after the first phase of
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rationalisation with the HQ group. During this first
phase of rationalisation, no definite decisions are made
and no slashing is done, since this committee has no
power to do so.
Upon receiving the amended/revised budgets from the
regions, the corporate finance group will again
scrutinise them and consolidate them into an updated
proposed budget. This will be analysed by the corporate
planning department and corporate finance department
based on two different scenarios - (i) the rationalised
way; and (ii) the most likely way, and presented to the
Budget Committee (Management Review) for review and
examination. This management review is what is known as
the second phase of rationalisation by the top management
and usually takes place by the end of September.
According to the Corporate Planning group, the
criteria used in determining the business plan, change
from time to time. During the period from 1987-1990, the
business plan was based on financial need, since clearing
up the mess preparatory to listing of the company was the
main target, and in determining the CWP for the company,
the Capping Approach was introduced during this period.
But from 1991-1992, the focus changed to clearing the
waiters and future demand, i.e. technological needs,
though finance continued to play a major role. But as
from 1993, it is more based on the business needs, i.e. a
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balance between financial, technological and other
criteria.
The Budget Committee is headed by the Executive
Director (Finance) (before 1992, it was headed by the
Executive Director (Operation)) and its members consist
of Director of Finance (up to 1992, where the post was
upgraded to the Executive Director post), Director of
Network Services, Director of Marketing, Senior GM of
Support Services, Senior GM of Human Resources, GM of
Corporate Planning and GM of Corporate Finance. This is
where the budget as a whole is analysed thoroughly and
major slashing is done, especially on the proposed
capital projects. The rationalisation (or cut-off as it
is called by the engineers) is done by taking into
account the region's constraints, capabilities, human
resources and contract availability. Along with this, the
management will review the recommendations made by the
Corporate Planning and Corporate Finance groups, who will
suggest the confidence level/achievable limits based on
the company needs, i.e. analyse the various scenarios.
Once the Management Review has agreed on the capital
expenditure budget, which constitutes a major portion of
the total budget, then the revenue budget is reviewed
based on the agreed capital expenditure budget. This is
followed by the operating expenditure budget (including
human resources budget) which is analysed in order to
support changes made in the capital expenditure and
revenue budgets.
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Once the second phase of the rationalisation has
been finalised and agreed by the Management Review, the
business plan is presented at the Management Forum to all
the Regional General Managers, early in November. This is
an important stage as the plan will affect the RGMs. One
senior manager commented:
"The pressure is on the RGMs since the regions
(including the international division) are the
profit centres of the company and thus the
finalised business budget will directly affect
them more than other divisions which are cost
centres to the company, especially with respect
to performance measurement".
After being presented to the RGM5, the business plan
is submitted at the Management Committee Meeting (MCM).
This is the highest level of committee after the board of
directors. The Executive Chairman presides over the
meeting, and the members consist of the two Executive
Directors, Director of Marketing, Director of Technical
Services, Senior GM of Support Services and Senior GM of
Human Resources. During this meeting, the executive
director, corporate planning manager and corporate
finance manager brief all members on the proposed
business plan. Since most of the members were involved
during the second phase of rationalisation, usually there
are only minor changes to the business plan at this
stage. Once the MCM has endorsed the business plan, it is
presented to the board of directors for approval at the
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end of November or early in December. Usually, the board
is briefed on the proposed business plan by the executive
director and after some discussion, the business plan is
approved by the board.
As can be seen from the above, the concept of the
business plan under STM is very different from under JTM.
This reflects the greater status accorded to the finance
group in the overall managing of the budget of the
company. This can be seen from the formation of the
Corporate Finance Department which is now responsible for
monitoring the overall budget implementation. The Budget
Committee is headed by the Executive Director (Finance)
and all new capital projects submitted to the budget
committee must first be evaluated for viability by the
Corporate Finance group. This has resulted in an increase
in the role of accounting and an attempt to change values
in accordance with financial considerations. As stated
earlier, the aim of the top management is to inculcate
sound planning practices and commercial awareness in the
engineers.
6.3.3 Capital Expenditures Budget
The capital expenditures budget (CEB) is part of the
business plan which is prepared by the regions/divisions.
The divisions/regions prepare their own estimates of the
number of projects. Under the company environment, these
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estimates are tied to the market plan and financial plan,
where customer growth and incremental revenues become the
major considerations. The capital projects at the regions
are usually done by the four network development
departments, namely local network development, switching
network development, longlines network development and
property development, headed by the respective Assistant
General Managers of each development group.
Since the CEB is one of the biggest portions of the
overall company expenditure, the management has provided
some guidelines which project managers should consider
when preparing the capital works budget. These are:-
(1) Prioritise the projects based on the return
on investment and according to the importance
of the projects with respect to improvement of
the telecommunication services.
(ii) In the case of a multistate project
coordinated and controlled by the HQ network
planning group, the region should obtain
accurate information to help the project
managers to plan and forecast their Capital
Works Programmes effectively.
(iii) Project managers should ensure at all
times that the implementation schedule for
projects and expenditures are accurate and
realistic.
(iv) Finally, they should ensure that all the
relevant data are recorded accurately and
updated regularly in the forms CWO1, CWO2,
CWO3, CWO4, and CWO5 (as shown in Tables 6.2(a)
and 6.2(b), and Tables 6.3(a) to 6.3(c)) which
become the basis for reporting and monitoring
used by the headquarters groups and fulfilling
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the above three guidelines for control
purposes.
(Source: Company Document, 1989)
Basically the Capital Works Programme has two
components : -
(i) 'Exchange Projects': switch network
projects, land and building exchanges, and
local network projects. These projects are
directly related to the total demand and number
of telephone customers.
(ii) 'Non-Exchange Projects': 'stand alone'
projects, including long distance network,
store and works, International and
administration buildings and quarters.
(Source: Company Document 1989).
With respect to the calculation of the project cost
estimates, the following factors need to be included:-
(i) inflation rate to be expected
(ii) exchange rate of foreign currency
(iii) import tax
(iv) price variation as shown in the contract.
(Source: Company Document, 1989).
Once the business plan for the Capital Works
Programme is approved by the board of directors, all the
RGMs/Heads are informed of the total capital expenditure
approved for their respective regions/divisions. This is
usually less than the amount requested, so the
regions/divisions need to prioritise their projects. Even
when a project has been approved, before it is
implemented, the project manager needs to obtain further
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approval under the Project Implementation Approval
guidelines issued by the Corporate Planning Department
and under the Financial Instructions of the company. This
is where the RGM or head of division (or even higher up,
depending on the value of the projects to be implemented)
has to approve the project to be implemented. The
rationale, according to the management, is to make sure
that someone higher up, with authority, is accountable
for the particular project that he has approved. This is
quite justified, given the fact that there are more than
6,000 projects running at any one time.
Again, with regard to preparation of the Capital
Expenditure budget by the engineers, the aim is to
inculcate commercial / financial values among them. The
engineers now need to link new projects to the
demand/market plan. Cost estimates have to be made taking
into account financial considerations such as inflation
rate, exchange rate, import tax and price variation.
Under JTN, the Capital Expenditure Budget was prepared as
a lump sum. The budget preparation was dominated by
engineers, who had little interest in commercial values
and saw no need for detailed financial analysis of each
individual project. Under STM, the Budget Unit is
directly under the Finance Group. Thus, there appears to
be an increase in the accounting sphere of influence.
6.3.4 Monitoring and Control of Capital
Expenditure Budgets
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As already mentioned above, for approval of CEB,
there are two steps which all the responsibility heads
must follow. First, the region/division needs to obtain
annual budget approval from the board on the new projects
after the CEB proposed by the regions/divisions has been
examined by the budget and management committees. Second,
after the CEBs have been approved by the board, approval
for project implementation must be obtained from
authorised personnel, in accordance with the guidelines
issued by the Corporate Planning Division and with the
company's Financial Instructions, 1987 (amended 1989).
With respect to monitoring of the projects, once
projects have been prioritised by the regions/divisions,
taking into account their actual Capital expenditure
budget approved by the board, forms need to be completed
in the format CWO2 and CWO4 for accrual expenditures and
forms CWO1 and CWO3 for cash expenditure. Copies of these
forms are submitted to the Corporate Finance Department
and Corporate Planning Department in order to coordinate
with the management reports. To enable close monitoring
of accrued expenditures by the corporate planning group,
the project managers need to submit forms CWO2 and CWO4
quarterly. For cash expenditures, monitored by the
Corporate Finance Department, forms CWO1 and CWO3 forms
must be submitted monthly.
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Another method of monitoring the capital expenditure
budgets is through the Project Expenditure Report. This
is reported in two ways: first, by information related to
cash expenditure and accrued expenditure, as shown in
forms CWO1.l, CWO2.l, CWO3.l, CWO4.]. and CWO4.2 shown in
Tables 6.4(a) to 6.4(e); and secondly, form CWO5 in Table
6.3(c) to monitor achievement on the installations of the
exchange line capacity and effective cable pairs.
Forms CWO1, CWO2, CWO3, CWO4 and CWO5 become the
basis for reporting and monitoring used by the HQ groups.
Details of these are as follows:
Form CWO1 - This relates to cash expenditure
(or cash flow) for on-going projects. Monthly
figures for the current year and budget year
are shown separately.
Form CWO2 - This relates to on-going projects
based on accrued expenditure, showing the real
value of the physical development of the
project. Quarterly figures for the current year
and budget year are shown separately.
Form CWO3 - This relates to the estimated cash
flow of projects which have been approved but
not yet started and new projects which are
considered necessary to be implemented.
Estimated cash figures are shown here on a
quarterly basis for the current year.
Form CWO4 - This relates to projects which have
been approved but not yet started and
new/proposed projects based on the accrual
expenditure to be incurred. Estimated accrual
figures are shown on a quarterly basis for the
current year.
Form CWO5 - This relates to other information
related to the physical exchanges such as total
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demand and telephone customers, exchange lines
capacity and effective cable lines.
(Source: Financial Instructions (1989) on
Procedure of Capital Expenditure of the
company).
Once the budget is prepared, monitoring and control
become important. In JTM days, these functions were
performed by outside bodies such as the Federal Treasury
and EPU, and the internal side was dealt with mainly by
engineers. In the absence of monthly reports, it was not
possible to monitor efficiently. All this changed under
STM. We can see that the new procedures introduced were
intended to make the engineers more accountable and
encourage them to operate on commercial lines. The
engineering values which prevailed during JTM days must,
under STM, compete with accounting values reflected in
the new procedures for monitoring the capital expenditure
budget. The new distinction between cash and accrual
reporting, for example, reflects the attempt to make the
engineers more financially aware.
6.3.5 Operating Expenditure Budget
Operational planning with respect to regions and
international divisions is linked to sales figures, since
the company uses these regions as profit centres.
However, for the divisions at HQ levels it is not
possible to use this approach, since they are cost
centres, so it is difficult for them to justify
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increases. For these reasons, according to an officer in
the budget department, slack budgeting seems to take
place in the cost centres as compared to profit centres
departments/regions. As he continues:
"Slack budgeting does not take place among the
regions because expenses are always related to
revenues. Thus over the years, they do not
inflate the figures. Whereas it does take place
among the divisions since they are cost centres
and the pressure is not on them. Thus, usually
during the budget examination, the budget unit
and budget committee will check thoroughly on
the proposed budget submitted by the
divisions".
The operating expenditure is divided into three main
classes, namely, labour, materials and incidental. The
budget for total labour is quite straight forward,
whereas for material, it will depend on the explanation
given. In the case of incidental items, justification is
usually needed and the budget holder will have to give
supporting details. Table 6.5 shows the breakdown of the
three main classes of operating expenditure of the
company.
Once the budget is approved and the figures are
released to all the regions/divisions, they will need to
give a breakdown of monthly estimates from January to
December. This process is important, since in monthly
reporting, the actual expenditure will be compared
against the budgeted monthly figure given by the
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TABLE 6. 5- Operating Expenditure of STM grouped under 3 main type of Expenditure namely
Manpower, Material and Incidental.
TYPE OF EXPENDITURE
MANPOWER
Executive - Salaries
Non-Executive - Salaries
Allowances
EPF
Sosco
Staff Benefits
Overtime
Medical
Total Manpower
MATERIAL
Equipment & Equipment parts
Auto Mobile
Building Parts
Fuel Gas
Furniture Fitting Renovation
Office Machines Equipments
Stationery
Uniform
Publication Photo Microfilms
Subscribers Equipment
Cable
Other Materials
Total Material
INCIDENTAL
Tranport & Travelling
Maintenance
Rental Lease (including Lease tnt)
Electricity
Water
Postage Courier Services
Assessment Quit Rent
Training
Insurance
License & Other fees
Advertisement
Corporate Promotions
Security services
International Servises Charges
Professional Charges Fees
Charges and Commissions
Miscillaneous
Allocated Charges
Total Incidental
Total
Source: Company Document, 1990.
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respective cost centre/budget holder. Thus it is
important for the division/region to break-down the
budget into monthly figures as accurately as possible,
rather than simply divide the annual total by 12. In the
case of the region, the break-down into monthly budgeted
figures is done by the budget holder, since monitoring by
the company is done up to that level only.
We can see that with respect to operating
expenditure, the recognition of the regions as prof it-
centres represent an attempt to introduce new values.
Increased operating costs, for example, have to be
justified by increase in future revenue. Again, the
breakdown of the expenses figures into monthly figures,
made possible by the monthly management report as a basis
for performance evaluation, shows the top management's
desire to instill new commercial values in the managers,
especially the engineers.
6.3.6 Monitoring and Control of Operating
Expenditure
After the plan has been put into operation, for the
operating expenditure to be effectively and efficiently
used by the responsibility centres, certain forms of
monitoring take place. The monitoring and control of the
operating expenditure are carried out in several ways:-
6.3.6.1 Budget Allocation
291
The operating expenditure budget that has been
passed by the budget committee and approved by the board
is for one financial year (i.e. from 1st Jan-3lst
December). During this time, the responsibility centre
can spend no more than the amount approved by the board.
The responsibility centre heads need to break down the
operating expenditure into monthly figures, which become
the basis for comparison with actual amounts in the
monthly reports, which include variance analysis.
In addition, to increase the effectiveness of
control, the responsibility heads divide the allocation
into half-yearly amounts which should not exceed half the
total allocated in the first six months. If the amount is
not sufficient for this period, the responsibility heads
should investigate the reasons, and apply for a
supplementary allocation, giving proper justification.
Here again, we can see the attempt to introduce a
new value system to the individual managers, including
engineers, requiring them to manage their operating
expenditure in accordance with commercial I financial
considerations.
6.3.6.2 Commitment of Expenditure
A vote book is kept by all the responsibility
centres in order to control the commitments made from the
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allocation amount provided to each of them. When the
responsibility head sub-allocates the warrants to the
cost centres under him, the vote book holder will credit
the vote book with the amount received. When any
commitment is made, the vote book balance is reduced by
that amount. No expenditure or commitment can be incurred
before the allocation balance has been checked and
authorised. This system recognises transactions when the
company is coimnitted to the supplier, e.g. transactions
are recognised when orders are issued.
Again here, the reason for introducing this system
was to inculcate the accrual concept of accounting,
especially with respect to capital projects. As the
company is a capital-based industry, capitalising the
projects at the proper time is important as it affects
the depreciation of these assets.
In order to achieve proper control in incurring
expenses from the allocated budget, the following rules
are issued by the Budget Unit (Corporate Finance
Division) and Corporate Accounts Division, to which the
responsibility head must adhere strictly:-
a) Initially the expenditure needs to be planned.
b) The vote book must be checked before any
commitment is made.
c) The vote book must be updated immediately
after order or commitment is made.
293
d) A reconciliation statement must be prepared
to reconcile the expenditure in the vote book
with the expenditure in the General Ledger
System.
e) The accounting head of the region (on behalf
of the General Manager) and the Budget Unit for
the HQ divisions are responsible in managing
the vote book, where they have to authorise the
balance and make an analysis on their
respective expenditures.
(Source: Company Document (1989) and discussion
with the officer's concerned).
Thus we can see the accounting role increasing in
making sure that these systems work. The reason for
enforcing points (a), (b) and (c) is to avoid over-
commitment on the budget allocation. Updating the vote
book immediately after the commitment is made, will help
the responsibility head in authorising the local purchase
order, since the updated balance is known. The updated
balance can also be used as a guide to plan for future
expenditure.
6.3.6.3 Reporting
Several types of reporting system are implemented by
the company for control and monitoring of operating
expenditure.
(a) Expenditure Reporting
This	 reporting	 is	 done	 monthly	 by	 each
cost/responsibility centre to show the budgeted amount
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and the actual expenditure incurred for each item under
the three main groups of operating expenditure, namely
manpower, materials and incidental, as shown in Table
6.5. The objective of this reporting is to assist the
management to measure the cost/responsibility centres'
performance and to review the budget. It is the
responsibility of the budget holder to make sure that all
expenditure is correctly allocated to the appropriate
expense centre as shown in Table 6.5 and classified
correctly. The expenditure report must also provide
sufficient, relevant and timely information in order to
assist the management in analysing the report. Table 6.6
shows the monthly expenditure reporting of the company,
classified into current month - where the report shows
the actual amount incurred (i.e. the accrual system is
used which includes not only amounts spent, but also
amounts realised but not paid) for the month, budgeted
amount for the month and last year's monthly figures for
actual amount incurred; year to date - where the report
also shows the monthly actual incurred accumulated
figures up to the reporting month, budgeted accumulated
figures up to the reporting month and last year's actual
incurred accumulated figures up to the reporting month;
annual budget (current year) and actual amount of last
year - where the report shows the amount approved by the
board for the current year and the actual expenditure
incurred last year.
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The monthly expenditure reporting by the individual
managers for submission to the Finance Division provides
further indication that management want to instill
financial values. The practice of comparing actual versus
estimated figures, and current with previous year's
figures, as shown in Table 6.6, reflects the management's
desire to monitor closely each item of expenditure. The
introduction of such practices may be expected to bring
about an increase in the influence of accounting values.
(b) Variance Reporting
All RGMs and Heads of Divisions are responsible for
ensuring that variances are reported for use in analysing
and monitoring the performance of each responsibility
centre. Reports usually show the current month variance,
where the actual figures are compared with the budgeted
figures for the month concerned. For additional
information, previous year's monthly actual figures are
also shown. The variances for the year to date are also
shown, where comparison is made between actual and
budgeted figures to date. Again, for additional
information, last year's actual figures to date are also
shown. This is as shown in Table 6.7.
Explanation of the differences must be given by each
responsibility centre, especially if there is substantial
deviation from the budgeted figures. Usually, in
determining the cause of variances, the responsibility
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heads will consult with the line managers and
supervisors. Variance reporting includes not only
explanation of variances, but also the appropriate action
to be taken.
The RGM5 have to submit the expenditure and variance
reporting to the corporate finance department, which is
responsible for compiling, evaluating and monitoring the
budget as a whole. The report will be discussed at the
monthly budget committee meeting with all RGMs, together
with capital expenditure, sales and revenue plan and non-
financial information.
Here again, we can see that by introducing variance
reporting, which did not exist under JTM, the management
is making the individual managers more accountable within
their area of responsibility. There is a clear aim to
instill commercial values, by taking action against those
whose spending deviates Un justifiably from the budget.
This again is expected to result in a change in emphasis,
with accounting role emerging in the organisation and may
lead to an increase in commercial values.
6.3.7 Discussion of the monitoring and control
of the budgeting system under STM
Control of the budget allocation for operating
expenditure has been quite stringent, in the sense that
the responsibility unit has to break down the yearly
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approved expenditure into 12 months, and is restricted to
spending up to half of the approved amount in the first
six months of the total budget.
As for monitoring and control through reporting, for
the operating expenditure, relevant, accurate and timely
reports of actual versus budgeted amounts, provided by
all responsibility centres, are important to enable
performance to be measured against budget. Preparation of
monthly expenditure reports and variance analysis reports
enables progress towards objectives to be checked and
precautions taken at an early stage. Variances can be
brought to the attention of the manager as early as
possible, so that necessary action can be taken. In
requiring these reports, the management is trying to
instill financial discipline in individual managers.
The expenditure reports and variance analysis report
are also used by the budget committee in their monthly
meeting with the RGMs. From this report, the company's
overall performance will be evaluated and summarised. As
mentioned earlier, the RGMs and GM (International
Division) have an additional responsibility to make sure
that their performance targets are achieved every month,
so as to accomplish the overall performance of the
company for that particular year. This heavy additional
responsibility is shouldered by them, since they are
responsible for the only recognised profit-centres in the
company.
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With respect to the monthly reporting of the
regions, the Profit and Loss account shows the total
sales (and the breakdown of the sales in term of business
telephone, residential telephone, ATUR, Telex, Leased
Circuits, other Services, and special services). With
respect to expenditure, it only includes operational
expenditure. Thus for the regions/International Division,
the profit is ascertained up to operational profit,
before any other provision.
However, for the regions and international division,
the monthly reporting includes not only the financial
results but also other non-financial information, such as
customer growth, productivity, and quality of service.
From these monthly regional reports, we can see the
changes that have taken place in the regions (such
information was not available as on a monthly basis
during JTN's time). The orientation and outlook may
indicate that changes has taken place from a service
approach to a result-oriented approach. Thus, overall, we
can see that the monitoring and control system under STN
is more stringent, with the aim of making the individual
managers more accountable. The managers (especially the
engineers) are expected to pay more attention to
financial considerations than they did in the past. Thus,
this may lead to increase in the influence of accounting
and may lead to a reduction of engineering influence
since monitoring and control of the budgeting system is
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to be based on commercial/financial criteria, as opposed
to the engineering criteria which prevailed under JTM.
6.3.8 Discussion on the reporting system
With respect to capital expenditure reporting, the
new reporting system incorporates both the cash and
accrual expenditure incurred in a separate form and for
each project, the demand and market of the actual figures
for the previous year are given with estimates for the
next five years. The figures are updated daily, using the
on-line computerised system. In contrast, under the old
system, only current figures were shown and only with
respect to the expenditure incurred i.e. cash figures.
The expenditure and variances as shown in Tables 6.6 and
6.7 exemplify the new system of monthly reporting, in
line with the company's aim of making the individual
managers more accountable within their areas of
responsibility. Implementing this reporting system, may
be expected to increase the influence of the accounting
group who prepare and monitor the reports.
6.3.9 Flexibility of the business plan under
STM for both the Capital and Operating Budgets
A certain flexibility is provided by the company
under the Business Plan approach to the budget, as
follows: -
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6.3.9.1 Revision of capital and operating budget
For the capital budget, the amounts approved by the
board will be on the total value of the projects as a
whole, even though the projects could last for more than
a year, which is quite common in this kind of industry.
Thus, as an example, if a project is worth M$2 Million
and it is expected to be completed in four years, then
when it is approved by the board in the budget year, the
total value of the project, i.e. M$2 million is approved.
However, the project manager needs to break down the
budget over four years. Let us say, for illustration,
that it is divided equally, i.e. M$l/2 Million each year.
The flexibility comes when the project is moving faster
than scheduled. If additional funds are needed in the
second year, then the project manager can use the amount
allocated for the third year, without having to ask for a
supplementary budget. Again here, the aim is to make the
engineers more accountable in their daily work so as to
facilitate smooth running of the projects.
For the operating expenditure budget, flexibility
arises from the amount approved for a year. The amounts
used may be more than the half amount limit approved by
the management, if the responsibility head can justify
the spending in question. However the revision made
should not lead to an overall increase in the year's
provision approved earlier by the board.
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6.3.9.2 Virement
Virement is defined as a transferring of an amount
of budgetary provision for some specified items that are
likely to be underspent, to other items in the budget
that seem to be overspent.
The use of virement in this company is strictly
controlled to avoid the breakdown in the budgetary
control that might occur if it were misused. Sometimes
overspend may be due to bad management by the person
responsible for handling the expenditures. On the other
hand, underspending does not necessarily mean that
resources have been utilised wisely.
In dealing with virement, the company has set its
rules as follows:-
(a) The virement must be for the same type of
expenditure or for a different type of
expenditure but on the same project.
(b) Virexnent for the same type of expenditure
must have an authorisation from the respective
director.
(c) Virement between different projects was not
allowed from 1987-1989, but is allowed as from
1990 with the approval relevent officer
depending on the amount.
(d) Virement between regions must be approved
by Management Committee.
(e) Virement between responsibility centres
must have approval from the General Manager.
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(Source : Financial Instructions of the Company
1987 (mended 1989)
From this, we can see evidence of accounting
influence, since the rules with respect to virement came
from the accounting group, who make sure that the
engineers follow them. This is a significant development,
considering that under JTM, one problem had been
frequent, almost arbitrary, movements from one capital
expenditure code to another. This was possible when
accounting played only a small role, but under STM, with
the increase in the accounting sphere of influence, it is
intended that this behaviour should be minimised and
eventually stop, especially with the emergence of the
internal auditor in the new organisation.
6.3.9.3 Supplementary Provisions
When the responsibility head finds that the approved
budget allocated for operating expenditure to his
division/region is insufficient to carry out the centre's
activities or programme, he can apply for a supplementary
budget by submitting a proposal to the GM of Corporate
Finance. The Budget Unit within the Corporate Finance
Division will analyse the additional amounts requested
and submit them to the board for approval.
However, for the capital expenditure budget, if the
supplementary amount is needed in order to complete
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projects, a proposal must be submitted to the corporate
finance division, who will present it to the budget
committee for consideration. The Budget Committee will
usually ask the technical group at the head office to
analyse and make a recommendation on the amount
requested. Then it will be submitted to the board for
approval.
6.3.10 Discussion of the flexibility of the
budget under the Business Plan
Some flexibility is incorporated into the budget to
make sure that unexpected events can be tackled by the
responsibility head, in the interest of achieving target
objectives. However, this flexibility is controlled in
order to avoid any misuse of the budget. The control is
achieved by asking the head or RGM to submit a
supplementary budget proposal if he requires funds
additional to the original amount approved earlier. Once
this is submitted, it will go through the budget
committee for analysis before submission to the board for
approval.
Control of vireinent is quite stringent to avoid
manipulation of the budget, for example by deliberately
miscoding expenditure from an overspent category to an
underspent category. To control this, approval must come
from the GM after a request has been made by the unit
head/cost centre head, and an explanation given. Usually,
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virement is only allowed between items of the same type
of expenditure. Virement between one project and another
is not allowed, as this would confuse monitoring, and
would remove the incentive to good planning. Overall, the
management's intention is to make the individual managers
behave as 'corporate men', instilling commercial values
in them.
6.4 Comparison of budgeting systems under JTM and SPM
Overall, one of the major changes that took place in
the budgeting process under STM is that objectives are
set within the organisation itself. The strategic
planning is done by the board of directors and top
management and operating planning is done by the regions.
This is very different from JTN days, when the strategic
planning was done by a central government agency and the
operational planning was done by JTM staff.
As was commented by one senior executive of the
company,
"During JTM days, our planning system was very
much driven by budgeting i.e. using an
incremental approach, whereas now, it is driven
by corporate strategy".
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And with respect to the Budget Unit, being under the
engineers, another senior executive of the company
commented,
"Under JTM, the budget unit was under the
Corporate Secretariat which was controlled by
the engineers. But, as its name implies, it was
not outgoing and not forward-looking. The
process was more or less the same but the
corporate evaluation was lacking during that
time".
In setting up a strategic plan, the management and
the board of directors set objectives and ways to achieve
them in both broad and specific terms. Once this is
established, a guideline is prepared and circulated to
all the divisions and regions involved in the business
plan. Thus, through this process, the budget becomes a
management control tool, whereby budget authority is
delegated to lower-level managers and/or responsibility
centres. This makes the division/region heads more
responsible and accountable for their divisions'/regions'
performance. The process involves participation of all
levels of management, as the budgeting process is
initiated at the lowest level of cost centres (i.e. at
area level) and submitted to the regions, and so on
upward. Lower level management are the people who know
best what they need to achieve their target.
Participation also minimises resistance towards the
plans. With the guidelines provided within the
organisation, the responsibility heads are always aware
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of the corporate level plan, so they can make sure the
operational level plan is properly formulated and
consistent with corporate objectives. This process
reflects the intention of the management to change the
value system of the managers and make them more
accountable than they were during JTM days.
The availability of the procedures and manual of
budget preparation, which is a written record of the
detailed procedures to be followed, including the
timetable, provides a uniform framework for the regions,
so it is possible to coordinate the proposed budget. The
plan, in theory, should become more realistic, since
there is coordination between the budget secretariat
(i.e. the Corporate Planning Department) and the regions,
with the Corporate Planning Department acting as an
advisor or catalyst in any changes in company policy
which affect the budget preparation. This indicates the
management's concern with the accuracy of budget
preparation and desire to inculcate sound planning and
efficient management.
The approach to preparing the budget is completely
different from that in JTM's time. The budget, or
business plan, is a one plus four roll-over budgeting
system. For example, in preparing the business plan for
1992-1996, the current year data (i.e. 1991) become
historical data, those for the budget year (1992) will be
the most accurate figures, and 1993 figures will be less
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accurate but will become a planning variance. For the
years from 1994-1996, no detailed figures will be
included in the business plan, but only indicative
figures which are nonetheless sufficient to indicate to
the staff, where the company is heading.
Overall, the business plan which is a new budget
system represents a 'result-oriented' approach for line
managers. Top management expect these managers to come
out with targeted objectives and targeted figures which
must show an improvement or growth. If the line managers
are not able to produce such figures, then the top
management will, through the process of rationalisation,
set targets which will eventually be accepted by the
regions. Again, the top management is attempting to
instill commercial values into the individual managers.
To date, budgets for capital expenditure are still
being prepared at the regional level by the engineers.
Accountants are still not involved, but the company is
planning to appoint project accountants by the end of
1993. The duties of the project accountant which have
been specified are firstly, to help in project planning
and, secondly, to asssist the engineers with project
implementation and project costing.
From a financial accounting aspect, the project
accountant should be able to advise the engineers on
which expenses to capitalise and which items should not
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be capitalised and once completed, that the project
concerned should be transferred to fixed assets.
From a management accounting and corporate finance
point of view, since not all projects can be implemented
at the same time, the project accountant should be able
to prioritise according to which project gives more
present value for the same risk.
As can be seen in the role of project accountant
above, the company is recognising that accounting work
should be done by an Accountant. Capital expenditure,
being a major expenditure, requires efficient management.
The company cannot afford the mistakes made during JTM
days. Again, we have indications of the finance group
expanding in the organisation, and the accountants
working hand in hand with the engineers, unlike the
situation during JTM days.
Unlike JTM days, the approved budget under STN is
closely monitored through monthly management reports. Any
deviations are highlighted and management is given
responses from the line managers. Any contingencies are
specified and carefully monitored. All of the project
plans are approved by the management. This is part of the
objective of the company to inculcate good planning
practice and adhere strictly to it. Once again, it appear
that an attempt is being made to instill financial
criteria. This, in turn, may result in increased
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accounting and financial values which are presence in the
new design archetype.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, the budgeting system under JTM and
STM environment was described and discussed in detail. It
was found that the approaches of the two systems differed
as the environment and mission of the organisation
differed.
Under the JTM environment, the budgeting system was
largely influenced by the Treasury Department of the
federal government, the EPU of the Prime Minister's
Department and Ministry of the Telecommunication, Post
and Energy, which controlled the planning and direction
of the organisation. These government agencies controlled
and monitored the funds, and made sure that expenditure
and operations were in line with the government plan and
objectives. The objective was mainly service-oriented,
with reducing the waiting-list of the subscribers as a
major priority.
When the organisation was privatised, the mission
changed to a profit-orientation. Under the company
environment, STM had to manage and behave like any other
company. For the following reasons, for which evidence
has been presented earlier, under STM, the accounting
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sphere of influence in the organisation appears to have
increased:
(1) Privatisation has brought a change from public
sector accounting to commercial accounting.
(2) Changes in organisational structure have given
greater prominence to finance and accounting. For
example:
a) The Corporate Accounts division has been
expanded.
b) A new Corporate Finance division has been
created and has expanded rapidly.
c) Regional level accounts have expanded with
the new sub-division into areas.
d) There has been an upgrading of accounting
post at all levels in the organisation, from
the regional accounts assistant (now Junior
Executives) to the Director of Finance (now as
Executive Director, with a seat on the Board).
e) New accounting posts have been created in
line with the expansion of the finance and
accounting sector at all levels.
(3) A costing Information System has been introduced
as is being expanded and is expected to play a major role
with the implementation of the product costing and
transfer pricing by the end of 1993.
(4) Coinputerised accounting system (notably the
SISKIS system) are being introduced to improve planning,
monitoring and control of stock levels and cash flows.
313
(5) A new, five-year rolling business plan has been
introduced. The business plan process gives greater
status to the Accounting and Finance Group in the
organisation.
(6) Project planning has been placed on a more
commercial footing with the introduction of viability
studies.
(7) Cost/Responsibility centres have been more
clearly delimited and their number increased, to
facilitate tighter control.
(8) The frequency and detail of reporting have been
increased, in the interest of closer monitoring of
company activities.
This apparent increase in the accounting sphere of
influence in the organisation is possible ground for
investigating whether engineering values and beliefs have
decreased in importance compared to accounting values.
This issue will be examined in more detail in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Descriptions and Discussions on the dynamic of
Change in the Capital Investment and Project
Process in the Local Network Development Group
in Central Region of STM
7.1 Introduction
The process of change happening from the time of JTM
up to STM, arising out of the three phases of
disturbance, was discussed in Chapter Five, while Chapter
Six described and discussed the budgeting system under
each environment. This chapter analyses the changes in
relation to the model used. By analysing the capital
budgeting system, it aims to trace the dynamics of change
taking place in the organisation out of privatisation,
with the emphasis on the period from 1987 onwards.
During this period, dynamic changes took place,
associated with the new role of accounting (Hopwood,
1991). With the change in objective from 'service-
oriented' to 'profit-oriented' and clarification of the
mission, a change was brought about in the commercial way
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of running the organisation. Accounting and financial
criteria and methods were introduced from time to time in
the organisation, affecting the engineers who dominate
this technical company. With this change, a new
vocabulary of accounting and commercial terms, which had
not seemed to be understood or appreciated by engineers
under JTM and in the early years of privatisation, began
to be appreciated and used by them in their daily work.
But to what extent are these accounting, financial and
commercial values used? Has there been a real
assimilation of the financial and commercial, changing
the engineers' values and beliefs along these lines? Or
was it a cosmetic change forced upon them by the top
management, but leaving untouched the inherited values?
To answer these questions, it would be helpful to
look in close-detail at a particular area of activity
within the company. This chapter therefore presents a
detailed case study of the Capital Budgeting System, as
exemplified by the Capital Investment and Project Process
at the Local Network Development Unit of the Central
Region where the dynamics of change taking place from the
three phases of disturbance are discussed, with
concentration on the third phase of disturbance. This
case study will provide the basis for the attempt, in
Chapter Eight, to answer the question posed above.
7.2 Critical Events of Change Taking Place
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Laughlin's model is used in this research work to
trace the process of change or to map out the movement of
tracks of the organisation concerned, arising out of the
'disturbances' that took place from the first phase, to
the second phase and later to the third phase, i.e.
privatisation of the. company concerned.
Initially, with the first phase of disturbance, i.e.
the liberalisation of the telecommunication services, no
major change occurred to the Department. Only when the
second phase of disturbance came, i.e. with the
introduction of the turnkey projects, were there some
changes in the subsystem and minor change in design
archetype, in the sense that major jobs and
responsibilities were taken over by the turnkey
contractors. The major change only came when the third
phase of disturbance set in, i.e. privatisation of the
Department. The change is seen in the change in company
objective from a 'service-oriented' to an 'economic-
driven' motive. This is clearly expressed in the mission
statement of STM, which is:
"to provide modern and high quality
telecommunication services in a timely manner
and at an affordable and competitive price to
users and to operate a viable business entity
while maintaining good corporate citizenship at
all times" (Annual Report of STM, 1989, p 1).
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This mission statement is a strong declaration of
objectives which have completely changed from JTM days.
The focus, in the ideology and culture of JTM, on
engineering excellence, was quite strong, as it had been
a closed Department for thirty years. However, after
privatisation, the rules of the game changed from a
service orientation to a market and profit orientation.
The government work ethos, which focused on the provision
of a public service, which had previously been strong,
was no longer valid. Also, the newly privatised entity
came under the Company Acts 1965; the emphasis was on
working for the shareholders, working for profits. The
top management and executives lived and behaved as
'company men' and ultimately the whole ideology of
business revolved around 'management'.
As the mission/objectives of the organisation
changed from 'service' to 'profit', certain major events
took place:
(i) Financial information acquired importance for
decision-making and monitoring purposes. Thus, along the
line, the company established financial and non-financial
indicators for measuring the monthly performance of the
company. During JTM days there was no monthly management
report; the 'business' of the Department was then to
fulfil the government's political requirements, and the
public's social and service needs (see Chapters Five and
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Six and also 'the role of Accounting and Finance
division' after privatisation in Section 5.5.2).
(ii) The business plan was introduced (see Chapter
Six). In the early stage of privatisation, the business
plan was very much inherited from JTM practices. However,
after two years of privatisation, changes took place
step-by-step, in an incremental manner. These changes,
which were introduced by the top management, affected the
project managers, who were mostly engineers. The changes
occurred at various stages: planning, initiation of
projects, material requisition, implementation and the
assetisation of projects.
(iii) Capital projects (which are part of the
business plan) under the old administration were planned
to meet service obligations to the public, and in some
instances, to meet technological needs. After
privatisation, a major change took place in the capital
budgeting system, as will be discussed later in this
chapter.
7.3 Dynamics of change in the organisation with respect
to Capital Budgeting System
To answer the questions posed at the beginning of
this chapter, we now turn to a detailed analysis of the
Capital Budgeting System. That system is chosen for
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analysis because of its important role in view of the
capital-intensive nature of the technical organisation.
Moreover the core of this work is done by the engineers
themselves. This is an important point to note, in view
of our concern with whether accounting (including
financial) through the capital budgeting system has
produced an impact or has changed the values and beliefs
of the engineers, i.e. whether it has affected the
interpretative scheme of the Laughlin model (1991).
As we saw in Chapter Two, the organisation of
JTN/STM is divided into headquarters functions and six
geographical regions, namely Central, North, South and
East in Peninsular Malaysia; and Sabah and Sarawak in
East Malaysia. The organisational chart for Central
Region is shown in Figure 7.1. The role of management in
the region is to plan, engineer, operate and maintain
services, with the functional guidance and overall
direction coming from the headquarters. The Region is
further divided into five functions, namely, Finance and
Accounts; Switching and Longlines; Marketing; Area Level
Operations and Marketing; and the Local Network
Development section, as shown in Figure 7.1. It was
decided by the researcher to analyse change with specific
reference to the Central Region because of its major
contribution to the overall business activity. As shown
in Table 7.1, as from 1987-1992, the Direct Exchange Line
(DEL) which represents the actual demand or number of
customers was between 36-37% of the company total, the
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highest among the six regions. Similarly, the Central
Region earned the highest revenue as shown in Table 7.2
from 1987-1992 where the revenues earned by the Central
Region was between 36%-38%.
Table 7.1: Direct Exchange Lines (Actual
Demand) By Regions in STI4 from 1987-1992
Year Central North South East	 Sarawak Sabah
	
%	 %	 %
1987	 36	 25	 18	 7	 8	 6
1988	 36	 24	 18	 8	 7	 7
1989	 37	 24	 19	 7	 7	 6
1990	 37	 24	 19	 7	 7	 6
1991	 37	 24	 19	 7.5	 6.5	 6
1992	 36	 24	 20	 8	 7	 5
Source: Annual Report of 5PM from 1987-1992.
Table 7.2 Total Revenue for Central Region
against STM as a whole
Year	 Total Revenue (a) Total Revenue (b) 	 (a)
(Central Region) 	 (STM as a whole) 	 /(b)
M$Nillion	 M$Million
1987	 622.2	 1644	 38%
1988	 683.0	 1882	 36%
1989	 783.7	 2141.2	 37%
1990	 913.7	 2574.3	 36%
1991	 1094.9	 3004.6	 36%
1992	 1260.8	 3414	 37%
Source: (a) - Company Document (Central Region)
from 1987-1992.
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(b) - STh Annual Report from 1987-1992.
The telecommunication services provided by the
organisation have increased over the years, with the
advancement of the teleconununication technology, as
discussed in Chapter Two. But its core function is still
to provide services to the customers on the basic
telephone networks, where the major revenue is earned.
Before this can be achieved, network exchanges have to be
built. This usually involves three network development
groups, namely the switching and radio network, long-
lines network, and local network development groups.
Because of the importance of the planning and
forecasting role carried out by the engineers at LND,
because LND represents a major part of the work done at
regional level, and also because of the major changes
that have taken place in LND, the researcher decided to
focus on LND Central Region in analysing the dynamics of
change. Yet another reason is the fact that LND is the
starting point in building the exchange; proposals start
from this group, which identifies growth centres and
forecasts future demand. As was said by a senior LND
engineer:
"Usually we will identify and propose the
building of a new exchange i.e. the starting
point is LND. We are the ones who start the
proposal. They don't propose the exchange
without our backing, since we are the ones down
the line who will do the forecasting. We know
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where the subscribers are and where the
potential subscribers will be, whereas other
development networks like switching and long-
lines wouldn't know until we inform them".
By taking the LND group in the Central region as the
focus of empirical research, it was possible to meet the
requirement of the interpretative approach and conduct an
explanatory case study, since the researcher was able to
gain insight by spending time with the LND project
manager and his team.
7.3.1 Local Network Development in Central Region
The organisational structure of the Local Network
Development Unit of the Central Region is as shown in
Figure 7.2.
The functions of the Local Network Development are:
(i) to provide a network which will enable
service to be given on demand during the
planned life of the network, with the minimum
of additional rearrangements and expenditure;
(ii) to keep spare plant to a minimum by
deferring provision of plant where this course
is economically justified;
(iii) to design all subscribers' lines and
miscellaneous circuits to the standard grade of
trasmission and within the limits imposed by
signalling requirements;
(iv) to optimise the utilisation and
effectiveness of existing and proposed plant to
maximise return on investment;
(v) to ensure that successive instalments of
plant involve a minimum of rearrangement;
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(vi) to ensure that standard construction is
used where practicable and the arrangement of
plant is such that maintenance is kept to a
minimum.
Source: Company Document 1990
As discussed in Chapter Five, the Local Network
Development Section has undergone a change in the sense
that during the period from 1972-1974 , most of the work
was done by JTM staff with the help of PWDs staff; on
occasion, some outside contractors helped on the
implementation side, but their contribution was very
minor. However, some changes took place from 1975, when
the government started to introduce the JKH system
whereby all JTN contractors had to register with the
federal Treasury. The number of contractors, which was in
single digits during the early part of the 1970s, rose to
around 30 when the JKH system was introduced. This
increase was due to the expansion of work in the
telecommunication industry in the country at that time,
in line with the government's industrialisation policy,
as discussed in Chapter Two.
However, as discussed in Chapter Five, the JKH
System lasted only up to 1982. As from 1983, the turnkey
system was introduced, work being shared by only five
major contractors. This system also lasted only five
years, i.e. up to 1988, when the JKH system was
reintroduced by STN, which could not cope with the local
network development work itself. The government still has
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the final say in contracts worth more than M$500 million
since it still owns about 75% of the shares in the
company (Annual Report, STM 1992), but the company hopes
by the latest measures to avoid a return to the turnkey
system. One senior accountant commented,
"We don't want the turnkey system any more
because it is very expensive. We are back now
to the JKH system and we have raised the number
of contractors from 30-40 before turnkey, to
120. We are also training them because some of
them lack experience. This is one approach to
preventing another round of the turnkey system.
With a lot of JKH contractors around, it will
be more difficult for the government to force
us to go for turnkey contractors, since these
people are large in number and some of them are
also active in the ruling political party and
worst of all, they will be out of work".
Another engineer commented on the turnkey system:
"The turnkey system not only cost more than
twice what it would cost if we were to do the
work, but they also took our important and core
function, which is planning of the network.
That was quite a frustrating thing to happen to
us, since that is one of the most important
functions that we had when compared to JKH
system. Under this system, we do everything -
identifying the growth area, deciding what
system to use, detailed planning and monitoring
of projects, and on top of that, we provide the
material. They just do the implementation part
of it with our people closely monitoring their
work".
7.3.2 Capital Investment and Project Process
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In analysing the change at micro level, i.e. using
LND in Central Region as the case study, the capital
investment process used by Pike & Dobbins (1986) was
taken as a basis, though some modification was made to
suit the organisational approach to the capital
investment and projects process, as shown in Figures 7.3,
7.4 and 7.5.
Further to that, analysis is focused on demand
forecast, and Effective Cable Pair (ECP) forecast and
utilisation rate of all the exchanges in the four areas
of Central region from 1988-1992. Demand and ECP
forecasting is done by the engineers in the Local Network
Planning section of the organisation, where the ECP
becomes the output. The demand forecast carried out by
the engineers as part of the fundamental planning
approach at the Local Network Unit is important, since it
forms the background or basis for the design and
implementation of the local network. Because of this, it
has a direct and important impact on the quality of the
local network, technically and financially. This
fundamental planning approach was only implemented after
corporatisation of the organisation, even though the
overall policy and guidelines were there during the 1970s
and early part of the 1980s (Interview with the former
engineers of JTM).
7.3.2.1 Identifying Growth Centre and Viability
Studies
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7.3.2.1.1 Initial Planning and Gathering of
Data in identifying the Growth Centre
In planning a local network project, the first phase
is to identify the need for a particular project. This is
where the gathering of data and information about a
particular area to be developed takes place. In
identifying the need for a project, i.e. either a new
exchange or extension of the present exchange, two types
of forecast are done : a top-down forecast and a bottom-
up forecast.
(i) Top-down Forecast
The top-down forecast which is carried out by the
regional Local Network Support Services with the help of
the four area Managers, estimates the total telephone
service demand within a region, town or specific exchange
area, based generally upon broad statistical projections
of population, income and other variables, with little
emphasis on the exact location of existing and projected
subscribers. In preparing this forecast, it is important
for the engineers concerned to have close contact with
the district or state officer, since this forecast takes
into account the types of economic activity and the
anticipated trend and pattern of economic development in
the area under study. Other factors taken into account
are environmental conditions, settlement and land usage
patterns, both existing and projected; demographic trends
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including the impact of development plans, government
policies and natural growth; and projected increase in
telephone penetration among the residential population
and in business and residential establishments.
(ii) Bottom-up Forecast
The bottom-up forecast is a forecast based on
detailed field studies of the surveyed area, identifying
existing and future telephone demand trends at a micro
level and is shown in figure 7.6. The following procedure
is followed in carrying out this forecast for a
particular area:-
(i) The area is divided into blocks for
detailed survey.
(ii) A land survey, including property
registration and a count of each block, is
carried out. This survey identifies all the
existing properties, as well as all known
development projects.
(iii) All unused land is identified and a
projection of land usage is carried out based
on information obtained from government
agencies and developers. If no information is
available, the projection is based on the type
of land usage of the surrounding areas.
(iv) A detailed list of property units for each
blocks is then prepared for various base dates
over a 20 year period.
(v) Using the penetration factor table prepared
earlier, a calculation is made of the telephone
demand, based on the property units in the
detailed block surveys. This generates the
'bottom-up' demand fOrecast.
Source: Company Document 1992
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Figure 7.6 - Bottom-Up Forecasting as Practised
by Local Network Development of Central Region
as from 1992
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Most of the engineers interviewed in the Central
Region were of the opinion that under JTM environment,
the emphasis in demand forecasting was on the top-down
forecast. Bottom-up forecasting was not adopted to the
full extent because the process was too tedious and
detailed. Thus, the most significant change to occur with
respect to demand • forecasting was the introduction of
bottom-up forecasting in Central Region, upon
corporatisation in 1987, with what is known as
fundamental planning.
7.3.2.1.2. Fundamental Planning
Basically, fundamental planning is a schematic plan
detailing existing and proposed projects to meet forecast
growth for the next 20 years. It is constructed from
forecast data and forms the basic framework necessary for
the programmed development of local network in a
predetermined manner. It reflects the design of the
primary cable and duct network which is essential to the
evolution of a long-term perspective plan for the
efficient and economical development of local network.
During JTM, fundamental planning did not play an
important role, even though the concept was recognised.
The reason for this deficiency was that the political and
social aspects of the service were considered more
important than the engineering and investment aspects
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(Interviews with some senior engineers of STM, formerly
JTM engineers). However, during the turnkey era which
started in 1983, the turnkey contractors appointed were
involved in this fundamental planning while planning the
local network. The organisational structure of the
formation and expansion of the Fundamental Planning Unit
can be seen in Figures 7.7(a), 7.7(b) and 7.7(c).
Upon corporatisation in 1987, the Fundamental
Planning Unit was established in the Central Region,
headed by a Manager specifically responsible for the
fundamental planning of the region. Since March 1992,
fundamental planning has been decentralised, with each
area having its own fundamental unit headed by an
Assistant Manager (known as Fundamental Engineer) and
reporting directly to the Project Manager.
As was said by one engineer who has served under
JTM, turnkey, privatisation and post-privatisation:
"In JTM days, we did not have fundamental
planning. This plan was part of the detailed
planning but it was not implemented as there
were no clear guidelines as to what we should
do, so we just did what we thought was right".
And she further added:
"Under JTM, most of the planning was done in an
ad-hoc manner, i.e. when you saw a demand, then
you planned for it, but not in detail as right
337
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now, since fundamental planning was absent.
Furthermore, now we have the master plan in
detail, whereas during JTM days, the plan was
incorporated with the government".
Another engineer commented:
"The fundamental plan was there but not
implemented, i.e. the site was identified but
the fundamental planning did not take place, as
nobody saw the importance of it - maybe because
we concentrated so much on the technical aspect
of it and relied on the headquarters group to
do the forecast for us; that was based on the
top-down forecast".
Yet another engineer commented:
"In JTM days, since there was no fundamental
planning, demand forecast was based on
projections and trends but now with the
introduction of fundamental planning, we have
one to five years, 5th year, 10th year and 20th
year demand forecasts".
7.3.2.1.3 Feasibility and Financial Studies
One of the most significant elements of the
fundamental planning is the feasibility study to be
carried out by the Project Manager on the new growth
area, i.e. to determine the most effective location of a
prospective new exchange. According to most of the
engineers interviewed, such studies were not carried out
during JTM, or if they were, they were based only on
technological, political and service considerations,
341
whereas currently they are based on commercial and
financial, as well as technological considerations, as
was seen by the researcher from the working papers on
proposed new exchanges submitted to the Management
Committee headed by the General Manager in the Central
Region.
Analysis of these working papers on the feasibility
studies carried out by the Project Engineer (now done by
Fundamental Planning Engineer) from 1972 to the present,
revealed the following scenario:
During JTM days, the demand forecast was based on
top-down figures, obtained on an incremental basis by
adding a percentage to the previous year's figure.
However, during the turnkey era, the turnkey contractors
did both top-down and bottom-up forecasting. This
practice was followed by the STM engineers upon
corporatisation and is now done more accurately since
privatisation. This demand forecast is now prepared by
the Fundamental Engineer at the Area level. One engineer
said, with respect to the two different systems:
"Under JTM, we would calculate the demand
forecast based on the flat growth rate and add
to the previous years figures. But now in
determining the demand forecast we have to go
and visit the site and count the number of
buildings in the development schemes, the
number of floors and offices and shops, and
coordinate with housing developers and the
state development office".
342
With regard to the proposal of a new exchange, under
JTM, no alternatives were evaluated from the economic
standpoint; the only consideration was of the various
points available to serve the area. The question of
whether to choose a static or mobile installation, or to
increase capacity from an existing nearby exchange was
not considered at all. Most engineers expressed the view
that money was not a problem during JTN days, and
furthermore, clearing waiters was the main objective of
the organisation at that time, and this is why proper
feasibility studies on the building of new exchanges were
not carried out.
This situation continued during the first year of
corporatisation, 1987, but as from 1988, the GM
instructed the Fundamental Unit to prepare feasibility
studies on new exchanges. From 1988-1990, the feasibility
study included the various options available and their
cost effects. These options might include building a new
exchange (static), mobile cabins, Multi-Access Radio
System (MARS), using fibre optics, or using copper cables
fed from existing exchanges. In analysing each option,
detailed costings were prepared by the fundamental
engineers (as can be seen in the working papers).
Moreover, other costs, such as cost of the land and
building, had to be taken into account. But at this
stage, each development group (i.e. local network,
switching network, longlines and property) do their own
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feasibility studies for a particular exchange development
and later meet to discuss their proposal wiht respect to
a particular exchange.
Since 1991, when the fundamental unit was
decentralised to area level as shown in Figures 7.7(a),
7.7(b) and 7.7(c) on the formation and expansion of the
Fundamental Planning Unit in the Central region, the
feasibility study for any proposed new exchange must
include the expected revenue to be earned, and the
capital investment method approach to be used in
determining whether the project is feasible or not. So
far, most of the project managers (engineers by
profession) in Central Region have used pay-back period,
but it is hoped that in future the engineers will be
using a more sophisticated method such as net present
value, internal rate of return, or others. All the
projects which were justified on the basis of expected
revenue and pay-back period, are not ready or have only
just been started, i.e. they have not been cut-over yet.
Moreover, actual revenues by exchanges are not being
apportioned to other exchanges, and cost per product
(e.g. cost per ECP) will only be ready when the CIS is
ready for implementation by the end of the 1993.
But as from the year 1993, the HQ group have
organised a workshop on integrated semi-urban/rural
network planning and development for several exchanges in
all the regions where all the four development groups
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including marketing sit down together to come out with
the proposed new exchange where commercial and financial
elements are taken into consideration.
7.3.2.1.4 Discussion on identifying growth
centres and viability studies during JTM,
Turnkey and STM environments
During JTM days, planning followed a simple approach
based on political and service considerations. Data were
gathered using a top-down approach. This was usually done
by the HQ group with the help of the Traffic Department
at the region. Thus, the LND at the regional level relied
on the forecast of demand prepared by the above group,
since fundamental planning was not done. As was commented
by one senior engineer:
"In coming up with a forecast of demand in a
particular exchange, the forecast could be
based on experience, gut-feeling, projection or
data. During JTM days, a lot of forecasts were
based on experience and projection but now,
under STM environment, we try to base it on
data, i.e. actual plans from the developer and
actual information from the various
authorities".
Another engineer who rose from the rank and file
said:
"During JTM, we didn't really have proper
demand forecast figures. As a project came
along and we became aware of it, we would just
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put in so many cable pairs on the basis of
experience".
And he added further:
"We, at Local Network, had to do our own
forecast using whatever development information
we had. At that time, we did not know what was
bottom-up or top-down, but we did a forecast.
And I think, Switching network also did their
own forecast based on the growth of the
exchange. But, during JTM time, we did not have
much liason between Local Network and
Switching, or if any, it was at very high
level, at top management level in headquarters.
But I think now, with the concept of an
integrated approach, where you have Marketing,
LND, as well as Switching and the Marketing &
Operation at Area level, you will get a better
and more reliable forecast. But the main thing
is the fundamental planning; that has helped us
a lot in terms of accurate forecasts".
During the turnkey era, this was not done by JTM
staff, as the planning was all done by the turnkey
contractors. Even though JTM engineers were supposed to
review the turnkey contractors' plans, in practice it was
difficult to do so, since only 14 days was given to them
to review the plan, as laid down in the contract signed
between JTM and the turnkey contractors. Furthermore,
most of the engineers in this section were transferred to
other divisions, since most of the functions in this
section were taken over by the turnkey contractors. Thus,
because of shortage of staff, it was not possible for
JTM's engineers thoroughly to go through the plan
proposed by the turnkey contractors, even though the
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proposals might not be favourable to JTM. Most of the
engineers were of the opinion that the turnkey contracts
signed between the turnkey contractors and JTM were one-
sided. They were formulated in a loose manner which
benefitted the turnkey contractors, the 14-day clause
referred to above, being an example of this imbalance.
According to one senior officer, JTM at that time had to
rely on the Government Attorney-General's legal officers
to translate the overall turnkey contract. But the
problem was that since these legal officers were outside
the control of JTM and furthermore not familiar with
technical terms used in the contract, as the turnkey
system was a recent innovation, they were not able to see
the weaknesses in the contracts. According to one member
of senior management:
"The Attorney-General's legal officers only
corrected the spelling mistakes and did not go
through everthing in detail, especially parts
that were unfavourable to JTM".
Upon privatisation, the turnkey system continued
until 1988 when it was replaced by the JKH system. As
from 1989, after the RGM and his subordinates had
participated in several financial courses, the top
management had stressed the importance of financial and
accounting criteria and the Financial Instructions had
been issued, the engineers had to change their way of
planning and forecasting their exchanges and customers,
in the interest of greater accuracy in material
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(inventory) procurement. With this realisation,
fundamental planning was established in the Central
Region first, and was subsequently introduced by other
regions throughout the country. With the establishment of
fundamental planning, the engineers in the LND section
not only had to forecast demand using the bottom-up
approach but also to identify new growth areas, as
discussed in section 7.3.1.2.1. In the early period of
privatisation, i.e. in 1989-1990, the working papers were
still prepared by the individual section, but viability
studies were done by the fundamental engineers, who
looked in detail at the cost of the projects in a
particular exchange, and studied various options using
different technology, and usually recommended the
cheapest option.
As from 1993, an integrated approach to planning has
been adopted. Working papers are prepared in a workshop
where all the three networks (i.e. Network, Switching and
Long-lines development group) together with the marketing
group sit together. This is quite a breakthrough since
the working papers are analysed in detail and different
technology explored in order to determine the cheapest
way of meeting expected demand. On top of that,
accounting and financial data are used in determining the
expected revenue (even though this is not an accurate
figure since apportionment of revenue to other exchanges
have not been considered as yet) to be generated from the
new exchange and payback period is used to determine how
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long it will take for the capital to be recovered from
the project. One fundamental engineer, supporting this
integrated network planning approach said:
"I think this integrated approach is good
because we have a yardstick to follow. For
example, in terms of cost, we are able to
determine the cost per cable. And since I'm
from the LND unit, and my knowledge about
Switching and Long-line Networks is shallow, we
sit down and learn from each other and in the
end, with more ideas we are able to come out
with various options, as can be seen in the
working papers that we have prepared out of
this workshop. Ultimately, we consider not only
the best in terms of technology, but also how
to cut cost, which benefits the company".
As another engineer commented:
"With the integrated approach in planning, our
planning and Switching and Longlines are able
to come out with programmes that actually go
hand in hand with each other, and avoid cases
where there is switching equipment but not
enough lines (ECP) and vice versa. I think this
was a major problem during JTM, where it
happened very frequently. Now, under STN, with
the integrated approach, such problems can be
reduced or avoided altogether".
Under the new approach, the feasibility studies done
by the fundamental group in the area are presented to
management at a monthly meeting attended by the three
AGMs and GM. Proposals for new exchanges are discussed in
detail and options considered based on financial and
commercial considerations. All of the personnel involved
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are engineers by profession. One senior engineer
commented on the process as follows:
"During JTM days, most reports on new projects
were to determine the location of a new
exchange rather than to look at the various
options available, or the system of engineering
detail to be used in order to save cost, which
was a secondary factor. Now, when studying the
growth centre, the cheapest ways to serve the
area are looked at, with the various options
available as far as engineering detail is
concerned".
Another engineer said:
"With respect to forecast, under both JTM and
STM, we have forecast up to 20th year, but
under JTN, nobody put much emphasis on it. And
it was done at the HQ level. Thus, we didn't
actually have a concrete demand forecast plan
and usually, it would come at the last stage;
you would find that your exchange was almost
full and then start doing a study in that area.
But now, since the forecast plan up to 20th
year is done by us at area level, we will
actually foresee or have an accurate idea that
a certain area will need more capacity. That
means we know very much further ahead, and we
will start putting up plans for new exchanges
or other alternatives to cope with the demand".
During JTM days, with the service objective
paramount, the concept of commercial viability was
minimal or non-existent. The main concerns were
technological feasibility within the government budgeting
system, since most of the top management were engineers
and budgeting was solely controlled by them.
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During the Turnkey era, viability was still based on
waiters, in the sense that a project was considered to be
viable as long as there were waiters. With the turnkey
contractors' introduction of fundamental planning, a form
of project feasibility study was done, but it
concentrated mainly on finding growth areas to forecast
future demand, as revealed to the researcher by some of
the former JTM staff (Uniphone Sendirian Berhad, 1984).
To the extent that the concept of viability existed at
all, at the top level, it did not filter through to
regional and area levels.
However, in the early days of privatisation i.e in
1987/1988, the top management was shocked to find a low
utilisation rate of only 42-43% as shown in Table 8.8 of
Chapter Eight, due to the low demand in a period of
economic slowdown. It should be pointed out, though that
the engineers were less concerned on the basis that in
telecommunication, it can take several years for a
project plant to mature i.e. be fully occupied.
Thus, in the early stage of privatisation, the
question of viability became a key issue, and top
management wanted only viable projects to be implemented.
Corporate Finance was given the task of looking into the
question of viability and producing guidelines on the
concept. According to the accountants, this was very
difficult, due to lack of a proper costing information
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system, shortages of staff to deal with the large number
of projects involved, and non-involvement of the regional
accounting and finance group in the preparation, vetting
through and prioritising of projects, which was done by
the engineers themselves.
However, the concept of viability was introduced to
some extent. HQ organised a 'road-show' during the
presentation of the business plan, when HQ technical
specialists, corporate finance and corporate planning
groups visited all the regions, to scrutinise projects
for viability, based on their own expertise and
experience. But according to some engineers at the
region, the basis used was that the project to be
undertaken must have waiters and be able to recover its
initial capital within five years.
After listing of the company, viability continued to
be an important issue, but with the problems of
increasing waiters and competition coming into the
picture, a certain flexibilty was given to project
managers with regard to prioritising of projects. Indeed,
for most small projects, viability is based on the
intuitive judgeinent of the engineers, though for new
growth areas / new exchanges, feasibility studies must be
done before the project can take place.
7.3.2.2 Detail Planning and Prioritising of
Projects
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7.3.2.2.1 Detail Planning
Detail planning is the process of designing the
project in detail once the installation of a new exchange
or the expansion of an old one has been approved. Thus,
once the fundamental plan has been approved by the
regional HQ, it will be passed to the detail planning
group. From the detail planning, the group is able to
estimate the number of cable pairs needed for a given
project (or scheme) based on the forecast demand done by
the Fundamental Planning Group.
In any project or scheme, there are three types of
planning: the Civil Work plan, the Exchange-side plan (E-
side) and the Distribution-side plan (D-side). Civil work
is basically the main duct work done for the Exchange
side, which specifies the number of ducts and types of
manholes and cables required. The distribution-side is
concerned with the network going out from the cabinet to
the distribution point, designed on the basis of detailed
plans received from the developers.
Normally if the group is dealing with a large
project which will take place over one to two years, it
will be included in the CWP of the Business Plan for the
next year. Once the detail planning has been done, the
requirements for all the various types of materials are
known and the Stores department is informed at least six
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months ahead of time, through the SISKIS on-line system,
which did not exist during JTM days.
In the case of minor work, especially ad-hoc works,
costing between M$lO,000 to M$50,000, mainly to clear
waiters or to tap ready demand, detail planning will be
done immediately, irrespective of whether it has been
budgeted or not, because in most cases, the allocation is
available. If not, the project manager can approve it, as
long as it is less than M$50,000. This is another
significant change as this could not be done under JTM
and in the early period of privatisation, when a project
was defined to be a scheme, rather than an exchange.
7.3.2.2.2 Project Scheduling or Listing and
Prioritising of Projects
All planned new projects, together with any projects
which have been deferred due to delays or insufficient
funds in the the current year, will be listed in a
project schedule to be submitted to the detail planning
group, so that the costs can be ascertained before any
project is included in the next business plan of the area
level. Most of the projects which have been identified by
the project manager and his team as necessary and viable
will be listed for the purpose of obtaining the budget
from the top management under the Business Plan. The
schedule will also include projects in rural and semi-
urban areas, but again, the integrated planning approach
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is applied so as to determine the cheapest way of putting
up the network, in terms of engineering design and
technology to be used and from the forecast demand to
estimate the expected revenue and payback period.
After the project list has been included in the
business plan, it will be passed for approval to the AGM
(LND) and his assistant at Regional HQ. They will analyse
the list of projects proposed by the areas based on the
bottom-line. They will examine previous performance, the
ECP achievement, demand achieved and any current problem
facing the projects, such as material shortages and
waiters. They will also take into consideration factors
like contractors' capability and capacity and material
requirements. They will also refer back to the demand
forecast to make sure that the ECPs expected to be
produced will meet the target of the marketing group. As
was commented by the assistant to AGM (LND):
"We only look at the bottom-line and consider
the factors discussed above, since there are
thousands of schemes of projects. And we rely
on the project managers down the line: they
should be confident that they can deliver all
the projects listed in the Business Plan".
She continued:
"The HQ people used to be very strict during
the early period of privatisation i.e. from
1987-1990, because there were ample lines
available.	 But	 now,	 with	 waiters	 and
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competitors coming in, they are not that
strict. But we at our end, are also aware of
financial and commercial implications, and now
we are doing feasibility and financial analysis
at the early stage, i.e. when we want to come
out with new exchanges. So we have to thrash
out issues of viability at an early phase".
Once the AGM (LND), his assistant and the four
project managers have reached a consensus, then the
proposed business plan on CWP for LND for Central Region
is submitted to the secretariat of the GM office. The GM
will call a meeting which will usually approve the plan
and submit it to the corporate planning division at HQ
(see Section 6.1, for the process of the business plan).
The change in the budget system and the basis on which
budgets are currently approved will be explained in a
later section.
Once the GM has received the approved budget
business plan for the coming year, he will meet all the
AGM5 to apportion the lump sum approved by HQ. It is
important to mention here that the budget approved by HQ
to the region is based on the lump sum or bottom line and
not according to individual project and the RGM is given
the authority to distribute the budget to the various
development group, operation and other cost-centres
accordingly. When the AGM (LND) has received his approved
budget, he will in turn meet with all his project
managers and allocate the budget according to their
project lists. Since the amount received will be less
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than they originally asked for, the project managers will
then consult with the engineers from fundamental
planning, detail planning and implementation groups,
regarding criteria for prioritising the projects.
Usually, priority is given to projects to clear waiters,
or where demand is expected to be realised rapidly.
According to some senior management staff at HQ, once the
business plan is approved, regional prioritisation seems
to be based on waiters and physical needs rather than
business needs. Table 8.8 of Chapter Eight, on the
utilisation rate at national level, suggests that this
may indeed be true.
In general, to prioritise the projects at area
level, a meeting will be held between the project manager
and marketing people, to discuss new information about
waiters and new demand anticipated in the area when the
proposed exchange is in place. As a result of this
meeting, projects will be reprioritised in order to
complete urgent projects or reduce waiters. This is
usually done by the project managers who have discretion
regarding projects up to a given value threshold; larger
projects need the approval of AGM (LND) or even the GM
himself Nonetheless, the final say with respect to
prioritising most projects, once the business plan is
approved, lies with the project manager.
7.3.2.2.3 Material Procurement
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Material procurement has always played an important
role in the organisation. For LND, items such as cables
(either copper or optics), duct, manholes, poles and
temporary cabins are the main materials needed to
complete a local network project. The total cost of these
items is considerable. Before describing and discussing
Material procurement in the LND of the Central Region
from JTM days to Turnkey and finally to STM, it will be
helpful to describe the material procurement system at
national level during those three phases.
7.3.2.2.3.1 Material Procurement at National Level
Material procurement at national	 level,	 is
contracted by a specialist group at HQ. Material
procurement for the Local Network was done by the Local
Network Development specialist group at HQ during JTH
days, but during the Turnkey era, there was not much
purchasing done for the Local Network, as this function
was taken over by the Turnkey Contractors. However, after
the Turnkey System finished in 1988, material procurement
was again contracted by LND specialist group at HQ,
coordinated by the regional Procurement section.
Depending on the types and amounts of material
needed, procurement may be by quotation or tender and
contracts may be short or long-term. Once the types of
procurement have been decided, quotations and tenders
will be invited and the candidates processed. Selection
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is made after a meeting held specifically for this
purpose.
During JTM days, the procurement process was poorly
managed because there was no proper planning and no
proper deadline for orders. Because of poor planning with
respect to forecast demand, the materials requested were
always in excess of requirement, as shown by the high
end-of-year stock levels shown in Figure 7.8.
When the company was first privatised, the
management were concerned about the stock situation. One
project manager recalled:
"When the new top management came in 1988, they
were shocked to see the high stock level in the
company. It was lying all over the place. Some
of it was out of date, and became scrap due to
obsolescence and the company was losing a lot
of money on this idle stock".
Evidence from Figure 7.8 shows that the total stores
and stocks were quite high from 1982-1987, especially
when compared to total capital expenditure (or total
revenues) of the organisation. Particularly worrying were
the Advances made on Material and Supplies at year end,
which as shown in Figure 7.8, were between M$277-M$483
Million from 1980-1984. Taking these advances together
with the stores and stocks, the high figures from 1980-
1986 indicate a lack of concern for idle cash. This was
related to the low influence of the accounting group
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Figure 7.8 - Closing Stocks and Advances for
Material Supplies of JTM/STM from 1980-1992
Year	 Stores & Stocks	 Advances for
	 Total
at year end	 Material
Supplies at
year end
(M$Million)	 (M$Million)	 (M$Million)
1980	 68	 311	 379
1981	 73	 277	 350
1982	 141	 333	 474
1983	 212	 483	 695
1984	 597	 345	 942
1985	 496	 62	 558
1986	 430	 12	 442
1987	 216	 216
1988	 151	 151
1989	 116	 116
1990	 94	 94
1991	 150	 150
1992	 157	 157
Source: Annual Report of JTM (1980-1986) and
STM (1987-1992)
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since there was no treasury function available during JTM
time, and to the strong influence of the engineers, whose
life was made easier by avoiding the need for forward
planning.
A computerised inventory system called SISKIS was
introduced in 1989. With the implementation of this
system, a new financial instruction was issued by the
Accounting and Finance Group, requiring all project
managers to request materials six months ahead of the
project start-date. As a result, the project manager has
to carry out forward planning and request only the amount
needed. This is an important break-through for the
company.
According to the GM, Corporate Accounts who served
under JTM for 15 years and is now with STM:
"Most of the cost of the projects goes to the
buying of the material i.e. telecommunication
equipment for building the projects. Thus the
overall planning, i.e. fundamental and detail
planning, plays an important role, since that
will be the deciding factor as to how much
stock is required. We do not want a return to
the JTM situation, where they ordered so much
stock that it became obsolete and affected the
cash flow".
He went on to explain that one of the functions of
CWO1-CWO4 statements is to help the engineer to plan
material requirements ahead. The SISKIS system avoids
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overplanning and requests for too much stock, releasing
cash for more profitable uses.
He again continued,
"It was different during JTM days, when the
project manager liked to order a lot and keep
it in store so that the planning became easier
for them. Now, we insist, under SISKIS, they
have to order six months ahead of time. As a
result of introducing the SISKIS system, you
can see that the year-end stock level has
reduced tremendously. So now, the engineer has
to pay a lot of attention to planning".
Another change that took place with respect to
Material Procurement is with respect to the quotation and
tender system, where commercial considerations have been
taken into account, and accounting and finance personnel
are represented on both committees, unlike JTM days. For
projects less than M$200,000 which come under the
quotation system, accounting personnel must be included
in the committee to ensure account is taken of commercial
considerations; while for projects worth more than
M$2 00 , 000 , under the tender system, two committees will
evaluate the purchase of material:- (i) Technical
committee which is headed by the technical personnel and
(ii) Commercial committee which is headed by the
accounting personnel.
It was a significant change for the company, for
purchases either for use or for stock, to be based not
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only on technical considerations (as under JTM) but also
on commercial and financial considerations.
7.3.2.2.3.2 Material Procurement in the Central
Region
Once the HQ specialist group and the successful
suppliers have signed a contract spelling out the terms
of the agreement, including the specifications, prices
etc, a copy of the contract will be sent to the regional
Procurement Section, where the ordering will be based on
this contract.
During JTN days, the ordering of material in LND was
done by the detail planning group, which would fill in a
material requisition form and submit it to the Regional
procurement material section. The system was weak from
the commercial point of view, in that requests were made
to the regional procurement section as and when required.
This was possible because of the high stock levels and
advances made for material supplies.
This system changed during 1983-1988, the turnkey
period, when all materials had to be provided by the
turnkey contractors. According to the turnkey contracts,
the contractors could buy from JTh first but if 3m could
not provide the necessary materials, they were purchased
from outside. This clause enabled the turnkey contractors
to draw on the materials stockpiled by JTM.
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Under the present (STM) system, once a new project
is included in the business plan, the detail planning
group must input into the SISKIS system for requisition
of material on that particular project, six months in
advance. But according to one project manager, in
practice, this means planning a year or more ahead in
order to meet the six months material requirement under
the SISKIS system.
7.3.2.2.4 Discussion on the Detail Planning,
Prioritising of Projects and Material
Procurement
Overall, there has been little chnage in the detail
planning system, other than during the turnkey era, when
the planning was done by the turnkey contractors
themselves.
With respect to prioritising of projects, during JTM
days, it was based on the service requirement with little
emphasis on the profit side. Towards the end of l970s and
early 1980s the objective was to clear waiters at
whatever cost. At the top management level, the overall
planning was very much driven by the government budgeting
system rather than corporate strategy, and the
incremental approach was used in deciding the capital
expenditure budget. In the turnkey era, the main
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consideration was on clearing the waiters, which was why
the turnkey system was introduced in the first place.
In contrast, under privatisation, prioritising of
projects is done twice - once before the business plan is
approved and again after approval of the business plan.
Most projects are included on the first list and most
will be considered as necessary by the engineers, since
as was commented by one senior staff at HQ, 'Engineers
are engineers. They love projects, since projects make
them busy and give them influence in the organisation'.
But of course, these projects are filtered by the
regional HQ on the basis of the capability and
availability of manpower of each area, material
availability in the country and the bottom line, before
the list is sent to the regional HQ secretariat and from
there to the Corporate Planning in the Headquarters of
the company.
As explained earlier, in approving the capital
project expenditures of the company, the top management
at HQ has its own objectives to meet. During the period
of 1987-1990, i.e. before the company was listed in the
KLSE, the objectives were based first on SWOT analysis,
and then on the financial need to show a good track
record i.e. good profit, favourable earnings per share,
return on investment etc, in order to meet political
objectives. Thus, between 1987-1990, the Capital
Expenditure for STM wide was only M$2.45 billions
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(source: taken from Company Business 1992-1996). During
this period, accounting influences were high, especially
as the 'annual depreciation growth capping' approach,
discussed in Section 7.5, was used to determine the
yearly capital expenditure introduced by the accountants.
And it was during this period that the project was
defined as a scheme, which limited the freedom of the
engineers to transfer the budget from one scheme to
another.
The scenario changed as from 1991, i.e. after the
company was listed, when demand started to increase as a
result of rapid economic growth in the country, there was
a substantial number of waiters and an influx of
competitors into the telecommunication industry. This led
to increases in capital expenditure, so as to meet
current and future demand and maintain market dominance.
Thus in 1991, because of these two factors, the company
was quite generous in approving the budget; of M$2.5
billion proposed by the regions and other divisions, the
top management approved M$2.3 Million. The other reason
why the management was able to approve such a substantial
amount was due to the success of listing. However, the
amount approved for 1991 was not fully utilised. There
was an implementation shortfall of almost M$900 million
due to material shortages and other problems. As a
result, in 1992, the business plan was approved on the
capability of the regions and other divisions to spend
their capitation based on the actual amount spent in the
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previous year, plus a certain percentage of growth. The
initial request for M$7 billion was reduced to M$4
billion, and finally, the top management agreed on M$2.4
billion. Again, however, there was an implementation
shortfall of about M$500 million due to many reasons, the
main one being the material shortages (Source: interview
with relevent officer of STh).
As from 1993, the business plan is based on business
needs, with a two-tier budget, a fixed amount based on
the capability of the regions and other divisions to
spend, and a flexible budget as a 'top-up' if spending
exceeds the fixed budget. It is important to note here
that approval of the budget for the respective regions is
based on the total amount and per project basis. This
gives the power and authority to the RGM to distribute to
his various sections. Even the amount given to the
various AGMs in the central region is based on the bottom
line, and so on, from the ACM (LND) to the various area
managers.
After the budget is approved by the HQ group as
discussed in section 7.3.2.2.2, the second prioritising
of projects is done at the LND in central region, by the
project manager. In this respect, there have been some
changes from 1987 to the present. During 1987-1990, the
project manager's freedom was restricted by the equation
of the project with the scheme, since it restricted the
transfer of budget from one scheme to another. But as
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from 1991, when the term project was expanded to refer to
an exchange, the project manager could transfer from one
scheme to another without much difficulty, within certain
limits.
7.3.2.3 Implementation of Local Network Projects
7.3.2.3.1 Implementation Process
During JTM days, the implementation process was
mainly done by the JTH staff with the help of Public
Works Department (PWD) staff, as discussed in Section
5.4.1, where it was also explained that, in 1976, the
government introduced the JKH system where the work was
done by the JKH contractors. But as from 1979, the JKH
system was modified and the registered contractors were
divided into three classes, as discussed in Section
5.4.1. In the turnkey era, the JKH contractors were
replaced by five turnkey contractors (For further
details, see Section 5.4.2.). After the Turnkey period,
the .JKH was reintroduced as from 1988, with the number of
contractors increased from 40 to 120. These carried out
the implementation: digging trenches, laying ducts,
erecting poles, placing the manhole covers and laying or
hanging the cable.
Under the present system, once the scheme of a
particular project is indented (i.e. the detail planning
has been done and other procedures carried out by the
detail planning group as described in section 7.3.2.2),
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the budget is available and the project can be
implemented. Indenting also means that an agreement has
been reached between the contractors and STM on that
particular project. However, the main contract between
the JKH contractors and STM is signed as soon as the
contract is awarded, STM being represented by the HQ
Specialist Group. Usually the implementation group will
need to apply for a permit from the relevant authority
(e.g. PWD or city council) before putting in the manhole
etc. During JTM days, application for a permit from a PWD
or any government agency was easier, since the
application was from one government Department to
another. Now, the treatment is different, since the
government organisations treat STM like any other private
company. The detailed plan is studied with the contractor
concerned, and materials requested from the regional
procurement section.
Once the project is completed, the supervisor-in-
charge, along with the engineer or junior executive, will
inspect the quality of the work, which will be tested in
relation to guidelines provided by the HQ specialist
group. If the result is satisfactory, the company will
issue a Certificate of Acceptance of Scheme, certified by
the Testing Officer (usually the technician) and approved
by the implementation engineer. But if the work is not
found to be of the quality required or if the project is
delayed due to the contractor's fault, then there will be
penalty charge against the contractor concerned. This
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aspect of the implementation process has remained
constant during JTM, Turnkey and STM.
Assetisation of the project takes place once the
Acceptance Certificate has been granted. During JTM days,
because most engineers did not understand the difference
between cash and accrual expenditure, most assetisation
figures were based on cash figures. This was mentioned by
the Consultant who studied the value of JTN in 1983 with
a view to valuation of fixed assets for privatisation.
Assetisation was inaccurate; it was incomplete, sometimes
done very late (sometimes several years after the lines
were installed), there was confusion between cash and
accrual concepts, and inconsistent treatment of
depreciation, as discussed in Section 5.5.1. These
problems arose because there were no proper guidelines,
due to the minimal role of the accounting department. It
was only when the Department was about to be privatised
that the question of valuation of assets was raised.
Upon the receipt of the consultant's report, the top
management directed Accounting to produce a better
system, and eventually, the Fixed Asset System (better
known as FA System) was established in 1985/1986. Thus as
from 1986, all the projects installed had to be assetised
as soon as possible. The assetisation process starts with
the implementation unit, whose personnel submit an FA1
form. From 1986-1988, such form were submitted to the
accounts section in the region, but from 1988, to the
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accounts section at area level. In 1992, the system was
fully computerised, under the new name, FASIS, and a 14-
day deadline was set for assetisation of completed
projects.
The implementation group must also, via the CASS
system, inform Marketing within three days, of
availability of the new lines for sale to the customers.
This system was not available during JTM days. Thus,
according to some engineers, since the commission date
was not enforced, the time taken to inform the Traffic
section, which was responsible for selling the lines,
could be several weeks or even or two months.
With respect to allocation of budget, during JTM
days, when it was based on service as an objective,
according to most engineers interviewed, for normal
projects, there was little problem, even though there was
considerable red-tape; the budget was quite generous,
since JTM was a revenue-generating Department. But upon
privatisation, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, the
implementation of the project could be problematic in the
event of running over budget since virement was
restricted. Transfer of funds from one scheme to another,
required approval from the RGM or even at HQ level, which
sometimes delayed implementation. But this was resolved
in 1989/1990 when the definition of a project was
extended to an exchange in the amended Financial
Instructions (1989 p. 36), which read as follows:
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"Capital budget is controlled from each
approved project or from number of unitof
assets approved. For the purpose of budget
monitoring, the term 'project' for capital
works for Local Network is an exchange for an
area".
Other changes in the implementation system which had
an impact on the accounting influence were the
introduction of the deadline for assetisation, the
assetisation method itself, and the inputing to the CASS
system of the distribution points available on completion
of the project.
7.3.2.4 Monitoring and Control of the Projects
Monitoring and Control of the projects under the
three environments takes place at both regional level and
HQ levels.
7.3.3.4.1 Monitoring and Control at Regional Level
With respect to monitoring of the work done by the
implementation group, under the JKH system during both
JTN and STM environment, a technician is assigned to a
particular project on a full-time basis. He or she is
responsible for several projects, depending on their size
and duration. In contrast, under the turnkey system,
technicians were present, but not on a full time basis.
The turnkey contractors were considered consultants to
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the organisation, since they did everything from initial
planning and detailed design to implementation and
delivery, so the technician's role was one of
intermittent supervision. Under the JKH system, only the
implementation is done by the contractors; most of the
work is done by the JTM/STM staff. As was commented by an
implementation engineer:
"Our concept is very simple. We treat JKH
contractors as our staff, we monitor their
work, and we tell them what to do, where to lay
the duct, where to lay or hang the cable and
the rest. We do the initial planning and detail
design, which was different during the turnkey
era".
During JTM days, the project monitoring was done
manually through filling the BP1 and BP2 forms as shown
in Figures 7.9 and 7.10. But the problem existed of the
differentiation between the cash and accrued figures,
since, as we have seen, the engineers did not understand
the distinction or see its importance. This was partly
because assetisation was not properly implemented by the
engineers, as the design archetype was based on
engineering values and beliefs and the influence of
accounting was minimal.
In contrast, under STM environment, the progress and
quality of the work done by the contractors are closely
monitored throughout. The supervisor will monitor each
project and at the end of the day, will receive a file on
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Figure 7.9 BP1 - Budget Control Form 1 (Project
Planning Card)
PROJECT PLANNING CARD
REGION
DESCRIPTION OF WORK
LOCAL ITY
FILE REFJREGION
FILE REF/HO
2. JUSTIFICATION & NEED
3. ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE
Property	 Estimated total cost	 .	 Year in whicti funds required
A/c	 M/Hrs.	 Labour	 Mat	 Incidental	 Total	 19	 19	 19	 19
$000	 S 000	 5000	 $00.)	 $000	 $000 $ P 000	 S 000
4. PLANNED PROGRESS OF WORK
LANDS / & BUILDINGS	 EQUIPMENT
Description	 Month	 Year	 Description	 Month	 Year
Acquisition of Land	 Tender exercise	 _______ _______
Specifications for Bldgs/Road	 Jsue of Indent/Contract
Tender exercise	 Delivery of materials
Construction to commence	 fristallation
Construction to complete 	 Testing
°eady for operation
Prepared by
ACT'SA ..............................District 	 Re—.eks/Recommendation
Date......................
Forward by
Regional Director/Controller 	 A:;	 Director ........................................(HOJGroupI
Date	 Date
Approved for inclusion in current Five Year Plan and Works Prograrre for the year ...........................
D-'or (Radio/telephone)
Noted by
Budget Cor,trol Unit	 .vte
Date...................
Source:	 Malaysian	 Telecommunications
+Instructions	 Ofl	 Budgetary	 Control
Instructions, 1978, p. 23.
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the activities accomplished by the contractors. He will
update weekly in the CWO1 for accrual expenditure and
CWO2 for cash expenditure and on a monthly basis, prepare
a progress report for discussion with AGM (LND) at the
monthly meeting, as shown in Figure 7.11 on the
monitoring of JKH Contractors' performance. On a
quarterly basis, he prepares a progress report for
submission to the Secretariat Unit of RGM's office. These
report will be compiled and sent to the Corporate
Planning at the HQ in the form of diskettes.
At regional level in the case of LND, the AGM (LND)
will monitor the overall performance of each area from
the monthly reports reveived from the project manager.
The focus is on the achievement of ECP, PKM and DKM in
the case of completed projects or physical progess for
uncompleted projects. The reports will also show the
actual amount of cash spent as well as the accrued amount
conmitted by the engineer in the particular area.
As for the accounting in the Region, under STM
environment, from 1987, capital projects were monitored
by the regional accounting group, but as from 1992, with
the establishment of accounts at the area level, this
role has been transferred to the accounting group at that
level. The monitoring of projects by the accounts group
starts at the project implementation stage, where the
following takes place:
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(1) The project manager submits the Capital
Project Accounting (CPA) set-up forms to
Accounts Unit at the area level. A copy of any
relevant contract or indent is also enclosed.
(ii) Accounts Unit checks the CPA set-up forms
and opens a project file.
(iii) Accounts Unit sends the CPA set-up forms
to the regional accounting group for inputing
into the CPA system, where the output will be
in the form of CW12 and CW34.
(iv) Regional office sends Monthly Capital
Project Accounts to the Accounts Unit and
Project Managers at area level for control and
monitoring purposes.
(v) Project Managers submit quarterly physical
progress reports to the Secretariat Unit of
RGM's office for consolidation and submission
to the corporate planning division for input
into the Project Management Control System. The
Business Plan for both cash and accrual
expenditure is updated and the report, as shown
in Figures 7.12(a) and 7.12(b),is printed out
and sent to all regions for monitoring.
(Source: Discussion with the Accountant at the
Central Region Office).
During JTM days, monitoring of projects by the
accounting was done with respect to processing of payment
to be made to the JKH Contractors. With respect to other
aspects such as the assetisation of completed projects
into the FA system, monitoring was not done as this
system was only introduced in 1985 and fully implemented
upon privatisation. As was explain earlier, in Chapter
Five, the accounting role in the region during JTM days
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was purely that of paymaster, and its influence was very
low.
7.3.2.4.2 Monitoring and Control at HQ Level
During JTM days, monitoring of the project for LND
was also carried out by the EPU of Prime Minister's
Department, as discussed in Section 6.2.8. But for the
numerous local network projects, this system was not
successful, as we have seen. The difficulty was
exacerbated by the problems faced by the EPU, as an
outsider to the organisation, in enforcing the monitoring
system. However, as from 1982, only projects worth
M$lOO ,0 00 and above need approval from the EPU, and
submit the quarterly progress report until the project is
completed.
Under the turnkey environment, the turnkey
contractors had to obtain approval from JTH engineers at
every stage, i.e. from demand forecast, fundamental plan
and detail scheme plan, subject to the 14-day rule
referred to earlier. In this way, JTh monitored the
turnkey contractors, and tested completed work for its
quality.
Moreover, since the turnkey system was introduced
for political reasons, and since it involved substantial
amounts of funds, monitoring was also carried out by an
inter-ministerial steering committee headed by the
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Minister of Post, Telecommunication and Energy. Other
members included senior staff of the ministry, top
management of JTM, officials from the Ministry of Finance
and officials from the Inter-Coordinating Unit (ICU) of
PM'S Department. This meeting was also attended by the
RGM and the contractor concerned. And at the regional
level, a project management group consisting of RGM and
project managers met on a regular basis with the turnkey
contractors to discuss the progress of the work.
Under STN, the projects are monitored using the
quarterly CW12 and CW34 reports forwarded to the
Corporate Planning and Corporate Finance Division. As we
have seen, the project manager submits cash and accrued
figures to the secretariat unit at the RGM's office, for
compilation and submission to the Corporate Planning and
Corporate Finance Division at HQ. As can be seen from
Figure 7.12(a) on the 'LND Business Plan for Petaling
Jaya, the accrual progress report for the second quarter
of 1993 includes all the schemes in one exchange. For
each scheme it shows the indent number, the name of the
project, the expected value of the project, the total
accrued value for 1991, the accrued value for each
quarter of 1992, and for 1992 as a whole, the accrued
value each quarter of 1993, and for 1993 as a whole,
expected and actual implementation and completion dates
and date of transfer to FA1 system for assetisation. On
the output side, it includes the ECP, PKM and DKI4
produced. These are the measurements used by HQ group to
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monitoring projects carried out by the region, i.e. in
term of physical output. As far as the cost is concerned,
monitoring is done by Corporate Finance, though accurate
costing is difficult at present; it should improve with
full implementation of the CIS by the end of 1993. All
the information prepared is shown on one line of the page
under this report, which uses the Project Management
System. This is a comprehensive report produced quarterly
by the Corporate Planning group upon receiving the
capital projects information from all the regions. The
weakness of the system is that it is not on-line, and
there is no integration between the various development
groups i.e. the local network, switching network, long-
lines network and the property management groups, each of
which reports separately. Figure 7.12(b) shows the
progress report in term of cash expenditure.
7.3.3.4.3. Discussion on the weaknesses of the
Monitoring and Control of the present system
During JTM days, monitoring was weak according to
the consultant's report, and there was the problem of
differentiating between cash and accrued figures.
Up to now, there are no proper project management
tools at HQ, which has led to all the project managers in
LND of the Central Region coming up with their own tools.
The management is very concerned about the situation,
especially in view of the low utilisation rate which will
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be discussed in the following chapter. But now, according
to some senior officers, the poor monitoring system is
being overshadowed by a material problem. The CWO1 and
CWO2 are not very effective, as they do not reflect the
true work-in progress and what is happening at the site.
The problem now is that once the project manager gets the
money, the top management wants to know what happens to
it, yet under the present monitoring system, the HQ group
rely on information which is subject to error and is
quite out-dated, since it is not on-line. Certain
important information is only inputed into the system
later.
Another weaknesses of the present system is that
there is still no coordination between the various
divisions carrying out projects in the company. In other
words, JTM's ways of doing things are still there. There
is little attention paid to the concept of project
management; early in 1993, a workshop was organised by
the HQ Technical services group in the various regions on
the intregated planning approach, but it is still too
early to comment on the new approach.
From the accounting and financial point of view, the
present project monitoring system has great difficulty in
meeting the requirements of the corporate planning and
corporate finance, because the present project monitoring
system is not able to interface fully with the SISWANG
system. As a result, engineers have to fill in various
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forms to provide the information needed by the accounting
group, which takes a lot of time which should be spent on
real project monitoring.
Thus, in order to overcome all these problems, the
company has decided to implement the PROMPT system. By
installing this system, the company hopes effectively to
manage the CWP expenditure, which will reduce the
implementation shortfall and improve utilisation rate. As
was commented by one senior manager at HQ:
"Overall, the project monitoring is done on a
piece-meal basis. It is more on an individual
basis, up to the project managers. But when the
company installs the PROMPT system, it will be
a procedure which the project manager must
carry out".
Another manager at HQ commented:
"With the PROMPT system, which is an on-line
system, the HQ is expected to monitor what is
happening on the ground; this can be translated
very quickly into management information such
as how many projects have been done and
implemented, how much money has been spent on
CWP, and which projects are already in
progress. Everything will be monitored because
the HQ group will update from time to time".
The PROMPT system is also expected to interface with
all other aspects of the financial system such as
SISWANG, and is expected to cordinate between the various
divisions implementing projects in the company.
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7.4 Summary
In this chapter, the dynamics of change with respect
to capital investment and project process of LND of
Central region were discussed in detail. Out of this
analysis, major change was found to have taken place with
respect to fundamental planning, feasibility study,
including financial analysis and inventory procedures
which affect the engineers, and also the overall
budgeting system.
But the question still remains, out of these changes
made by the company, as described in this chapter, has
there been a real assimilation of financial and
commercial values among the engineers? Or was it a
cosmetic change forced upon them by the top management?
The next chapter will analyse the results of the projects
implemented by the engineers at LND of the Central
region, in terms of forecast demand, forecast ECP and
utilisation rate of the ECP5. This may help us to answer
the question we have just posed.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Analysis and Discussions of the Principal
Findings of the Study with reference to
Laughlin Model (1991) and Greenwood and Hinings
(1988)
8.1 Introduction
Chapter Seven described and discussed in detail the
dynamics of change in the organisation with respect to
Capital investment and Project Process of the LND in
Central region in JTM days, the Turnkey era and during
and after the privatisation. In this Chapter, an analysis
is carried out of three important elements of
performance:
(i) the demand forecast against actual demand
of subscribers in each exchange for each of the
four areas in LND of Central Region (from 1988-
1992);
(ii) the ECP forecast against actual ECP in
each exchange for each of the four areas in LND
of Central Region (from 1988-1992);
(iii) the utilisation rate (i.e the actual
demand against actual ECP) in each exchange for
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each of the four areas in LND of Central Region
(from 1987-1992);
In case of elements of performance (1), the
overall figures of LND for Central Region are
also shown as from 1982-1992 and for (iii), the
overall performance on the utilisation rate for
JTM/STM from 1975 to 1992 are also shown.
The analysis of these three elements is important
since they provide an indication of the extent to which
the project engineer and his team in the LND of Central
Region have changed from engineering values to commercial
and financial values. This is a direct analysis, since
these three elements become the end products for the
engineers' role in the capital investment and project
process. In addition to the above, the analysis of the
overall performance of the company and Central region are
also discussed in this chapter.
The chapter then discuss the significant changes in
the budgeting system for capital projects since
privatisation as it shows the influence of both the
accounting and engineering groups. The chapter then
discusses the principal findings of the study on the
three phases of disturbance and finally, on the overall
analysis of the movement of organisational tracks using
both Laughlin's model, and Greenwood and Hinings (1988)
where detail comment is made with respect to the outcome
of the study.
8.2 Analysis of LND in Central Region
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8.2.1 Analysis with respect to forecast against
actual demand; Forecast against actual ECP; and
Actual Demand versus Actual ECP (i.e. the
utilisation rate) for Local Network Development
Group in Central Region.
Analysis of the overall demand forecast against the
actual demand by the Fundamental Group in the Central
Region, reveals a more than satisfactory standard of
forecasting accuracy, suggesting that the engineers in
the Central Region have, to some extent at least,
assimilated commercial criteria and integrated them into
their daily work, in this case through the bottom-up
approach.
The overall Telephone demand forecast, compared to
actual demand in the Central Region from 1982- 1992 is
shown in Table 8.1. Table 8.1 reveals that the accuracy
of actual against forecast figures has improved over the
years. Since privatisation, with the establishment and
expansion of the Fundamental Planning Unit, the engineers
are becoming better planners with respect to bottom-up
telephone demand forecast.
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Table 8.1 - Telephone Demand Forecast compare
with actual in Central Region done by Local
Network Section
Year	 Forecast	 Actual	 Actual Demand/
Demand	 Demand	 forecast Demand
1982	 313442	 208358	 64%
1983	 405700	 219737	 54%
1984	 417039	 275246	 66%
1985	 459677	 285000	 62%
1986	 480882	 327000	 68%
1987	 493370	 408424	 83%
1988	 449364	 452265	 101%
1989	 497135	 507052	 102%
1990	 594307	 584975	 98%
1991	 677990	 629185	 93%
1992	 784489	 715410	 91%
Source: 1982-1986 Interview with JTM Personnel
and Minutes of Budget Meeting 1982/84 and from
1987-1992 Business Plan Document.
As shown in Table 8.1, during JTM time, from 1982-
1986, the percentage of actual against forecast was only
between 54-68 percent, whereas after corporatisation and
privatisation i.e. from 1987-1993, the percentage of
accuracy improved to reach between 83-102 percent. This
suggests that fundamental planning is helping the
engineers in the Central Region to forecast demand using
the bottom-up approach. Table 8.2 shows the forecast
against the actual demand for each area from 1988 to
1992. All these demand forecasts are carried out by the
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fundamental engineers in each area using the bottom-up
approach, which was absent during JTM days.
Table 8.2 - Telephone Demand Forecast against
Actual by each Area in Central Region done by
Local Network Section from 1988-1992
	Year Area 	Forecast	 Actual	 Actual Demand /
Demand	 Demand	 forecast Demand
1988	 KL	 139769	 143162	 102%
	
PJ	 135427	 134961	 100%
	
WS	 66530	 67979	 102%
	
ES	 107638	 106163	 99%
	
Total	 449364	 452265	 101%
1989	 KL	 154768	 156303	 101%
	
PJ	 146712	 148990	 102%
	
WS	 73295	 79540	 109%
	
ES	 122360	 121986	 100%
	
Total	 497135	 506819	 102%
1990	 KL	 176874	 178761	 101%
	
PJ	 172086	 168821	 98%
	
WS	 94242	 94231	 100%
	
ES	 151105	 143162	 95%
	
Total	 594307	 584975	 98%
1991	 KL	 208832	 193281	 93%
	
PJ	 195317	 178269	 91%
	
WS	 114073	 102432	 90%
	
ES	 159768	 155203	 97%
	
Total	 677990	 629185	 93%
1992	 KL	 251426	 221177	 88%
	
PJ	 224462	 199437	 89%
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	WS	 128912	 116357	 90%
	
ES	 179689	 178439	 99%
	
Total	 784489	 715410	 91%
Source: Business Plan Document (1989-1993)
The actual demand figure is exclusive of waiters, to
make possible consistent comparison from 1982-1992.
However, Table 8.3(a) shows the percentage of waiters
over the number of actual subscribers (known as customers
after privatisation of the organisation) during JTM days
and in the STM environment. It can be seen that the
percentage of waiters against actual subscribers was very
high from 1976 - 1983, i.e. during JTM days, when it was
between 31-48 percent, whereas under the STh environment,
the percentage was much lower, i.e. from between 1-4
percent from 1987-1992 in Central Region and from less
than one percent to above four percent in the Areas of
the Central Region. And Table 8.3(b) shows that the
percentage of waiters over actual subscribers
(nationwide) during JTM days was very high between the
years 1971-1986, when it was between 10-34 percent. The
researcher was not able to obtain the number of waiters
from 1988-1992 i.e. during STM. as it was not reported in
the annual report as it was quite sensitive to the
organisation because of the emergence of the competitors
in the telecommunication industry. However, the number of
waiters in the Central Region from 1987-1992 was obtained
as shown in Table 8.3(a).
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Table 8.3(a) - Percentage of Waiters over
number of Actual Demand in Central Region
during JTJ4 (from 1976-1983) and STM (from 1987-
1992)
Year	 Number of Actual
	 number of	 % Waiters!
Subscribers	 Waiters	 Actual
Subscribers
1976	 76371	 36362	 48%
1977	 88040	 42491	 48%
1978	 106297	 39302	 37%
1979	 127477	 40768	 32%
1980	 157564	 49319	 31%
1981	 186096	 59853	 32%
1982	 201411	 75344	 37%
1983	 219737	 79955	 36%
1987	 406845	 14459	 3.6%
1988	 452265	 4553	 1.0%
1989	 506819	 2308	 0.5%
1990	 584975	 7283	 1.2%
1991	 629185	 25488	 4.1%
1992	 715410	 25094	 3.5%
Source: (a) Figures from 1976-1983 taken from
Department document - JTM Budget File.
(b) Figures from 1987-1992 taken from
Company document - Business Plan
Note: Figures from 1984-1986 are not available.
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Table 8.3(b) - Percentage of Numbers of Waiters
over Numbers of Actual Subscribers for JTN as a
whole from 1971-1986
Year	 Number of	 Number of	 % Waiters /
Actual	 Waiters	 Actual
Subscribers	 Subscribers
1971	 110019	 11924	 11%
1972	 121603	 13674	 11%
1973	 136494	 20591	 15%
1974	 149458	 35085	 24%
1975	 169538	 48306	 29%
1976	 191359	 65303	 34%
1977	 227564	 76438	 34%
1978	 271010	 81247	 30%
1979	 325154	 105699	 33%
1980	 395640	 133609	 34%
1981	 488675	 149945	 31%
1982	 585378	 189808	 32%
1983	 700097	 199831	 29%
1984	 849129	 190542	 22%
1985	 958598	 332000	 35%
1986	 1042827	 348000	 33%
Source : JTM Annual Report from 1979-1986
Note : As from 1987, the number of waiters are
not shown in the Annual Report but according to
some off icers interview were of the opinion
that it has gone down tremendously as from 1988
to 1992 when compare to during JTM days.
Further evidence can be seen in Table 8.3(a) in
the case of Central Region.
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Thus from this analysis, we could deduce that even
though there are waiters under STM environment, the
percentage of waiters against number of actual
subscribers is very low compared to during JTM days as
shown in Table 8.3(a).
Further evidence of improved forecasting on
commercial lines is revealed in considering the Effective
Cable Pairs (ECP). Table 8.4(a) shows that the actual
against forecast percentage was between 93-98% from 1988-
1992 of the Central Region. Whereas Table 8.4(b) shows
the forecast against actual ECP for each area from 1988-
1992. All these show that the engineers have improved
their forecasting of ECP, as the percentage of accuracy
has improved steadily since privatisation and post-
privatisation.
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Table 8.4(a) - ECP Forecast compare with actual
in Central Region done by Local Network Section
from 1988-1992
Year	 Forecast	 Actual	 Actual ECP/
ECP	 ECP	 forecast ECP
1988	 1044024	 1023502	 98%
1989	 1133234	 1056707	 93%
1990	 1142626	 1121792	 98%
1991	 1227428	 1180154	 96%
1992	 1330469	 1270309	 96%
Source: Business Plan Document (1989-1993)
Table 8.4(b) - ECP Forecast against Actual by
each Area in Central Region done by Local
Network Section from 1988-1992
	Year Area 	Forecast	 Actual	 Actual ECP
ECP	 ECP	 forecast ECP
1988	 KL	 376702	 369850	 98%
	
PJ	 246483	 243236	 99%
	
WS	 176803	 173537	 98%
	
ES	 244036	 236879	 97%
	
Total	 1044024	 1023502	 98%
1989	 KL	 406152	 380719	 94%
	
PJ	 275423	 249659	 91%
	
WS	 184773	 178415	 97%
	
ES	 266886	 247914	 93%
	
Total	 1133234	 1056707	 93%
1990	 KL	 407872	 397334	 97%
	
PJ	 272957	 272830	 100%
	
WS	 184051	 189650	 103%
	
ES	 277746	 261978	 94%
	
Total	 1142626	 1121792	 98%
1991	 KL	 426192	 420102	 99%
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	PJ	 307555	 286604	 93%
	
WS	 202760	 194681	 96%
	
ES	 290921	 278767	 96%
	
Total	 1227428	 1180154	 96%
1992	 KL	 447192	 437912	 98%
	
PJ	 348114	 318096	 91%
	
WS	 220626	 210699	 96%
	
ES	 314537	 303602	 97%
	
Total	 1330469	 1270309	 96%
Source: Business Plan Document (1989-1993)
However, Table 8.5 shows that the utilisation rate
for the Central Region i.e. taking actual demand over
actual ECP, was between 42%-56% from 1987 to 1992. In
fact, most of the engineers in this region were of the
opinion that it is not fair to compare actual demand only
against actual ECP, and that by right, waiters should
also be added. Even if this is done, actual demand plus
waiters against actual ECP, still gives a utilisation
rate of only 44%-58%, (as shown in Table 8.6) very little
different from the figure before inclusion of waiters.
Table 8.7 shows the percentage of actual demand over
actual ECP for each area in Central Region from 1987-
1992.
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Table 8.5 - Utilisation Rate for Central Region
from 1987-1992
Year	 Actual	 Actual ECP	 Utilisation
Demand	 rate
1987	 406845	 960884	 42%
1988	 452265	 1023502	 44%
1989	 506819	 1056707	 48%
1990	 584975	 1121792	 52%
1991	 629185	 1180154	 53%
1992	 715410	 1270309	 56%
Source: Company Document - Business Plan 1988-1993.
Table 8.6 - Utilisation Rate for Central Region
from 1987-1992 (where Actual demand include
waiters)
Year	 Actual	 Actual ECP	 Utilisation
Demand	 Rate
1987	 421304	 960884	 44%
1988	 456818	 1023502	 45%
1989	 509127	 1056707	 48%
1990	 592258	 1121792	 53%
1991	 654673	 1180154	 56%
1992	 740504	 1270309	 58%
Source: Company Document - Business Plan 1988-1993
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Table 8.7 - Telephone Demand Actual against ECP
Actual by each Area in Central Region done by
Local Network Section from 1987-1992
Year Area Actual
	 Actual	 Actual Demand /
ECP	 Demand	 Actual ECP
1987	 KL	 351742	 131076	 37%
	
PJ	 234668	 125612	 54%
	
WS	 160383	 58470	 37%
	
ES	 214091	 91687	 43%
	
Total	 960884	 406845	 42%
1988	 KL	 369850	 143162	 39%
	
PJ	 243236	 134961	 56%
	
WS	 173537	 67979	 39%
	
ES	 236879	 106163	 45%
	
Total	 1023502	 452265	 44%
1989	 KL	 380719	 156303	 41%
	
PJ	 249659	 148990	 60%
	
WS	 178415	 79540	 45%
	
ES	 247914	 121986	 49%
	
Total	 1056707	 506819	 48%
1990	 KL	 397334	 178761	 45%
	
PJ	 272830	 168821	 62%
	
WS	 189650	 94231	 50%
	
ES	 261978	 143162	 55%
	
Total	 1121792	 584975	 52%
1991	 KL	 420102	 193281	 46%
	
PJ	 286604	 178269	 62%
	
WS	 194681	 102432	 53%
	
ES	 278767	 155203	 56%
	
Total	 1180154	 629185	 53%
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1992	 KL	 437912	 221177	 51%
	
PJ	 318096	 199437	 63%
	
WS	 210669	 116357	 55%
	
ES	 303602	 178439	 59%
	
Total	 1270309	 715410	 56%
Source: Business Plan Document (1989-1993)
The question was posed to both the Central Region's
engineers and the HQ staff who are involved in this work,
as to why the utilisation rate was still below 60% from
the year the company was privatised until 1992.
The engineers at the region, especially the project
manager, argued that it was quite normal to have this
sort of rate (there is not much different in the
performance when compared with the national utilisation
rate during JTM (from 1975- 1986) and STM (from 1987-
1992) which is shown in Table 8.8) since the
telecommunication industry cannot be equated to
manufacturing, where the rate could be as high as 90%.
They claimed it is not possible to compare with another
industry, because a telecommunication company deals with
network provision where lead time is needed in installing
the network and because of the rapid economic development
in the country as a whole, and this region in particular.
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TABLE 8.8 :- Percentage of Actual Subcribers
against Actual Effective Cable Pair (ECP) for
JTM/STM as a whole from 1975-1992
Year	 Actual	 Effective	 Utilisation
Subscribers	 Cable	 Rate
Pair	 (%)
1975	 169538	 286100	 59%
1976	 194359	 346800	 56%
1977	 227564	 468594	 49%
1978	 271010	 621518	 44%
1979	 325154	 868012	 38%
1980	 395640	 1084635	 37%
1981	 488675	 1119170	 44%
1982	 585378	 1380425	 42%
1983	 700097	 1766982	 40%
1984	 849129	 1967964	 43%
1985	 958598	 2076455	 46%
1986	 1042827	 2529270	 41%
1987	 1131719	 2685000	 42%
1988	 1247687	 2915000	 43%
1989	 1388183	 2967000	 47%
1990	 1585744	 3220000	 49%
1991	 1816860	 3405000	 53%
1992	 2091578	 3835000	 55%
Source : (1)Taken and calculated from Annual
Reports of JTM from 1975-1986.
(2) Annual Report of STM from 1987-1992.
One engineer commented that the network has to be
optimised at the beginning to avoid having to duct the
ground too often as demand increases. Another engineer
suggested that it is necessary to analyse from the
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specific locality point of view. In a long-established,
very saturated and stable area, utilisation rate could be
as high as 80%, but in a new area, then it inay only be
20%-30% in the first few years. Another officer at the
region commented:
"With respect to the utilisation rate, you must
assume that the actual ECP is at 80% since for
every 10 ECP available, one is reserved for
testing and the other one is reserved for spare
in case all the ECP are utilised".
The RGM, justifying the low utilisation, said that
the way utilisation is calculated is very misleading. He
suggested that utilisation should be looked at in the
longer term, since the network was installed looking
ahead to expected utilisation some years later, as the
country develops. He pointed out that the Malaysian
market is not as saturated as those of developed
countries like U.K. and Europe.
However, some of the HQ group interviewed by the
researcher were of the opinion that the utilisation rate
has not been satisfactory. One manager who is an engineer
monitoring the region's progress on the project commented
that:
"Utilisation of around 50% is quite low, when
you compare with other countries like South
Korea, Japan or Singapore who are able to
utilise around 75%. If they can do it, why
can't we? And they (the region) started to
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argue that there is not enough capacity in the
place where waiters are present".
A senior officer in the Corporate Planning Division
argued that the problem arises from the fact that in
planning the network, the region was concerned with
actual numbers, rather than business needs, as the market
requires. He gave an example where for the 1992 business
plan proposal, the initial proposals from all the regions
and other divisions totalled M$7 billion. He continued:
"Can you imagine what would happen to us? So we
cannot take these figures to top management. We
have only M$4 billion in terms of revenue, so
if we were to accept that figure of M$7
billion, we would need to borrow from overseas
financial consortium, because we cannot get it
from the local financial consortiums. If we do
that, it will be a problem because of the high
cost involved in terms of interest and that
will eat into our bottom line. So we have to
consolidate this figure to a reasonable figure.
So after deliberation and rationalising with
the regions, we agreed initially on M$4
billion, and later on M$2.2 billion".
But why is this happening? According to another AGM
at HQ office, there could be two reasons:-
(i) Engineers love projects and they just install
anywhere they like. More projects will show that they are
busy and engineers still have influence, since the
captain of the ship is the engineer, and furthermore,
their performance is based on the number of ECP5
produced, not on the number of ECPs utilised. It is not
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the responsibility of the project engineers, but rather
the marketing group at the area level, to sell these
ECPs.
(ii) Another reason could be that engineers did not
plan well or if they have planned well, it could be due
to the marketing group being unable to sell those lines.
If there are still some waiters, it could be that the
lines are installed in the wrong area.
Referring back to the Table 8.2 on the demand
forecast against actual and Table 8.4 on the ECP forecast
against actual in the Central Region, the demand forecast
against actual by the engineer is very satisfactory, due
to the introduction of fundamental planning as explained
previously. The same goes for the ECP forecast against
actual. So the reason for the low utilisation rate shown
in the Table 8.5 could be engineers' motivation to have
more projects and produce more ECPs, as that is how
performance is judged.
If that is the case, then the assimilation of
financial and commercial values by the engineers in this
region can be said to be limited, largely confined to
fundamental planning. In other respects they are not
driven by financial values but more by the inherited
engineering values and performance based on physical
output, since under privatisation, rewards are not fixed
as in JTM but rather more based on performance - in the
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case of project engineers, judged by physical values
rather than financial values.
8.2.2 Analysis of overall performance of the
Department from 1982 up to 1986 and of the
privatised company, SPM from 1987 to 1992.
As can be seen from the analysis of the overall
performance of the Department from 1982 to 1986 and of
the privatised company from 1987 to 1991 in Table 8.9,
over the years the company has performed well, compared
to when it was a government Department. There are many
contributing factors which led to this result, one being
that it was privatised at the right time, in the sense
that the economy was booming. Moreover, the increased
economic growth of the country led to increase in demand
for both residential and business lines, as shown in
Table 8.10. However, the research suggests that the
improved performance could also be attributed to the
emergence of the Accounting and Finance group in the
organisation as participants in the decision-making
process under the new company environment, which led to
them becoming visible and becoming the eyes of the
organ isation.
From Table 8.9, we can see that the Operating Income
increased from M$771 million in 1972 to M$1644 million in
1987 (i.e. the first year of privatisation) and doubled
to M$3,414 million in 1992. Profit before Tax increased
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Table 8.10 - Number of Business and Residential
and Total Customers
Year	 Business	 Residential	 Total
Telephone	 Telephone	 Telephone
1982	 218230	 367157	 585387
1983	 248794	 451303	 700097
1984	 285701	 5634428	 849129
1985	 309051	 649547	 958598
1986	 319248	 732579	 1042827
1987	 332997	 798722	 1131719
1988	 363549	 884138	 1247687
1989	 397848	 990335	 1388138
1990	 449790	 1135954	 1585744
1991	 518109	 1298751	 1816860
1992	 587098	 1504480	 2091578
Source: Annual Report of JTM (1982-1986) and
STI4 (1987-1992).
411
from M$260 million in 1982 to M$1,276 million in 1992. We
could argue that both the engineers (on both the
operations anc marketing sides) and the accountants
played a role in achieving this favourable financial
performance.
From Table 8.11, as a result of the increase in the
operating income and profit before tax over the years,
the return on shareholders' funds increased from 0.2% in
1987 to 12.7% in 1992; return on total assets has also
increased from 0.1% in 1987 to 8.8% in 1992; dividend
rate after issue of shares to the public in early part of
1990 increased from 5% in 1990 to 15% in 1992; and
earnings per share before tax increased from 0.3 cent in
1987 to 64.7 cent in 1992. Again this could be
attributable to the two factors mentioned above.
With the Finance and Accounting group becoming more
visible and playing an influential role in the
organisation, the debt/equity ratio reduced from 1.1 in
1982 to 2.3 in 1987 and again to 0.2 in 1992 as shown in
Table 8.12. This further reduced the cost of interest on
loans from M$106 million in 1982 to M$336 million in 1987
and to M$25 million in 1992 (Annual Report of JTM, 1982
and STM, 1987 and 1992).
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Table 8.12 - Debt Equity Ratio of JTM and STM
from 1982-1992
Year	 Debt Equity	 Year	 Debt Equity
Ratio	 Ratio
1982	 1.1	 1987	 2.3
1983	 1.5	 1988	 2.0
1984	 1.8	 1989	 1.5
1985	 1.8	 1990	 0.3
1986	 2.0	 1991	 0.2
1992	 0.2
Source: Annual Report of JTM (1982-1986) and
STh (1987-1992).
Table 8.13 - Revenues from Total Telephone
(both Residential and Business) and Total
Services
Year	 Total Telephone	 Total Services
(M$)	 (M$)
1982	 598798	 771677
1983	 739631	 970894
1984	 958509	 1232865
1985	 1136348	 1430390
1986	 1279145	 1558699
1987	 1437326	 1644000
1988	 1748000	 1882000
1989	 1979200	 2141200
1990	 2332100	 2574300
1991	 2751100	 3004600
1992	 3085500	 3414800
Source: Annual Report of JTM (1982-1986) and
STI4 (1987-1992)
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Table 8.11 - Financial Performance in
Percentage of STM from 1987-1992
Types of	 1987	 1988	 1989	 1990	 1991	 1992
Ratios
Return on
	 0.2%	 7.7%	 13.6% 10.9% 16.7% 12.7%
Shareholders
Funds
Return on	 0.1%	 2.3%	 4.8%	 6.8% 11.5%	 8.8%
Total Asset
Dividend Rate -	 -	 -	 5.0% 12.5% 15.0%
Earnings per 0.3c 12c	 24c	 36c	 55c	 65c
Share (before
Tax)
Note: c - cents
Source: Annual Report of STM (1990 and 1992).
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The reorganisation of the company combined with a
marketing and customer services approach in late 1988
resulted in an increase in the number of customers,
number of new services and revenues from all the services
as shown in Tables 8.10, 8.13 and 8.14. This indirectly
indicates a satisfactory job performed by the Marketing
divisions at Headquarters and the regions. Table 8.10
shows the growth of the residential and business
telephone customers from 585,387 (i.e. 367,157
residential telephone customers and 218,230 business
telephone customers) in 1982 to 2,091,578 (i.e. 1,504,480
residential telephone customers and 587,098 business
telephone customers) in 1992. This has resulted in an
increase of revenues for both residential and business
telephones from M$599 million in 1982 to M$l,437 million
in 1987 and a further increase to M$3,086 million in
1992, when revenues from total services also increased
from M$772 million in 1982 to M$1,644 million in 1987 and
a further increase to M$3,415 million in 1992, as shown
in Table 8.13.
With respect to financial performance by type of
services, business telephone services showed an increase
in revenues from 50.2% in 1987 to 54.5% in 1992 as shown
in Table 8.14. With respect to the overall performance on
the movement of share prices from the day it was listed
in KLSE, from Table 8.15, shows that the performance has
been highly satisfactory, with the year end prices
increasing from M$7.00 in 1990 to M$9.75 in 1991 and to
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Table 8.14 - Financial Performance (in term of
Percentage of Operating Revenue)
Types of	 1987	 1988	 1989	 1990	 1991	 1992
Services
Business	 50.2	 50.7	 53.4	 58.4	 57.2	 54.5
Telephone
Residential	 34.1	 32.3	 31.3	 28.4	 28.4	 29.1
Telephone
Mobile	 1.8	 3.3	 4.1	 4.8	 5.9	 6.8
Services
Telex	 5.4	 3.8	 2.7	 2.3	 1.7	 1.3
Leased	 3.9	 2.8	 2.6	 3.4	 3.6	 3.9
Services
Data Services 0.1	 0.3	 0.4	 0.4	 0.4	 0.4
Other	 5.5	 6.8	 5.5	 2.3	 2.8	 4.0
Services
Source: Annual Report of STh (1990 and 1992).
Table 8.15 - Share Price of STM (Lowest and
Highest in the year 1990-1993)
Year	 Lowest	 Highest	 Price at
Price	 Price	 Year End
1990	 M$5.90	 M$7.20	 M$7.00
1991	 M$6.80	 M$12.10	 M$9.75
1992	 M$9.55	 M$15.O0	 M$14.50
1993*	 M$14.00	 M$14.40
Note:(l) * - up to 8th January 1993.
(2) STh share was first listed on 7th
November 1990 at M$6.50. It was issued at a
premium of M$4.50 a share.
Source: New Straits Times (Malaysia), 1st
January 1991, 1992 and 1993.
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M$15.0 0 in 1992. The good performance of the movement of
the share prices presumably reflects the overall
performance of the company since privatisation.
8.2.3 Analysis of the Regions' Performance as
Profit Centres
As was mentioned earlier, the profit centres that
operate in the company are the regions, i.e. Central
Region, Northern Region, Southern Region, Eastern Region,
Sarawak Region, and Sabah Region, and the International
Division at Headquarters.
As far as monitoring the performance of these
regions is concerned, the regions need to submit monthly
performance reports, not only on financial results but
also on customer growth, productivity and quality of
service as shown in Table 8.16 for Central Region as an
example. This system of monthly reporting is a new
approach to the region, as it did not take place during
JTI4 days. The regions' overall operations/performance
from 1987-1992 is shown in Table 8.17(a) - for Central
and Northern Regions; Table 8.17(b) - for Southern and
Eastern Regions; and Table 8.17(c) - for Sarawak and
Sabah Regions.
For Business Direct Exchange Lines (DELs) i.e. for
business telephone lines and subscribers, all the regions
show an increase over the period mentioned: for Central
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Region, from 131,737 DELs in 1987 to 246,256 DEL5 in
1992; for Northern Region, from 71,214 DELs in 1987 to
118,228 DELs in 1992; for Southern Region, from 48,138
DELs in 1987 to 92,723 DELs in 1992; for Eastern Region,
from 23,107 DELs in 1987 to 40,296 DELs in 1992; for
Sarawak Region, from 30,767 DELs in 1987 to 50,187 DELs
in 1992; and for Sabah Region, from 28,124 DELs to 39408
DELs in 1992. Numbers of Residential DELs and ATUR
(Mobile Telephone) subscribers, also increased over the
same period as shown in Tables 8.17(a), 8.17(b) and
8.17(c). With respect to the DEL5 per 100 population per
region, all the regions show overall increase over the
period, and with respect to the DELs per employee, all
the regions except Sabah show an overall increase over
the period.
Overall, the Central Region performed better than
the other regions, having the advantage of being based in
the capital city (i.e. Kuala Lumpur) and the state of
Selangor, which have experienced high economic growth,
and have a high population growth and a greater
proportion of middle class groups.
Overall performance of the regions, shown in Tables
8.17(a), 8.17(b) and 8.17(c) has been outstanding over
the period from the first year of privatisation. One
reason for this is probably the commercial and financial
considerations taking place in managing the regions, as
the overall objective of the company shifted from a
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service motive to economic driven motives. At the same
time, the accounting and finance group became more
visible in the organisation, including the regions, where
the accounting group expanded rapidly, as mentioned
earlier.
8.3 Significant Changes in the Budgeting System for
Capital Projects since Privatisation
When the new management came in 1987/1988, the
question of viability of projects became a key issue,
especially when the top management saw that ECP
utilisation rate was only 42%-43% as shown in Table 8.8.
They decided that proper feasibility studies should be
done in order to assess the viability of projects. So, in
1988, a directive was issued on this viability concept.
One measure taken in this respect was to have projects
defined in terms of schemes, of which there might be more
than 50,000 all over the country. This method of
definition was imposed by top management, in the interest
of tight control by the accountants. In respect of
Capital Works Expenditure, only Corporate Finance at
headquarters were involved. The accounts & finance
section at the regional level were only involved in the
preparation of the operating expenditure budget for the
business plan. They were not involved in making sure that
only viable projects were included in the project listing
under the business plan.
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The AGM (Accounts & Finance) of the Central Region
in an interview on 5th December 1991) said that in a
management seminar, the question had been raised why the
accountants at region level were not in the picture,
vetting throughout the project evaluations and sitting
with the engineers to get first hand knowledge, before
final vetting by HQ. The answer given was that this was
due to the historical structure of the company, whereby
the secretariat (at Regional HQ headed by an engineer
with a manager rank) was responsible for compiling all
the data and information on the capital works programme
and submitting it to HQ.
The AGM went on to explain that for accounting to
play the role it would like to play, a redefinition of
their role would be needed. He also drew attention to the
problem of manpower. However, he emphasised that Accounts
and Finance Group monitor projects after the business
plan has been approved, control the budget and make sure
that the project has been assetised i.e. from the
financial side of it.
The researcher found, during a visit to the
organisation from May- July 1993, that Corporate Finance
at HQ did not have the manpower to carry out that kind of
viability study on all the projects and also found it
difficult to penetrate into the engineering work
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territory. Another obstacle is related to the weak
costing system inherited from JTM.
On the subject of project viability, the GM
Corporate Accounts, when interviewed in 1991 discussed
the difficulty of determining the appropriate basis for
assessment, since no projects or asset generates revenue
by itself, but only when joined together with the main
network, so it is very difficult to assign revenue to a
particular project or asset. Whether to use full costing
or marginal costing has still to be settled. He went on
to say that this difficulty is characteristic of the
telephone industry and is shared by other companies.
When the GM (Corporate Accounts) was interviewed
again in June 1993, the position was much the same:
"When it comes to analysing the individual
project, I think it is very difficult; no one
asset can generate income without being
connecting to others. This concept of
'viability by project' until now we have not
come up with a formula to use full costing or
marginal costing".
A costing unit was only established in 1991, after
top management were made aware of the importance of
having a proper costing information system, especially in
view of the problem of project viability and competitors
coming into the picture.
426
As was commented by one senior accountant,
"we have to look at the competitors. We have to
put ourselves in order. How are we going to
meet the competitors, if there are any? Do we
have any bargaining power in terms of cost,
price and tariff? Because we have to give
feedback to the regulator (the new JTM) for
revision of the tariff in relation to the
licence given. Thus we really need to
concentrate on a proper costing information
system. That is why we formed this unit in
early 1991 and also have appointed a consultant
from U.K. to study and implement this system in
our organisationTi.
Because proper implementation of project viability
could not be established, the amount to be spent on the
capital works programme expenditure cannot be determined
using this approach during this period. Thus the
'depreciation growth capping' concept was introduced as
an alternative, whereby the management decided to use a
maximum of 10% of the growth on annual depreciation and
work backwards to determine the additional capital
expenditure. This idea was proposed by the Corporate
Finance Group after they had done some calculating to
determine the bottom line of the company in 1988-1990. As
can be seen from Table 8.18, there was little capital
expenditure during this period. This was partly as a
result of the capping approach, and partly due to the
need during this period to show a good profit and loss
statement and balance sheet prior to listing of the
427
company on the KLSE, which resulted in less than the 10%
of the capping approach being spent during this period.
Table 8.18 - Capital Works Expenditure (Actual)
for Sm as a whole and for Central Region from
1987-1992
YEAR	 STM AS A WHOLE	 CENTRAL REGION
(M$ Million)	 (M$ Million)
1987	 680.4	 180.7
1988	 718.9	 145.4
1989	 392.1	 90.6
1990	 900.0	 148.3
1991	 1700	 357.6
1992	 2100	 311.9
Source: Company Document- Business Plan 1990-
1992 and interview with the Regional
Accountant.
Thus it can be seen that the capping approach
introduced by the Corporate Finance became the main focus
in determining the amount of capital expenditure to be
allowed in any one year during the early period of
privatisation. This is important, since there were no
guidelines for setting a limit on capital expenditure.
The engineers in the region listed projects based on
their experience. As the GM of Central Region pointed
out, it is the engineers who take all the criticism when
services are slow or lines busy, so they would naturally
try to protect themselves by listing as many projects as
possible.
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Thus, the move to the capping approach, shows to
some extent, at least, the influence of accounting values
on the policy for determination of capital expenditure to
be spent in any given year. This was an important event,
since the company is a capital-based industry and its
capital expenditure figures are quite substantial.
Moreover, capital expenditure affects the engineers' core
activities in the organisation.
But this capping approach ceased at the end of 1990.
As from 1991, the management decided that approval would
be based on the capability of the region to carry out the
projects - usually determined on the basis of the actual
amount spent by each region in the previous year.
Since 1991, it can be seen that the management has
been more relaxed in terms of the rules, guidelines and
instructions of the business plan. One reason is the fact
that the company has been listed in KLSE; shares have
been sold to the public, to employees and even to foreign
investors. Many engineers commented that during the first
three years of privatisation, the company was very cost-
conscious, cutting here and there (evidence of which can
be seen in the drastic cuts in capital expenditure during
these years) so as to show a favourable financial
position in preparation for the listing. This was
influenced by the government, which owned 100% during the
stage of corporatisation, i.e. before listing.
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During these three years, the headquarters group in
charge of the business plan would go to all the regions
and review each project, scheme by scheme, to question
the viability of the project, and would slash any they
felt to be non-urgent, or not viable. As one of engineers
in the central region said:
"They would go through each project submitted
by us one by one, in detail until midnight and
would slash any that they felt was not urgent
or viable".
During this period, projects were equated to
schemes, just as under JTM, which created difficulties
for the engineers in managing the project, because one
particular exchange might involve 20-50 schemes. When the
project was defined as a scheme, it was necessary to
obtain the approval of the RGM or even people at the
headquarters, to transfer allocation from one scheme to
another, which sometime delayed implementation of the
project. But of course, from the headquarters point of
view, virement was not to be encouraged, as the engineers
were supposed to budget as tightly as possible. In other
words, they wanted to make the engineers become good
planners.
But all this changed in 1991 when projects were
defined in terms of exchanges. This change was made after
complaints were made by engineers during various meetings
and seminars. The change is important for the project
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manager and his team, since it is more flexible in the
sense that budget virement between one scheme and another
is possible. Approval need be given only by the project
manager or his assistant, if the scheme is within the
area concerned.
Another development came in 1992, when the waiters
started to increase, even though the percentage was very
small compared to the situation during JTM days, as shown
in Table 8.3(a). Despite the relatively small figures,
this is a sentitive issue, which has been raised in
Parliament.
Because of this problem, as from 1991, the company
has been more flexible in its budget procedures. Some
flexibility was established by defining projects by
exchange instead of scheme, but vireinent could only take
place from one scheme to another within the same
exchange. Since 1991, however, virement can also take
place between exchanges in the same area or even from one
area to another, if the two project managers agree and
obtain the consent of their superior (e.g. AGM (LND) in
the case of Local Network Development).
As from 1992, flexibility has been taken still
further, as the management has approved two types of
budget. One is the fixed budget and the other is the
flexible budget. The fixed budget is the amount that is
certain to be allowed to be spent, which is based on the
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previous year's total amount spent, while the flexible
budget is an additional amount approved for use if the
fixed budget is used up, especially for unforseen and
urgent projects. Most engineers were of the opinion that
the flexible budget was introduced by the top management
so as to cut the red tape in budget approval, especially
in dealing with the problem of waiters, and also because
of the fast-growing economy of the country, which results
in new projects being approved by the authority concerned
at short notice.
Thus we can see that even though the engineers were
not able to spend in 1990 and 1991, when there was quite
a substantial implementation shortfall, eventually, in
order to solve this problem, the company has reached an
accomodation with the engineers by introducing the two-
tier budget system. The main reason why this is taking
place is the concern about waiters and competitors. If
there are too many waiters, and the public complain, then
the government will be displeased. This would give a good
ground for competitors to lobby for licences to be issued
to them to compete, on the basis that it would overcome
the waiter problem.
As was commented by a senior engineer in Central
Region:
"Actually, the top management at headquarters
also know the real problem. They cannot just
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simply cut off because we can back up the
figures (i.e. the capital expenditure figures)
that we have proposed to them under the
Business Plan. And if they (i.e. the HQ
people), out of the blue, cut of f, and then
actually we need that amount, they will have a
problem later, because the customers will
complain. So who is supposed to be responsible?
If they asked us, "why don't you provide the
lines ?", we would answer, "No budget", so we
would pass the problem back to them. But now,
with the introduction of the flexible budget,
they are making us (i.e. the project people and
the region) answerable, responsible and
accountable".
At this point it would be helpful to suininarise the
main points emerging from analysis of the company's
performance. Evidence has been presented of several
improvements since privatisation, which appear to be at
least in part attributable to the introduction of
commercial considerations and increased concern for
prudent financial management, as follows:
(a) Accuracy of overall demand forecasting has
greatly improved.
(b) The number of waiters as a percentage of
subscribers has been reduced.
(c) ECP forecasting has improved.
(d) There has been a general improvement in the
performance of STM as compared to JTM.
(e) The company's debt/equity ratio has improved,
interest expenses reduced, and the company's risk profile
reduced.
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(f) Since privatisation, the regions have achieved
outstanding performance as profit-centres. It seems very
possible that this is related to the introduction of more
commercial considerations and the rapid expansion of the
accounting and financial group at the regional level.
(g) The increased importance attached to financial
needs as the criteria governing the business plan was
reflected in the new approach to the capital budget,
including the depreciation capping approach of 1988-1990
and enforcement of the 1989 Financial Instructions.
(h) The company has achieved better inventory and
asset management.
(1) The company has invested heavily in a new
costing information system and computerised project
monitoring systems (i.e. the PROMPT System).
However, we have also seen evidence of developments
which cast doubt on the extent to which these changes
indicate a real move away from engineering influence:
(a) The utilisation rate is still unsatisfactorily
low, giving rise to questions as to whether the
engineers' love of projects and traditional engineering
performance criteria may to some extent be in conflict
with considerations of commercial viability.
(b) Since 1991, with the success of listing on KLSE
and the continued pressure to decrease the waiting list
further, there has been a relaxation of business plan
rules and guidelines, including a flexible budget and
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greater flexibility for virement,	 suggesting an
accomodation between management and engineers.
Having summarised the implications of an analysis of
the company's performance, we are now in a position to
evaluate the overall effect on the organisation of the
three phases of disturbance, drawing not only on this
analysis of performance, but also on the evidence
presented in previous chapters. Accordingly, the next
section presents a detailed discussion of the
organisation's response to external disturbance from the
l970s to the present.
8.4 Discussion of the Principal Findings of the Study on
the three phases of disturbances
The political ideology and long term strategy of the
country influenced the development of the
telecommunication industry, as was shown in Chapters Four
and Five. This influence led to disturbances to the
Department, categorised as first, second and third phases
of disturbance.
This study looked at the processes of change of a
telecommunication organisation over a period of time,
from the early 1970's to date, where in accordance with
Laughlin's model (1991), three phases of disturbances
were identified. The processes of change were identified
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by tracing the process of movement of organisational
tracks (Greenwood and Hinnings, 1988) and using
Laughlin's model of organisational change (1991). Out of
the third phase disturbance, i.e. privatisation of the
company, major changes took place with respect to the
organisation concerned, with accounting as one of the
main catalysts, discussed in Chapters Five, Six and
Seven.
Before we present the final outcome of the findings,
we shall, in the following subsections, discuss the three
phases of disturbance that took place, with the help of
Figures 8.1(a) and 8.1(b).
8.4.1 Period of First Phase Disturbance
As was discussed in Section 5.4.1, the first phase
of disturbance was the result of political, economic and
technological factors, which led to some of the
Department's business being given, in the 1970s, to the
newly established private telecommunication firms,
especially the Bumiputra firms, in order to achieve NEP.
This marked the liberalisation of the telecommunication
industry. We saw earlier how, before liberalisation took
place, JTN was a government Department with a monopoly in
the telecommunication industry in the country. The
Department managed and controlled everything: the supply
of telecommunication equipment, the running of the
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Figure 8.1(b) - Movement of organisational
tracks using both Laughlin Model (1991) and
Greenwood & Hiimings (1988).
Definitions and Clarification of the term used:
(1) Interpretative Scheme 1
The values and beliefs are driven by the
engineering system with little impact of the
values and beliefs of the accounting system.
(2) Interpretative Scheme 2
The values and beliefs are driven by the
accounting system with some (little)
consideration in the values and beliefs of the
engineering system.
(3) Design Archetype 1
Strong elements of the engineering system
present in the design archetype which make it
become influential and produce a key link
between the interpretative scheme 1 and the
sub-system.
(4) Design Archetype 2
Strong elements of the accounting system
present in the design archetype which make it
become influential and produce a key link
between the interpretative scheme 2 and the
sub-system.
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(5) Embryonic Design Archetype 1A
Minor disturbance (i.e. the first phase of
disturbance) affects the design archetype which
affects slightly the strength of the
engineering system in the original design
archetype (i.e. design archetype 1).
(6) Embryonic Design Archetype lB
Another minor disturbance (i.e. the second
phase of disturbance) affects the design
archetype which gradually (slightly) reduces
the strength of the engineering system in the
embryonic design archetype lÀ.
(7) Embryonic Design Archetype 2
Major disturbance (i.e. the third phase of
disturbance - privatisation era from 1987-1990)
affect the design archetype and a new design
archetype emerges where accounting system as a
new element is becoming apparent.
(8) Embryonic Interpretative Scheme 2
The values and beliefs in the first level of
the interpretative scheme are starting to
produce slight changes in line with the
financial system which is a strong element in
the new design archetype (i.e. design archetype
2)
(9) Schizoid
Tension between the 'Interpretative Scheme 1'
(with the first level of the values and beliefs
along engineering system lines) and 'Embryonic
Interpretative Scheme 2' (with the first level
of the embryonic values and beliefs along
financial system lines) as a result of rebuttal
taking place among the engineers.
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(10) The Engineering System
The engineering system is defined as a system
as a whole and includes not only the
engineering technical system but also their
strong influence and ideas in the organisation
as a whole. This is present as a strong
elements in the design archetype 1 and forms as
a key link between the interpretative scheme 1
and the sub-system of the organisation,
resulting in the emergence of an engineering
culture. The engineering system does not
include the engineering technology, which is a
separate issue altogether, but engineering
technology may further influence the
engineering system.
(11) The Accounting System
The accounting system is defined as a system as
a whole but includes not only the accounting,
financial, and commercial system but also their
influence and ideas in the organisation as a
whole. This is prevailing throughout the
organisation in the 'design archetype 2' and
can form a key link between the 'interpretative
scheme 2' and the sub-system of the
organisation and can result in emergence of
elements of an accounting culture.
Note: The second and third levels of the
Interpretative Scheme which are the 'metarule'
and 'mission', remain intact throughout the
three phases of disturbances as far as
engineers' values are concerned.
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networks, and the supply of telecommunication services.
However, as a result of the disturbance in the 1970s and
l980s, this monopoly was reduced.
During this liberalisation period, the Department's
objective was basically service and technologically-
oriented. Accounting's role and influence was limited;
cost, profit and financial viability were less important.
Thus, referring to Laughlin's model, during this period
the subsystem was affected, since some business
opportunities were lost (in revenue terms) because of the
first phase disturbance. However, during this period the
'design archetype' and 'interpretative scheme' were not
affected. The values and beliefs in the interpretative
scheme of the organisation were still based on the
engineering system which was part of the design
archetype, since the company is technically-based and
service was its prime objective. Accounting did not form
an important part of the design archetype.
Thus, overall, the first phase disturbance at the
initial stage only affected the subsystem of the
organisation, and produced no major change. During this
period, the policy of liberalisation introduced by the
Ministry of Telecommunications, Post and Electricity was
supported by the top management of the Department, who
had vested interests in the sense that they eventually
opened new, private telecommunication firms upon retiring
or resigning from the Department. The other reason was
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the minimal influence of the accounting group existing in
the Department at that time, as discussed in Chapter
Five, where it was shown that when problems arose,
instead of being solved through the application of
commercial/financial considerations, they were shifted to
the private telecommunication firms, which made these
problematic areas profitable (see Section 5.4.1.).
However, as was also discussed in Section 5.4.1
towards the middle and the end stage of low level
disturbance, as shown in Figure 8.1(a), certain major
events took place in the organisation which affected the
design archetype. The Department was affected by major
events, the NEP and the shift to industralisation, as
discussed in Chapter Two and Section 5.4.1. One important
point that needs mentioning again is that out of
liberalisation and NEP, there emerged an increased number
of telecommunication firms, notably bumiputras who were
former top management staff of JTM and some of which were
well connected to the top level government leaders
(Kennedy, 1990). With these developments, as shown in
Figure 8.1(a), this first phase disturbance at the later
stage, coupled with the second phase disturbance,
threatened the 'design archetype' which changed from
'design archetype 1' to the 'embryonic design archetype
lÀ' position (see Figure 8.1(a)). The engineering system,
which constituted a strong element of the design
archetype, had been threatened, but accounting at this
stage did not form an important element in the design
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archetype as it still played the minor role of paymaster
and custodial role.
8.4.2 Period of Second Phase Disturbance
The second phase disturbance came in the early part
of 1980 when turnkey projects were introduced by the
government, as discussed in Section 5.4.2. Because of
this phase of disturbance, the engineering system was
affected, when the engineers' core and prestige
functions, planning and engineering (i.e. the
implementation of the projects) were taken over by
turnkey contractor firms.
The decision to introduce the turnkey projects was
made by the Ministry and central planning authorities
outside the Department, and supported by the relevant
Minister himself (NST, October 15, 1983). Even though the
engineers and top management of the Department were not
happy with the decision, they had no power or authority
to stop the turnkey projects from being implemented.
Due to this second phase disturbance, the
engineering system was threatened and its influence
started to decline in the organisation, and in the
industry as a whole. The engineers' main function changed
from planning and implementing the projects, to
monitoring the projects implemented by the turnkey
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contractors. As one former senior engineer of JTM who is
now working with STM commented,
"During the turnkey projects period, the
engineers in JTM were doing supervisory work,
since the planning and engineering parts were
given to the turnkey contractors. This is where
the engineers' influence started to decline, as
their major basic job had been taken over by
outsiders".
According to other staff interviewed, the worst part
about the turnkey projects was that they resulted in the
reduction of promotion prospects for JTM staff, since the
scope of work had been reduced tremendously.
As discussed in Chapter Five, as a result of this
policy, some of the experienced staff left the Department
to join the turnkey contractors. This marked the decline
of the engineering influence in the organisation. In
fact, according to Kennedy (1990, p. 176), because of
these turnkey projects:
"there was an upward shift of authority over
decision making for the telecommunication
system, from the engineers who ran 4JTM to
officials within the Ministry and above who
were appointed rather than career civil
servants; and the growing accumulation of power
by private entrepreneurs in the
telecommunication industry".
This statement provides further evidence that the
engineering system, which was a strong element in the
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design archetype in the organisation, started to decline
when the engineers' role was transferred to the turnkey
contractor firms. This threatened the design archetype
further, as shown in Figure 8.1(a); it moved from
'embryonic design archetype lÀ' to 'embryonic design
archetype 1B' position in the movement of organisational
track.
One reason for the major jobs being given to the
turnkey contractor firms was the insignificant presence
of the accounting system in the organisation. Even though
the accounting role had began to change as from 1971,
when the government decided to make JTM a self-accounting
Department, running along commercial principles, the
accounting department was viewed as an alien entity by
the functionally-oriented engineers in the organisation.
The basic objectives still remained service-oriented with
the clearing of the waiting list the main priority.
However, the accounting department's role changed
slightly from 1971, when the department was able to
process and make payment directly from the Department
instead of sending the payment vouchers to the
Accountant-General 'S Office.
The other change that occurred was when the
Department was directed by the government to make at
least 8% return on capital. So for the first time, the
Department needed to forecast expected revenues, even
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though this was done in a very uncoordinated manner,
since it was not tied to the preparation of budgets
because of lack of coordination between the accounting
and the technical groups, as discussed in Section 5.5.1.
Thus the accounting department did not make much impact,
even though the Department was in theory required to run
as a commercial entity as a condition of the loan granted
by the World Bank. In fact, in the preparation of budget,
accountants were mostly not involved. The task was given
to the lower level officers, as they were permanent staff
of JTM and so trusted more than the accountants and
bookkeepers who were on secondment from the Accountant-
General's Office. Evidence and detailed explanation was
given in Section 6.2. In fact, the budget was under the
control of a group of engineers who were in the
secretariat office (a think-tank committee) reporting
directly to the Director-General of JTM.
During JTM days, according to the Report on
Privatisation on JTN (1984, page 26),
"JTM's accounting and control systems (had)
three basic problems:
(a) lack of adequate systems of internal
control and recording of transactions,
(b) failure to maintain the existing systems by
conducting regular control procedures,
(c) the use of accounting concepts not in
accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles".
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The main problem during JTM days as far as
accounting and finance are concerned was the domination
of the engineering system, in the sense that engineers
were the main actors in the organisation. The decision-
making processes were in the hands of the engineers,
which led to choices (including those involving
accounting and financial matters) being based on the
engineers' views, beliefs and understanding. Cost,
profit, capitalisation of assets on completed projects
and project viability, meant little or nothing. The
accounting personnel were not able to influence the top
to change these attitudes, as most of the top management
were engineers by profession and had the same values as
their subordinates. But accounting did make an initial
impact when the report on the finding of the net worth of
JTM made by the consultant in 1983/1984 showed that one
of the weaknesses in the system was related to
assetisation, as discussed in section 7.3.3.3 and section
5.5.1. This led to 'design archetype 1' being threatened
as the accounting system began to make an impact in the
design archetype, as shown in Figure 8.1(a) where out of
second phase of disturbance, the organisation track moved
from 'embryonic design archetype lÀ' to 'embryonic design
archetype 1B'.
8.4.3 Period of Third Phase Disturbance
8.4.3.1 Privatisation Era - from 1987 to 1990
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In the early l980s, as discussed in Chapter Three,
the introduction of the government's privatisation policy
led to JTM being the first government Department to be
privatised. As discussed in Chapters Three and Five, the
rationale for making JTH the first government-Department
candidate to privatise involved many factors, including
the relative inefficiency of the Department, as shown by
its high waiting lists, and its failure to become self-
sufficient after 1972, despite being made a self-
accounting Department, supposedly operating on commercial
principles. Most capital expenditure was still financed
by the federal government. The failure to become self-
sufficient was due to the Department's adherence to the
servicing approach, and to giving insufficient emphasis
to commercial and marketing values.
The privatisation of the company started with the
change in the objective from a service and technological
to a profit-driven orientation. With the change in
objective, the top management and board of directors were
appointed, all of whom, with the exception of the
Managing Director, came from outside. After nine months,
the Managing Director was forced to resign and was
replaced by a new person from the private sector as
explained in Section 5.4.3. During these nine months, the
company strategy and organisational structure mirrored
the old one. However, after the new Managing Director was
appointed, major changes took place step by step, as was
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discussed in Section 5.4.3. The outcome of the third
phase of disturbance was a gradual but significant
increase in influence of accounting, where the design
archetype moved from 'embryonic design archetype 1B' to
'embryonic design archetype 2' during the first two years
of privatisation i.e. from 1987-1988. This is a period
when the Accounts and Finance group was expanded to
include four additional units. The establishment of the
management accounts unit (for the purpose of monthly
reporting, which was not done properly during JTM days),
financing/treasury unit and the transfering of the budget
units away from the Corporate Secretariat signified the
real beginning of the accounting system becoming part of
the design archetype of the organisation. This is where
monthly management reporting and the business plan were
introduced, as has been discussed in section 5.5.2,
Chapter Five and section 7.3 of Chapter Seven.
The move from 'embryonic design archetype 2' to
'design archetype 2' position occurred when financial
needs became the criteria used for the business plan in
the organisation before the listing of the company, i.e.
during 1988-1990. This resulted in a decrease in capital
expenditure, and use of the 'annual depreciation capping
approach' to determine capital expenditure for a
particular year. Other factors include the enforcement of
the Financial Instructions introduced 1989, and the
introduction of forward planning on the material
procurement through the SISKIS system. From the
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organisational structure point of view, the accounting
and finance group expanded further with the splitting of
the accounts and finance group into Corporate Accounts
and Corporate Finance, each with its own General Manager
reporting to the Finance Director. Along with that, the
company's organisational structure was restructured along
commercial and market lines. These changes resulted in
the accounting system becoming a stronger element in the
design archetype.
With regard to the LND at the central Region, the
third phase of disturbance brought a further expansion in
the role and status of accounting. Whereas accounting at
this level has previously been done by low-grade clerical
staff reporting to engineers, the new structure created
proper accounting units at area level, and an upgrading
of accounting posts, reflecting the management's attempt
to strengthen commercial values throughout the
organisation.
8.4.3.2 Post-Privatisation Era - from 1991 to date
Corporate Finance & Accounts further expanded with
the creation of the Costing Unit in 1991 after a
consultant had been appointed to design a costing
information system. This probing into detailed costing
and accounting of the project management system would
directly affect the engineers. The importance of this
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unit was further felt when the post of head of this unit
was upgraded to AGM in 1992.
Corporate Accounts made a forward move when the area
accounting group was established in 1991 and the post of
the head of this group was upgraded from Accounts
Assistant to Junior Executive in 1992. With this
establishment, the group can monitor the financial side
of the project at area level, where most projects are
located.
With the CIS ready to be implemented by the end of
1993 on product costing and transfer pricing, the
importance of the project accountant and the accounting
group at the area level emerges. The post of project
accountant will be filled by the end of 1993.
Furthermore, the PROMPT (project monitoring and
philosophical tools) system is expected to be ready for
implementation by the end of 1993. As explained earlier,
this project was established due to the absence of a
proper project monitoring system. PROMPT is intended to
overcome monitoring problems and will link all five
development groups which will help with the integrated
planning approach which was introduced in 1992/1993.
Thus, referring to Figure 8.1(a), we can see that
the track has moved from 'design archetype 2' to
'embryonic interpretative scheme 2' i.e. the company is
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in the early stage of changing to the new interpretative
scheme along accounting and financial values and beliefs,
especially with the enhanced presence of elements of the
accounting system in the design archetype due to the
third phase of disturbance during the privatisation era.
At the position of 'embryonic interpretative scheme 2',
the company is in a position to try to change the third
layer of the interpretative scheme, the values and
beliefs of the engineers, in line with the accounting
system. Evidence on the initial position of the
'embryonic interpretative scheme' can be seen from the
expansion and influence of the accounting and finance
group as discussed in section 5.5.2 and chapter six; and
section 7.3 where it appears that the engineers in LND in
Central Region have assimilated some commercial values
with respect to the fundamental planning, which has
helped them improve forecasting of demand for exchange
lines and ECP, as shown in Tables 8.1 and 8.4(a) and
discussed in Section 7.3.3.
However, Table 8.5 shows that the utilisation rate
for the Central Region i.e. taking actual demand over
actual ECP, was between 42%-56% from 1987 to 1992. Even
if waiters are also added, actual demand plus waiters
against actual ECP, still gives a utilisation rate of
only 44%-58%, very little different from the figure
before inclusion of waiters (see Table 8.6). Looking at
Table 8.8 on the utilisation rate for the company as a
whole, the utilisation is about the same, between 37%-59%
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front 1975-1986 (i.e. during JTM days and between 42%-55%
front 1987-1992 (i.e. during STM era).
Referring to Figure 8.1(a), as the accounting system
is increasing its impact in the design archetype and
appears to be in the process of changing the values and
beliefs of the engineers, i.e. at the stage of 'embryonic
interpretative scheme 2' position, engineers at HQ level
are rebutting this total colonisation change in the third
layer of the interpretative scheme. Thus the track moves
front 'embryonic interpretative scheme 2' to 'schizoid',
with tension between the third layer of the
'interpretative scheme 1' (engineering values and
beliefs) and the third layer of 'embryonic interpretative
scheme 2' (financial values and beliefs).
At the regional level also, analysis of the
utilisation rate in the LND of the Central Region
suggests that it is at 'schizoid' position, as the low
utilisation rate is evidence that the engineers have not
fully assimilated financial values and beliefs. The
assimilation of financial and commercial values by the
engineers in this region appears to be limited, largely
confined to fundamental planning. In other respects they
are not driven by financial values but more by the
inherited engineering values and performance based on
physical output, since under privatisation, rewards are
not fixed as in JTM but rather more based on performance
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- in the case of project engineers, judged by physical
values rather than financial values.
But why is this taking place? In the next section,
analysis is made with respect to the overall analysis of
movement of organisational tracks using Laughlin Model
(1991) and Greenwood & Hinnings (1988) where overall it
is in the 'schizoid' stage as explained above.
8.4.4 Overall analysis of movement of
organisational tracks using both Laughlin Model
(1991) and Greenwood & Hinnings (1988)
The overall pattern of influence of the accounting
and engineering systems through the three phases of
disturbance and into the post-privatisation era is shown
graphically in Figure 8.2. From this it can be seen that,
while accounting influence has increased noticeably since
privatisation, engineering influence has remained
relatively steady throughout; although there was a slight
decline in the corporatisation era, in recent years there
has been some sign of a re-emergence of engineering
influence.
One of the reasons for engineers' rebuttal resulting
in a 'schizoid' position, referring to the Laughlin model
(1991) and Greenwood & Hinnings (1988), is inheritance
capability.
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This inheritance capability is due to the service
objective and structure of the organisation under JTN.
The role of the project engineer during JTN days was
basically to write up the specification, which depended
on demand. The demand forecast was given by the Traffic
personnel, based on a top-down approach. This was the
only role played by the engineers with respect to the
commercial aspect of the projects. They concentrated on
the design specification, open tender and evaluation of
the tender from the technical point of view. The
commercial aspect was only minimally attended by the
accountant. Because of the absence of commercial
guidelines and the dominance of the engineering system as
a whole in the organisation, the engineers would get what
they wanted. Even though the criterion 'buy the cheapest'
was the guideline used by the treasury, because there
were only two foreign suppliers for certain
telecommunication equipment available at that time, still
the engineers were able to get what they wanted which was
what was the best technically.
Even in terms of implementation and payment of the
materials purchased, proper monitoring and reporting
system was absent, as explained earlier in section
7.3.3.. This was so because the organisation was very
much driven by engineering values; most of the top
management were engineers, the funds were controlled by
engineers and marketing just provided the forecast
inputs.
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Thus, because the structure, procedures and system
are still based on the JTM framework and also because of
the former senior engineers of JTM who now hold senior
positions, especially in the specialist group at the HQ
level, inherited values prevail to a large extent, even
after the listing of the company i.e. as from 1991.
But there was a change as from the privatisation era
i.e. the period of 1987-1990, when the key objective of
the government was to get the company floated. So this
was a period of cost cutting, showing a good profit and a
good track record in preparation for the listing of the
company. As shown above, the accounting system increased
in strength and the design archetype move from 'embryonic
design archetype 1B' to 'design archetype 2' position as
shown in Figure 8.1(a). There was strict centralised
control by the management, which was a hindrance to the
engineers.
One senior engineer, with respect to the period of
1987-1990, commented:
"The flotation objectives were very good
objectives, very clear, straight forward
objectives and the moment we were privatised,
the environment changed from the government
culture to the business culture. Nobody knew
what culture was. What was corporate culture in
terms of values, beliefs, opinion, attitude,
practices and so on, nobody knew. So, if people
didn't know, they were just followers, so that
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is one aspect of the impact of commercial
values. The power of engineers was not seen at
that time; when the commercial people came in,
the engineers got a shock, when all these
profits or track records must be achieved to
impress the company or the government etc.
Their freedom was curtailed, controlled and it
worked. It shows a very good progress".
But even after the listing, the accounting and
finance group expanded further as mentioned in Sections
5.5.2 and 8.4.3.2.1 where the corporate finance expanded
by the creation of the Costing Unit, to probe into
detailed costing, which would directly affect the project
engineers. Further to that was the expansion of the
accounting group at the area level, as described in
Section 5.5.2. These expansions, the appointment of
project accountants and the PROMPT system, will lead to a
proper costing and transfer pricing system. These
developments imply that the top management is very
serious about improving the project management and
monitoring system. Relating to the movement of tracks, as
shown in Figure 8.1(a), it can be said that the position
of the track moved further from 'design archetype 2' to
'embryonic interpretative scheme 2' position. But
referring to the LND in Central Region, there is a
tension taking place where the engineers are rebutting as
will be discussed later in this section. This is a stage
where the position moved again from 'embryonic
interpretative scheme 2' to 'schizoid' position.
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But after the listing, with advancements in
telecommunication technology, the engineers are becoming
more and more confident, because technology is an
important factor for the telecommunication industry, and
the people who have this knowledge can control the
organisation to a certain extent. Thus, even though the
corporate planning and corporate finance check the
projects, they are hesistant to restrict projects unduly,
as they fear that failure to clear waiters and implement
technological advance will adverse affect the business
operation.
According to one senior engineer,
"During the coming era, i.e. as from 1991,
there is much talk about the telecommunication
technology and how it is affecting other
markets overseas, how people are changing to
digital numbers. This has resulted in the
engineers realising that they are the true
workers of the company. They put up things like
infrastructure, they operate infrastructure,
they run the infrastructure, wheras others are
just minding the business. And with the
increase in customer demand, especially
business customers, for different kinds of
telecommunication equipment, there is an
increase in the dependence on the engineers,
especially now with the waiting list. More
traffic resulted in a lot of congestion, faulty
installations, billing is not well done in the
sense that technology recording the calls bills
is operated by the engineers. These are
important features now because the expectations
of public are high. This is a very sensitive
area, especially now the telecommunication
system has become a necessity and part and
parcel of the business and residential
community".
459
Thus, overall, out of the inheritance capability,
the JTM engineers become the technocrats who are the
engineering lords now. With regards to planning, the
engineers are coinmercialily oriented as a result of the
constraints imposed on them and the introduction of
fundamental planning, as evidence has shown. But as
engineers, they would still want to plan their projects
because projects are good for them. So, with respect to
financial aspects of decision-making based on projects,
there are no strict guidelines. The engineers always
start with the engineering sites and then the personnel
from the corporate finance and corporate planning review
the plan made by the engineers, or plans may be based on
preapproved contracts. Thus, no real investment appraisal
is required. Even though there is a financial committee
in the case of big projects, but for some projects,
because of their technological advance, the accountants
are out of their depth and have little to say; sometimes
accountants may be scarced of being blamed as stumbling-
blocks to technological advance. So with respect to
whether the engineers have changed from a financial point
of view, the change is only gradual. Nevertheless, there
has certainly been a change in management because the
expectations of the shareholders and government with
regard to performance, have led to the company's terms of
reference being translated into financial terms.
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But the problem is that total investment, earnings
per share, and profit after tax are not easy to translate
into engineering terms. Even though there is a change in
that the engineers are aware that they are working in a
commercial environment, there is no real consciousness
that whatever the engineers do can directly relate to
some returns or must have some commercial value. The
impact of commercial values is only felt 'before', in the
sense that guidelines are set and 'after', in the sense
that top management or corporate planning / corporate
finance are not happy with the market forecast. The lack
of impact on engineering operations themselves is due to
inherited values.
On a macro basis, i.e. on a corporate basis, the
commercial progress and achievements have been tremendous
before and after floatation as shown from sections 8.2.2
and 8.2.3. The company is commercially run, projects are
well placed, investment is well directed, and the system
is placed where the customers are. But on the micro
basis, there are still some projects which do not reflect
the commercial aspiration, either due to technological
advancement, or because of waiters or competitors, or due
to inherited values and the engineers' love of projects,
as in the case of normal projects in the LND, Central
region, where low utilisation rates have resulted in
almost all the exchanges in the four areas.
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Thus even though the values that the engineers need
to have, have been made clear by the top management,
there has still to be a continous effort by the
management to instill these commercial values. In the
case of LND of Central Region, we can see that commercial
values have been improved with respect to the fundamental
planning, which has made the engineers good forecasters
as far as customer demand and ECP forecasts are
concerned, but not with respect to the utilisation rate
as shown in the four areas in the LND of the Central
Region where it was between 42%-56% from 1987-1992.
The reasons as to why this was taking place from
1987-1992 was due to several factors. The first relates
to the engineers' understanding of commercial values.
Engineers are still engineers. They may know the language
terms of financial requirement. But if they are not using
it everday, they will not understand it. They don't see
it as their first priority. Their first priority is with
respect to writing technical specifications and
implementing projects. Thus with respect to whether the
engineers have changed along financial lines, the answer
is not to the full extent of values and beliefs of the
interpretative scheme of Laughlin model, because of the
nature of their work, which is still based on specialist
functions.
The second question is whether the engineers are
motivated to change, to make financial values their own.
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The reward system is not based on the revenues from
projects, but rather on the completion of the projects
and on physical output i.e. ECP output in the case of LND
and also to a certain extent, of the company overall.
From the above we could see there are not much tangible
evidence on the part of the engineers of a change to
financial values.
The third factor relates to whether the company has
a system which will actually facilitate the engineers'
use of these financial values in their daily work. At
present, the company does not have such a system, because
every division has different target to meet and
accountability. Thus the current system does not actually
permit this.
Even though, there are many accountants within
corporate accounts and corporate finance, they are not
the 'captain of the ship', because it is a technical
company. Corporate accounts and corporate finance and
corporate planning can set a target of conunercial values,
but up to now it has never been fully accepted by the
engineers. They need to be supported or the inputs must
come from the accountants. In this respect, the
appointment of the project accountant by the end of the
year may make a difference.
The controls on the financial and accounting side
installed by the company since privatisation have
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resulted in good overall performance, but if the company
had introduced such measures much earlier and stressed
financial consideration more deeply, the profit the
company is making would have been much more. But it will
change when the new layers of managers come in, as the
new system is implanted and with the introduction of the
concept of transfer pricing which, it is hoped, will
increase the assimilation of commercial values and
beliefs among the engineers.
8.5 Summary
In this chapter, an analysis has been presented of
the three elements, i.e. forecast demand, forecast ECP
and utilisation rate, which affect directly the engineers
of LND of the Central Region. The analysis covered the
period from 1988-1992 for forecast demand and forecast
ECP and from 1987-1992 for the utilisation rate. From
these analyses, it was found that colonisation change did
not take place in accordance with Laughlin's model. The
assimilation of commercial values only took place with
respect to fundamental planning, and was not enough to
permeate the aspects of the engineers' work. There is
strong evidence that inheritance values remain among the
engineers at LND in Central Region.
However, the accounting and finance group emerged
visible throughout the organisation both vertically and
horizontally, with elements of the accounting system
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increasingly prevailing in the design archetype. As a
result, the company is in a 'schizoid' position, where
there is a tension between the engineering and accounting
systems, especially since engineering values are making a
comeback as a result of technological advancement, the
importance of clearing waiters, and competitors entering
the telecommunication industry.
The next chapter will summarise the outcome of this
study and consider whether in future the company may come
out of this 'schizoid' position and successfully move to
a new interpretative scheme, in which total colonisation
will have taken place.
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CHAPTER NINE
Conclusion
9.1 Introduction
This chapter begins by summarizing and highlighting
what has been found in this study about the outcome of
the third phase of disturbance (of the three discussed in
detail in Chapter Eight) in the organisation under study.
We then discuss the analytical framework used and its
relation to the model. The findings of the study are
viewed in relation to previous research in this field,
and similarities and differences highlighted. The chapter
ends by considering the future outlook for the company
and making recommendations for future research.
9.2 The Outcome of Third Phase Disturbance
Evidence was presented in the preceding chapters of
several important issues arising from change in JTM/STM.
The first is the emergence of the finance and
accounting group as visible in the organisation, and its
extended role in implementing new planning and budgeting
procedures, accountability and performance appraisal, in
line with the move to a more commercially-oriented
organisational mission. In this sense, accounting seems
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to have become part of the design archetype, and the
increased emphasis on prudent financial management
appears to have been a contributory factor in the
company's success since privatisation.
Focusing on the capital investment process in LND at
Central Region, however, it was found that the new
procedures have, as yet, not been sufficient to instill
commercial values in the individual engineers. We saw in
the previous chapter that during the earlier phases of
disturbance, accounting and engineering influences
appeared to be moving in different directions, with the
former increasing as the latter declined. Post-
privatisation, however, both internal parties (engineers
and accountants) have increased in influence. While the
accounting role continues to expand, particularly in view
of the changes (PROMPT, CIS) scheduled by the end of
1993, at the same time, the physical base of performance
appraisal, weaknesses in project monitoring at micro-
level, inherited values and the sensitive issues of
waiters and competitors, have enabled a resurgence of
engineering influence. This tension between accounting
and engineering has left the company in a 'schizoid'
position.
In this situation, external parties (investors,
creditors and customers) lose. Although the company
performance has improved, it has not yet been optiiuised
in the sense that there is still considerable
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underutilisation of ECPs; if the company's performance
was more efficient from that point of view, investors
would obtain a higher return, while customers could reap
the benefit of improved performance in lower basic
charges.
Thus, it appears that increased influence of both
accounting and engineering groups has been achieved by
the placing of a 'barrier' against external pressures.
9.3 Discussion on the findings of the study in relation
to the analytical framework used by the researcher,
i.e. Laughlin's model (1991).
Referring to the analytical framework used in this
study, i.e. Laughlin's Model (1991), at the highest level
of abstraction of the interpretative scheme, which is the
meta rules, there is no change arising from the
transformation of the Department to a public listed
company, since the organisation's aim was, and still is,
to provide telecommunication services to the public at
large in Malaysia. In contrast, at the medium level of
abstraction of the interpretative scheme, which is the
mission and purpose, it could be argued that overall the
mission has changed from service to economic driven
motives. The mission has changed because under JTM, the
mission or objective was to provide telecommunication
services with the aim of clearing the waiting-list; under
that scenario, JTM, as a government Department, was the
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only Department responsible for providing telephone
services to the public at large. However, upon
privatisation of the Department, the newly privatised
company was issued a licence by the Ministry which gave
it the exclusive right to operate the basic
telecommunication network for a period of 20 years. There
was also a clause which stated that the regulator could
change the terms of STM's licence or issue licences to
other companies. This clause had an impact on STM, since
if the company could not provide the standard of service
expected by the regulator, then the exclusive rights
could be withdrawn and other companies could be awarded
licences and compete with STM.
Thus, it could be argued that making a profit for
the newly privatised company is both a constraint and an
objective. It is an objective, in the sense that the
company needs to make a profit so as to satisfy the
shareholders of the company. On the other hand, it is a
constraint, because the company has to perform and
provide at reasonable rates to the public at large. If it
does not, the exclusive right may be taken away.
But referring to Laughlin's model, from the
viewpoint of the engineers at LND, the mission has not
changed, since their beliefs are still engineering-based.
Thus, to a certain extent, the basic principle remains
the same, which is to provide the best telecommunication
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service possible with the resources and manpower
available.
At the lower level of abstraction of the
interpretative scheme, which is values and beliefs, the
company is in an embryonic position, with the accounting
system becoming a stronger element in the design
archetype, as a result of the developments discussed in
sections 5.2.2. and 7.3.
But with the technological advancement and other
factors discussed in section 8.4.4 and shown in Figure
8.2, the influence of the engineering system is
reemerging, resulting in a 'schizoid' position. So, using
Greenwood and Hinings (1988) movement of organisational
tracks, the change in the organisation resulting from the
disturbance has not followed a linear track, but has
moved from one track to another with the change in the
design archetype and interpretative scheme of the
Laughlin model. Thus, overall, even though there were
different phases of disturbance, the study shows that
there has been some degree of 'insulation' from external
pressure, coming in this case, from the people at the LND
area in Central region. This resulted in a delay in
cultural change to the engineers which would affect the
third level of the interpretative scheme, i.e. moving
from 'embryonic interpretative scheme 2' to
'interpretative scheme 2' referring to Figure 8.1(a).
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This would indicate that studies on organisational
change should look more from the process point of view.
There are interconnections or interrelations between the
first, second and third phases (for both periods, i.e.
the privatisation and post-privatisation eras), in that
the outcome of the third phase of disturbance was related
to or influenced by the first and second phases of
disturbance. A good example is with respect to the
fundamental planning, where the project engineers learned
from the consultants hired by the turnkey contractors
during the second phase of disturbance, i.e. the turnkey
era, which resulted in JTM/STM engineers implementing
fundamental planning after the turnkey period was over.
This resulted, as we have seen, in the improvement of the
engineers' forecasting of demand and ECP for the four
areas of the central region.
Referring to Figure 8.1(a), the question arises
whether the company will move from the 'schizoid'
position to a completely new position, i.e.
'interpretative scheme 2' where eventually culture and
mission will change in line with commercial and financial
criteria. This will be a difficult task. But the top
management is making every effort to ensure that it will
finally move out of this 'schizoid' position, by means,
at macro level, of a change in the company mission aiming
specifically at the individual divisions, and the
introduction of the PROMPT system. At the micro level,
the implementation of the CIS including product costing
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and transfer pricing, and the appointment of the project
accountant at regional levels, will help the engineers
with the management of projects according to financial
criteria.
9.4 DisCussion of the findings of the study in relation
to previous research
Overall, the study has concentrated on studying
accounting from the organisational point of view. This
comes in response to a call made by Hopwood (1978), who
pointed out that little has been done to study accounting
in practice, i.e. in the context in which it operates.
This is especially so in a developing country like
Malaysia where, as mentioned in Chapter One, no study of
this nature has previously been done (to the best of the
researcher's knowledge).
With respect to accountability by managers, this
study found that managers in the organisation are more
accountable than before, i.e. during JTM's days. This can
be seen from the broadening range of matters for which
they are accountable, now that the regions have been made
profit centres, rather than cost centres as they were
before. In the course of this change, monthly reporting
has been introduced, whereby the regions/divisions are
responsible and accountable not only in terms of
financial performance, but also with respect to non-
financial	 information	 such as	 customer growth,
472
productivity and quality of service, as shown in Chapter
Five.
This, however, was not possible during JTM days as
the study found that total accountability could not be
practised under a government environment, since minimal
management accounting was being practised. This led to
only partial success with respect to the PPBS practised
by all the government Departments, including JTM, in the
early 1970s. This is consistent with Pendlebury's (1989),
assertion that
"Lack of measurable outputs has also led to the
demise of such suggested public sector
budgeting reforms such as planning, programming
budgeting system (PPBS) and zero-base
budgeting".
As a result, the budgeting system was simply a
matter of applying funds received from the Federal
Treasury, and control of funds was concentrated largely
on spending within the correct expenditure codes,
detailed authorization being required to transfer funds
from one expenditure code to another. There was
comparatively little emphasis on other aspects such as
variance analysis and costing. This is in line with
Pendlebury's (1989) criticism that management accounting
in the public sector is restricted to budget preparation
and budgetary control, where the emphasis is on inputs
only.
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The study analysed the movement of organisational
tracks resulting from the three phases of disturbance
that affected the company. In analysing these movements
and in identifying the changes that took place, Greenwood
and Hinnings (1988) and Laughlin's models (1991) were
used by the researcher to provide the analytical
framework. As can be seen from figure 8.1, the three
phases of disturbance identified in this study indicate
that in practice, organisational change is a dynamic
process, rather than static and input-determined.
The study also found that as a result of this
change, accounting and finance emerged as a visible group
in the organisation and its influence was enhanced. This
finding is consistent with Broadbent's (1992) second
approach of the matrix, i.e. technical contextual
accounting, where accounting became a powerful promoter
of change and attained recognition of its importance in
the organisational context, becoming a strong element in
the design archetype in the organisation. Thus, the
researcher's findings support those of the second
approach of Broadbent (1992), especially with respect to
studies of the public sector in developing countries.
This study provides further evidence to support
Hopwood's assertion (1990) that "used strategically,
accounting can help to make organisations what they were
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not". It was found that accounting played a significant
role in the transformation of a Department to a public
limited company, i.e. it became visible throughout the
organisation. Hopwood (1990) expressed the significance
of accounting visibility as follow:
"enabling such a conceptual visibility to be
created, accounting can play a powerful role in
organisational and social affairs. It can
influence perceptions, change language, and
infuse dialogue, thereby permeating the ways in
which priorities, concerns and worries, and new
possibilities for action are expressed". (pp.
9)
In this study, it was seen that with the emergence
of accounting throughout the organisation, came new
commercial and accounting vocabulary, such as 'viability'
(to a certain extent), 'accruals versus cash basis',
'customers' as opposed to 'subscribers', 'pay-back
period', and 'detailed analysis of projects'. This is
also in line with studies done by Dent (1991) and Ogden
(1991) on two different organisations, which as a result
of external disturbances, moved to commercial criteria in
running the organisation.
As was discussed in Chapter Eight, as a result of
the third phase of disturbance, the business plan, which
was part of the accounting system, emerged as an integral
part of the company's communication system and formed
part of the design archetype. As Laughlin's model shows,
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the design archetype represents an important element in
the model, since it links the other two elements, i.e.
the sub-systems and the interpretative schemes
(Broadbent, 1992). This is so since the accounting system
is part of the design archetype. And as in the case study
done by Dent (1991), it became increasingly significant
element. Laughlin (1991), discussing Dent's (1991) study,
notes that
"accounting as a formal communication and
language system was used to both enable change
and then to take over as the central elements
of the interpretive schemes of the
organisation" (Laughlin 1991 p. 228).
However, the finding of the present study differed
somewhat on this point. Even though the business plan
(which is part of the accounting system) became a more
important element in the design archetype, it did not
change the interpretative scheme. Second order change did
not take place, as the metarule and mission did not
change and although change at the initial stage started
to happen at the cultural (i.e. value and belief) level,
it was rebutted by the engineers, which led to tension
between the engineering system and the accounting system,
creating the 'schizoid' position.
Other researchers have identified similar
situations. For example, in Broadbent's (1992) study,
second order change did not take place, as the metarules
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and mission and beliefs remained the same, but changes
occurred at the cultural level, where fragmentation also
took place.
This study is also in conformity with the view
expressed by Carnall (1990) in his book, "Managing Change
in Organisations", that organisation change occurs in
five stages:- denial (why change 7); defence (stall for a
while); discarding (adjusting to the change); adaptation
(implementation); and internalisation (accepting that the
new way is normal). The discussion presented in Chapters
Five and Seven shows that the changes that took place in
the company moved through the first four stages mentioned
by Carnall, while the fifth stage is still in an
embryonic position.
The findings of this study recall to some extent a
study conducted on Britain's Railways by Lawrenson (1992)
in which, the engineers were found to be very effective
in resisting change but later absorbed the rules of
accounting within their own functions and were, as a
result, able to defend their own values. In this study,
the reseacher found that the engineers were able to
defend their own values (i.e. the engineering system) in
terms of the technological advancement needed in their
work and the inheritance values which form part of their
core function of the business, though at the same time
they have improved some of the commercial elements in
their work, especially the fundamental planning work, in
477
the case of project engineers in the LND of the Central
region.
9.5 Lessons learned in using Laughlin Model as
a analytical framework for study:
(1) The model is a skeletal framework and, as such,
one needs to provide the flesh for the model. In so
doing, the study was able to enrich the basis for future
empirical research. In the case of this study, the
researcher was able to fill out the model by analysing
the dynamics of change taking place with respect to
accounting from an organisational point of in view and in
particular, with respect to the dynamic changes taking
place in the budgeting system (later known as business
plan), among the engineers and accountants at the Local
Network Development of the Central Region.
(2) The researcher also needed to use Greenwood and
Hinings (1988) model in analysing the movement of
organisational tracks of the organisation, since change
needs to be studied from a process point of view, rather
than a static point of view. It was found by analysing
the dynamics of change, that even though the main
disturbance or jolt came from the privatisation of the
organisation, there were other earlier disturbances which
efffected the organisation, which had to be considered
when studying change from the process point of view.
These earlier disturbances affected the movement of the
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organisational tracks leading to the present position,
i.e. the 'schizoid' position. These other disturbances or
jolts can be listed as follows:
(i) Industrialisation policy - the shift in the
government policy from agriculture-based to
industrial-based.
(ii) The New Economic Policy (NEP) - NEP is a
two-pronged strategy comprising the eradication
of poverty, irrespective of ethnology and
restructuring society so that economic
activities are not identified with specific
ethnic groups in the country. This policy, was
seen to affect the organisation through the
government policy on employment, liberalisation
and the introduction of JKH contractors and
turnkey projects.
(iii) External social pressures - Changing
demands and expectations of both residential
and corporate customers, as a result of
economic growth and industrialisation.
(iv) Long-term policy - the government policy
of making the country industrialised by the
year 2020, and making Kuala Lumpur the
financial centre.
(v) The emergence of competitors in the
industry, especially after privatisation as
well as the possibility of the government
issuing a licence to another company, as a
second network for basic services.
The first three factors directly contributed to the
process of change taking place from the early days and
became part of the disturbance or jolt to the
organisation, leading eventually to privatising of the
organisation under study but the fourth and fifth factors
relate to change since privatisation. These disturbances
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have been classified in this study as the first, second
and third phases of disturbance, as a result of which the
movement of organisational tracks is analysed. This
einphasises the importance, when using this model, of
taking a process-determined rather than input-determined
approach.
(3) As a skeletal model, the Laughlin model provides
no clear guidelines or criteria by which to classify
elements as being in the design archetype or otherwise,
or to determine their strength. It is therefore left to
the researcher to set or infer criteria as seems
appropriate in the circumstances. Similarly, while
mapping the movement of organisational tracks, it is
difficult to determine what is or is not significant
change. Moreover, at times, it is difficult to identify
the type of change, while that change is still in
process. Because of this, in this study the types of
change at various phases of disturbance have not been
identified, as the study was concerned primarily with
whether or not second order change (i.e. colonisation
change) has taken place as a result of the third phase of
disturbance, i.e. privatisation of the organisation. With
respect to mapping out the movement of organisational
tracks, definition of the terms used at various
positions, as shown in Figure 8.1(b) have been developed
and clarified by the researcher, to assist clear
understanding and facilitate following the movement of
the organisational tracks.
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(4) The use of Laughlin's model was not without its
difficulties. Since change needed to be examined over a
longer period than was covered by the researcher's
attachment to the organisation, the problem inevitably
arose of how to reconstruct the past. Documentation was
sometimes missing and staff turnover meant that personnel
who recalled the JTM era were not always available. These
difficulties were all the greater because the researcher
was not a member of the organisation's staff in the
position of a participant observer, and because the
telecommunications industry is a politically sensitive
area. As was shown in Chapter One, the researcher was
able to draw on his professional experience and contacts
to overcome these difficulties. However, it is felt that
the problems encountered are likely to be experienced by
other researchers attempting to use the model,
particularly in developing countries where record-keeping
may not be as accurate as in developed countries, or
where political and social circumstances may have
contributed to loss or discontinuity of documented data.
(5) The researcher found during the conduct of the
case study that it is extremely difficult to look at an
organisation as a whole, and particularly to follow the
movement of tracks within the whole organisation. It is
therefore necessary to focus on a clearly delimited area
of activity which can be observed closely over a period
of time. In the present study, this was achieved by
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narrowing the focus to the capital budget processes in
the LND at Central Region. At this level, detailed data
could more easily be collected and the movement of tracks
more clearly identified, than across the whole
organisation.
9.6 Conclusion
From the above study, one could conclude that in the
course of privatisation from a government Department to a
privatised company, using Laughlin's model (1991) as an
analytical framework, 'colonisation change' did not take
place. This is shown in this research by tracing the
movement of organisational tracks from 1972 to date,
concentrating mainly on the third phase of the
disturbances.
With respect to the illustration of the capital
budgeting and project process as a detailed example of
the dynamics of change taking place, it was found that
the influence of the engineering system which
predominated in the organisation from its inception in
1957 to 1986, when decisions were based on that system,
changed gradually in stages arising out of the first,
second and third phases (privatisation era) of the
disturbances, as shown in figure 8.1(a). This led to the
engineering system becoming less influential. In its
place, the accounting system emerged as from the third
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phase, where the design archetype eventually moved to the
'design archetype 2' position. Out of this change, from
the engineering to the accounting system, the accounting
and finance group emerged as visible in the organisation.
During the third phase (post-privatisation era),
accounting further increased its influence and moved from
'design archetype 2' to 'embryonic interpretative scheme
2' position with the approval given to the PROMPT System
and the establishment of the CIS with product costing and
transfer pricing. But, on the other hand, the weaknesses
in the project monitoring system and the method of
performance measurement applied to project managers have
led to the engineers behaving as they did during JTM
days, due to inherited values brought with them from JTM
to STM and also because of the rapid development of
telecommunication technology, which has led to the
influence of engineers reemerging in the organisation.
This has resulted in the movement of tracks from
'embryonic interpretative scheme 2' to the 'schizoid'
position, with tension between the engineering system and
the accounting system.
With both groups increasing their influence, they
have gained at the expense of third parties, the
investors and customers. The first are losing because the
company should be making more money, even though it is
performing well. Thus, the long term investors should be
getting more return than they do at present. As far as
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the customer is concerned, by performing better or by
reducing costs, the company should be able to pass some
of these benefits to customers by reducing the basic
rates that they charge. Thus the increase in the
influence of both groups has been achieved through
successful creation of a 'barrier' around themselves to
protect against external pressures.
But with the technological advancement and other
factors discussed in section 8.4.4 and Figure 8.2, the
influence of engineering is reemerging, resulting in a
'schizoid' position. So, using Greenwood and Hinings
(1988) movement of organisational tracks, the change in
organisation out of the disturbance does not follow a
linear track but moves from one track to another with the
change in the design archetype and interpretative scheme
of the Laughlin model. Thus, overall, even though there
were different phases of disturbance, the study shows
that there has been some degree of 'insulation' from
external pressure, in this case, coming from the people
at the LND area in Central region. This insulation
delayed the cultural change on the engineers, which would
affect the third level of the interpretative scheme, i.e.
movement from 'embryonic interpretative scheme 2' to
'interpretative scheme 2' referring to Figure 8.1(a).
This indicates that studies on organisational change
should look more from the process point of view. There
are interconnections or interrelations between the first,
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second and third phases (for both periods, i.e. the
privatisation and post-privatisation eras); the outcome
of the third phase of disturbance was related to or
influenced by the first and second phases of
disturbances. A good example is with respect to the
fundamental planning, where the project engineers learned
from the consultant hired b the turnkey contractors
during the second phase of disturbance, i.e. the turnkey
era. This resulted in JTM/STM engineers implementing such
planning after the turnkey period was over.
To move out of the 'schizoid' position to a
completely new position, i.e. the 'interpretative scheme
2', where eventually culture and mission will change
according to commercial and financial criteria, will be a
difficult task. But on the other hand, the top management
is trying to ensure that it will finally move out of this
'schizoid' position. At macro level, there will be a
change in the company's mission, specifically aiming at
the individual divisions and the introduction of the
PROMPT system. And at the micro level, the implementation
of the CIS incorporating product costing and transfer
pricing, and the appointment of the project accountants
at regional level, will help the engineers with the
management of projects along financial lines.
Another possibility is that the company could move
out of the 'schizoid' position into second order change
(as defined by Gray et al 1993) with the implementation
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of the PROMPT system, product costing and transfer
pricing. This would mean that the engineers would accept
to a certain extent commercial values, resulting in a
change taking place, but the original position would be
unaltered, i.e. the 'genetic code' would still remain the
same, as Gray et al (1993) suggested in his discussion of
the third order change. Or alternatively, it may lead to
a partial colonisation taking place by the accounting
group and at the same time a partial recolonisation
taking place by the engineers group, particularly with
new groups of engineers periodically coming into the
organisation from outside.
9.7 Recommendations for Further Research
It was found in the study, based on Laughlin's
model, that colonization did not take place out of the
organisational change process but instead the company is
in a 'schizoid' position. The next question therefore
arises, as to whether the company and in particular, the
LND of Central Region will move to a new position, i.e.
the 'interpretative scheme 2', where eventually culture
and mission will change according to commercial and
financial criteria as top management is certainly trying
to ensure this with the implementation of the new
company's mission and tha PROMPT system at the macro
level, and the implementation of CIS incorporating
product costing and transfer pricing and the appointment
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of project accountants at regional level. Alternatively,
will this lead to the fragmentation of the culture
elements of the 'interpretative scheme' which Broadbent
(1992) found in her study, or partial colonisation taking
place in line with commercial values and beliefs, and
partial recolonisation on an engineering basis? This
would be an interesting topic for future research.
Moreover, it is felt that further research is
necessary in order to understand clearly the changes in
the different layers that are taking place in the
elements of the 'interpretative scheme' and the
hierarchical relationship between Inetarules, mission and
beliefs, and cultures which form the interpretative
scheme (Laughlin 1991). In doing so, we can uncover and
examine the layers of these elements within the
interpretative scheme. This is related to Foucoult's
(1972) Archeology of Knowledge which Hopwood (1987) used
to research the Archeology of Accounting System. It is
therefore reconunended that this be the subject of further
research, especially on this organisation itself.
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Appendix 1 : Interview Guidelines - Structured
Questions
Part A - This part of the interview schedule is
aimed at identifying the characteristics of the
respondent.
Question 1
(i) How long have you been involved in the
Capital Works Programme?
(ii)What is the nature of your involvement in
the Capital Works Programme?
(iii)How do you compare the involvement under
the present environment with during JTMs days?
(iv) Isi there much difference between your
involvement before and after, especially from
the financial point of view? Can you provide
hard evidence on this issue?
Question 2
(i) Can you describe your responsibilities in
the preparation and implementation of the
Capital Works Programme under the present
system, as compared to the system during JTMS
days?
(ii) Is there much difference between the two
systems with respect to (i)? Can you provide
hard evidence on this issue?
PART B
This part of the schedule is aimed at analysing
change with respect to the planning stage of
the Capital Budgeting Process.
Question 3
(i) In planning the individual projects in your
area, how are the initial proposals put forward
under the business plan?
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(ii) How about during JTM days? Is there much
difference under the two environments? Can you
provide hard evidence on this?
Question 4
(i) How do you go about gathering data or
information with respect to planning projects
under the present environment?
(ii) How about during J'H4 days? Is there much
difference, and can you provide hard evidence
of this?
Question 5
(1) How do you go about preparing/designing the
projects of the Capital Works Programme?
(ii) How about during J'rM days? Is there much
difference between the two systems and can you
provide evidence of this?
Question 6 - relates to presentation of
proposals to the management
(i) How do you go about presenting the proposed
capital projects to the management under the
present environment?
(ii) How about during JTM days? Is there much
difference between the two systems and can you
provide evidence of this?
(iii)During the capital budget examination, do
you (the engineers) still use "cut-off", the
term that was used during JTM days or
"rationalisation" as is used by the HQ group?
Question 7 - relates to the analysis, choice
and decision on capital projects
(i) What criteria are used by the management in
analysing the capital works programme proposed
by the regions (i.e. the engineers) ? Is it
based on service, technological and financial
or other considerations? Which are the main
criteria used in analysing the projects?
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(ii) How about during JTM days? Is there much
difference between the two systems and can you
provide evidence of this?
(iii) In selecting from among the projects
proposed by the engineers (which I was told
could number more than 1000), what criteria are
used to approve the projects?
(iv)Are the criteria used different from those
used under JTM, and can you provide evidence of
this?
Question 8 - Relates to the material management
related to capital projects
(i) How was the purchasing done under JTM as
compared to now?
(ii) Is there a big difference between the two,
especially with respect to the financial
criteria being used?
(iii)What sort of reports are used in managing
the requisition / procurement of materials for
the company? How does this differ from J'fl4
days? Does the report contain more financial
information than before?
Question 9 - relates to the control and
monitoring of the capital projects
(i) How do you go about controlling /
monitoring your spending so that you will not
go over the capital budget under the present
environment, as compared to the system during
JTNs days?
(ii)Is there much difference between the two
systems with respect to (i)? Can you provide
hard evidence?
Part C - Questions on other aspects of the
engineers' work.
Question 10
It was suggested by the Accountants that the
engineers understanding of the accrual versus
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cash method of accounting was very weak during
JTM days -
(i) How far is this statement true?
(ii)If so, why was this ?
(iii)How about now, under STM environment? Do
you see it as an important thing, especially
under the present environment?
(iv)Do you understand why the adoption of this
concept is important, especially when it comes
to capitalisation of finished projects? Are you
aware that this concept affects the
depreciation and profit figures? Has the
understanding changed now, compared with JTM
days?
Question 11 - Relates to receiving the
(financial) statements/reports
In managing your capital works programme,
(i) How many statements do you receive now, as
compared to during JTM5 days?
(ii) To what extent have financial terms been
adopted where they had not previously been
used?
(iii) Do you receive information which was
previously set out in technical engineering
terms but is now in accounting terms? If so,
can you give examples?
(iv) How often do you receive these various
financial statements, when compared to before?
(v) Who prepares most of the reports now, and
who prepared them under JTh?
Question 12 - Relates to the usage of the
reports/ statement (financial or otherwise) by
the engineers
(i) In preparing your capital budget proposal,
as I notice in the capital budget plan 1990-
1995, you need to fill in various information
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and need to come out with estimated cost. Did
this procedure take place during JTMs days?
(ii) With respect to preparing the proposals
and filling in the various forms, other than
utilising your technical-engineering type of
specification, do you use the previous
financial/management reports received, in
analysing / recommending the capital works
programme? To what extent do you use these
financial/mangement reports now, as compared to
before?.
(iii) Which of the reports you receive now
different, and in what way? Do the reports
contain more financial information than
previously? If so, how much more ?
(iv)How much financial information do you have
to put in your report now ? Does the financial
information that you receive help you in
writing your own reports?
(v) Other than for helping you in your capital
budget proposals, do the financial /inanagement
reports you receive help you in your daily
work?
Question 13 - Relates to Performance Evaluation
Question (i)
What is a budget? Is it different from before?
Does the budget affect you in any way, compared
to before?
Question (ii)
What are the general effects on the individual
engineer of the budgeting system through
performance evaluation plan, i.e. do you think
the budgeting system as a target has any effect
on the project managers in the organisation,
compared to before, under JTM?
Question (iii)
What kind of reports do you get now, for
capital	 budgeting	 system,	 related	 to
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performance evaluation? What kind did you get
previously? What are/were their financial
contents (if any) ?
Question (iv)
Do you make use of the financial report in
evaluating your own subordinates? Do you use
the same method as is imposed on you to
evaluate the performance of the employees you
have control over, or do you evaluate your
staff performance differently from the way the
top management level evaluate you?.
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